Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D. Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India
Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed. Former Principal,A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India
It is inexcusable that who think in the Western frame of thought are totally ignorant of the frame of thought of the East. Year after year we channelize our thinking exclusively in the thought forms of Western culture, in practicing or examining the concepts of psychology. In modern days we can no longer deny that all the mankind lives in One World, naturally such ignorance of eastern mind is as dangerous as it is inexcusable.
It will be quite interesting to analyse the eastern concept about the psychological character of dream-consciousness.
Buddhist Theories of Dreams
Mr. Aung gives us a lucid account of the four Buddhist theories of dreams : ” The first of these is clearly the physiological theory, which recognizes a source of dreams in the pathological conditions of the body. . . .The theory of the induction of dreams by peripheral nerve-stimulation, due either to the action of external objects on sense-organs, or to disturbances in the peripheral regions of the nerves, is but a branch of the physiological theory. The second may be called the psychological theory. It recognizes the induction of dreams by central stimulation due to the automatic activities of the mind.” The theory of the induction of dreams by the agency of spirits may be stigmatized in the West as ” the superstitious theory”. ” But as the devas or mythical beings as they would be termed in the West, are, according to Buddhism, but different grades of sentient beings in the thirty-one stages of existence, the theory in question, merely recognizes the suggestive action of mind upon mind, and may therefore be aptly called the telepathic or telepsychic theory “- 1
The theory of the induction of prophetic dreams by the agency of merit and demerit may be called ” the clairvoyant theory “. The theory which explains dreams as the fulfilment of desires may also be called the psychological theory. The different kinds of dreams described by Indian thinkers may be explained by these four theories.
The Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas Theory of Dreams
The the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas generally recognize the perceptual character of dreams. But there are some Nyaya-Vaisesika writers who hold that dreams are representative in character ; they are recollections of past experience due to revival of subconscious impressions. We may designate this doctrine as the representative theory of dreams as contrasted with the presentative theory.
Among the Naiyayikas Bhasarvajna started the view that dream- consciousness is a kind of false recollection (smrti)2 We have already seen that Jayasimhasuri distinguishes between anubhuyamanaropa illusions and smaryamanaropa illusions. The former consist in the false ascription of a percept to another percept. The latter consist in the false ascription of an idea of memory to a percept. Jayasimhasuri includes dreams in the latter. So he regards them as representative in character. 3 Jayanta Bhatta seems to regard dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience. 4 Kesavarnisra regards all dream- cognitions as false recollections. 5 Jagadlsa holds that dream-cognitions are produced by recollections of objects perceived in the past, adrsta or merit and demerit, and intra-organic disorders. 6 Thus the ancient Naiyayikas regard dreams as presentative in character, while the majority of medieval and modern Naiyayikas, regard them as representative in character. 7
The Mimamsakas Theory of Dreams
The Mlmamsakas also recognize the representative character of dreams. Kurnarila holds that even dreams have an objective basis ; they are produced by external objects which are not present to the sense-organs but were perceived elsewhere in the past and now revived through their subconscious impressions. 8 Parthasarathirnisra says, ” It is definitely known that dream-cognitions are of the nature of recollection.” 9 He holds that external objects perceived in some other time and place are remembered owing to the revival of their impressions through the agency of adrsta (merit or demerit) ; but they appear to consciousness as objects existing here and now owing to the perversion of the mind by sleep. 10 Prabhakara also regards dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience. But he slightly modifies the doctrine of Kumarila. He advances his theory of obscuration of memory (smrtipramosa] to account for the apparently presentative character of dreams. His theory will be considered in the next section.
The Vedantic Theory of Dreams
Samkara also is an advocate of the representative theory of dreams. He says, ” Dream-consciousness is of the nature of recollection (smrtt)” 11 ” Dreams are reproductions of past waking perceptions owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions ; so they have the semblance of waking perceptions.” 12 Though Samkara advocates the representative theory of dreams, his follower, Dharmarajadvarmdra advocates the presentative theory. 13
Prabhakara’s Representative Theory of Dreams
According to Prabhakara, dream-cognitions are really reproductions of past waking experience ; but they appear to consciousness as direct and immediate sense-presentations owing to lapse of memory (smrtipramosa}. In dream-consciousness memory-images of past experience appear to consciousness as percepts. It is due to lapse of memory which makes the distinctive character of the memory- images, viz., their representative character drop out of consciousness ; and thus the memory-images of past experience deprived of their representative character appear to consciousness as percepts in dream. The process may be represented as follows :
Memory-image memory = percept or representation memory = presentation.
Recollection is the apprehension of the previously apprehended (grhitagrahanam smrtih) ; and if the element of ” the apprehended ” sinks below the threshhold of consciousness, then recollection appears as a direct apprehension or perception, the representation appears as a direct and immediate presentation. Thus, according to Prabhakara, dream-cognitions are really representative in character, but they appear to consciousness as direct presentations owing to lapse of memory. Prabhakara explains both the waking illusions and dream- illusions by the same theory of obscuration of memory (smrti- pramosa).
The Nyaya-Vaisesika Criticism of the Prabhakara Theory
Udayana discusses the nature of dream-cognitions in Nyayaku- sumanjali and criticizes the Prabhakara theory of dreams. In the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to function, yet we have direct and immediate presentations of objects not present at that time and place. This dream-consciousness cannot be of the nature of memory, inasmuch as during the state of dream we do not recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience in such a form as ” I remember this ” ; nor, on waking from sleep, do we remember our dream-cognitions in such a form as remembered this “. But, on the contrary, during the state of dream we apprehend our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions, and not as mere echoes of our past experience ; and on waking from sleep we remember our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions in the dream- state. So dream-cognitions are not representative but perceptual in character.
But how can they be perceptual in nature, since the things that are presented to consciousness in dream are not present at that time and place, and the peripheral organs are not quite operative at that time, which are the channels of all perceptions, and the central organ too cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs ? Are dream-cognitions, then, illusions of memory (smrti-viparyasa] ? Do dream-cognitions appear as percepts, though, as a matter of fact, they are nothing but memory-images ? Do memory-images appear to consciousness as percepts in dream- cognitions ? Are dream-cognitions the illusions of memory as Prabhakara holds ? If by illusions of memory he means the illusory cognitions of the objects of memory, Udayana has no objection. But if by these he means the illusory appearance of memory as perception, then it cannot be maintained that dream-cognitions are the illusions of memory. For if dream-cognitions were nothing but illusory appearances of memory-images as percepts, the perceptual character of dream-cognitions would be contradicted at some time or other and recognized as representative. But, in fact, in the dream- state we never recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience. Besides, in the dream-state we have cognitions of many things which have never been perceived before, e.g. the lopping off of our own heads. Moreover, it is not possible for one form of consciousness to appear as another, though an object may appear to consciousness as quite a different thing. If in dream-consciousness memory-images were illusorily cognized as percepts, we would never have a direct presentative consciousness in the form ” I perceive this pot “, but we would have a presentative consciousness in the form ” I perceive that pot ” (i.e. perceived in the past and reproduced in memory). As a matter of fact, in dream-cognitions we have a direct and immediate presentation in the form ” I perceive this pot “. Thickness is the special characteristic of perception alone, while that next of memory. Hence, dream-cognitions must be admitted to be presentative or perceptual in character. 14
The SamkarIte Criticism of the Prabhakara Theory
According to the Samkarite, in an illusory perception of waking life we do not perceive an object as another, as the Nyaya-Vaiesika holds, but we perceive an illusory reality which is produced at that time and place ; this reality is illusory (pratlbhaslka] and undefinable (anlrvacamya) as distinguished from the empirical (vyavaharlka) reality which is the object of right perception. Likewise, according to him, dream-cognitions too are illusory perceptions, during sleep, of illusory realities produced at that time and place, like the illusory perceptions of our waking life.
But Prabhakara contends that dream-cognitions cannot be direct and immediate sense-presentations, because the peripheral organs cease to function during sleep and the central sensory or mind cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs ; and because dream-cognitions are not presentations at all, it is quite useless to assume that they apprehend illusory realities produced at that time and place. In fact, Prabhakara urges that dream- cognitions are nothing but representations of our previous waking perceptions ; and because we cannot discriminate the dream- representations from their originals in waking perceptions we mistake them for actual sense-presentations.
To this the Saniikarite replies that dream-cognitions cannot be representative in character because in dream we are conscious that ” we see a chariot “, and on waking from dream we are consciousthat ” we saw a chariot in dream “. This introspection clearly shows that dreams are perceptual in character and this fact of experience cannot be explained away by a dogmatic assumption. And., moreover, dream-cognitions cannot be mere recollections of our previous waking perceptions, for the objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) were never perceived in our waking life exactly in that place ; hence dream-cognitions must be regarded as immediate presentations or perceptions. 15
The Samkarite Criticism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory
Though the Sarhkarlte agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisesika in regarding dream-cognitions as presentative in character, and in refuting Prabhakara’s doctrine of the representative character of dreams, yet he differs from the latter in the metaphysical implication of dreams. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, in an illusory perception we erroneously ascribe unreal silver to a nacre which is real in the illusory perception of the nacre as silver (suktirajata). But the Samkarite holds that unreal silver (pratibhasika rajata) is produced at that time and place, which is apprehended by the illusory cognition of silver. So, in dream-cognitions, too, according to him, unreal objects such as elephants, chariots, etc., are produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream-cognitions last.
The objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) cannot be erroneously ascribed to any real object (e.g. ground) present to the sense-organs, since the ground is not in contact with the peripheral organs. Nor can they be erroneously ascribed to an object such as ground reproduced in memory, since the ground is not reproduced in memory in dream but is an object of actual perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions cannot be perceived through the peripheral organs, since they do not really exist in that place, and consequently cannot come in contact with the sense-organs. Nor can these objects of dream-cognitions be brought to consciousness in dream through association (jnanalaksana- sanntkarsd) with the ideas of other objects which are not present to the sense-organs at that time. Nor can they be perceived by the mind, since it cannot apprehend external objects which are not in contact with the external organs. Nor can they be cognized byinference, since they are distinctly felt as objects of direct perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions are perceived in the absence of recollection of any mark of inference. According to the Sarhkarite, therefore, the unreal objects of dream-cognitions are produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream- cognitions last. Herein lies the difference between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Samkara-Vadanta in their explanation of dream-cognitions. 16
Dreams Illusions and Indefinite Perceptions Theory
Udayana distinguishes dream-cognitions from illusory perceptions of waking life and doubtful and indefinite perceptions. Though dream-cognitions are illusory perceptions, since they apprehend objects which are not present at that time and place, and as such resemble illusory perceptions of waking life, they differ from the latter in that they are produced when the peripheral organs are not quite operative, while the latter are produced by the peripheral organs. Then, again, dream-cognitions are not to be identified with doubtful and indefinite perceptions. For dream-cognitions are definite and determinate in character, in which the mind does not oscillate between alternate possibilities, while doubtful and indefinite perceptions are uncertain, because in them the mind is not fixed on a definite object but wavers between two objects without any definite decision. 17 Bhatta Vadlndra also describes a dream-cognition as an illusory, definite perception (niyatakotlka) which does not waver between alternate possibilities and which is produced when all the peripheral organs cease to operate. 18
Srldhara also holds that dream-cognitions are definite and determinate perceptions as distinguished from indefinite and indeter- minate perceptions. And also he clearly shows that dream-cognitions,arising either from the intensity of subconscious traces, or from intra-organic disorders, or from unseen agencies, are purely illusory, since they consist in the false imposition of an external form upon something that is wholly internal, and as such are not essentially different from the illusions of our waking life, the only difference lying in the fact that the former are illusory perceptions in the condition of sleep, while the latter are illusory perceptions in the waking condition. 19
Jayasimhasuri also holds that dreams are illusions in the condition of sleep. Dreams are illusions because in them things which were perceived in the past and in some other place are perceived here and now. 20 Thus, in the language of James Sully, ” Dreams are clearly illusory, and, unlike the illusions of waking life, are complete and persistent.” 21
References
1 Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 48-9.
2 princess of Wales Sarswatibhavan Studies, Benares, vol. iii, p.82n,
3 Nyayatltparyadipika of Jayasimhasuri (B.I., 1910). p. 67.
4 Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti (Benares, 1924, pp. 182-3, 545-
5 Tarkabnisa of Kesava Misra. (Rulkni’s-, edition, Poona p. 30.
6 Tarkamrta of Jagadisa (Jivananda’s edition, Calcutta,. 1921)., p.ii,
7 Allahabad University Studies, vol. v, p. 278.
8 , Nyayavartika of Udyotkara (B.L, 1887-1904). p, 242.
9 Nyayaratnakara on V., p. 243.
10 Ssstradipika of Parthasarathi Misra (Benares, Samvat, 1964). pp. 2ii-i2.
11 Samkara’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra.., ii, 2, 29.
12 Samkara’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra. iii, 2, 6. Cf. Sully : ” Dreams are to a large extent the semblance of external perceptions,” Illusions, pp. 130-1.
13 Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya (V.S.S,, Benares, 1893 pp. 159 ff.
14 Nyayakusumanjali, ch. v, pp. 1467.
15 Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya (V.S.S,, Benares, 1893 and SikhSraani, pp. 159-161.
16 Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya (V.S.S,, Benares, 1893. with fikhSmani and Maniprabha”, p. 162.
17 Kiranavall of Udayana (Benares, 1885 and 1887). p. 271.
18 Rasassra, pp, 101-2.
19 English translation. of Nyayakandali of Srldhara (V.S.S., Benares, 1895). , p. 388.
20 Sully : ” There is sometimes an undertone of critical reflection,which is sufficient to produce a feeling of uncertainty and bewilderment,and in very rare cases to amount to a vague consciousness that the mentalexperience is a dream.” Illusions, p. 137 n.
21 Nyayakandali of Srldhara (V.S.S., Benares, 1895). pp. 185-6 ; Upaskara, ix, 2, 8.