Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.
Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India
Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.
Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India
Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusions. These theories are not only based on the purely psychological analysis of illusions, but also on their epistemological significance and ontological basis, Prabhacandra refers to seven different theories of illusions in Prameyakamalamartanda :
1-Akhyati (non-apprehension),
2-Asatkhyati (apprehension of a non- existent object),
3-Prasiddhlrthakhyati (apprehension of a real object established by knowledge),
4-Atmakhyati (apprehension of a subjective cognition projected into the external world),
5-Anirvacaniyarthakhyati (apprehension of an undefinable object),
6-Anyathakhyati or Viparita- khyati (apprehension of an object as otherwise, i.e.as a different object),
7-Smrtipramosa (obscuration of memory) or Vivekakhyati (non-apprehension of discrimination or non-discrimination).
It is not known who is the advocate of the first doctrine. The second doctrine is held by the Madhyamika. It is not known who is the advocate of the third doctrine. The fourth doctrine is held by the Yogacara ; the fifth, by the Samkara School of Vedantists ; the sixth, by the Patanjala, the Naiyayika, the Vaisesika, the Bhatta Mimamsaka, and the Jaina ; and the seventh, by the Prabhakara Mimamsaka.
In Nyayatatparyadiyika Jayasimhasuri mentions eight different theories of illusions, adding to the above list Alaukikakhyati (apprehension of an extraordinary object, different from the ordinary objectsof experience). The Sarhkhya advocates the doctrine of Sadasatkhyatl Ramanuja advocates the doctrine of Satkhyati (apprehension of a real object)..
THE DOCTRINE OF AKHYATI
The doctrine of Akhyati is given by Prabhacandra, a Jaina philosopher, in Prameyakamala-Martanda). According to this doctrine, an illusion has no objective substratum ; it is objectless (niralambanct) ; it does not apprehend any object at all ; it is a pure hallucination. Let us consider the illusion of a mirage, or the illusory perception of water in the rays of the sun. What is the object of this illusion ? Is it water, absence of water, or the rays of the sun, or something else ? Water cannot be the object of the illusory cognition, for, in that case, the cognition would be valid and not illusory. The absence of water cannot be the object of the illusion, because it is the cognition of water that induces the person under illusion to exert himself to get water. The rays of the sun, too, cannot be the object of the illusion, for, in that case, the cognition would not be illusory but valid, representing the real nature of the external stimulus. It cannot be argued that the rays of the sun are perceived as water, inasmuch as one thing cannot be perceived as something different. Hencean illusion is objectless or without any objective substratum (niralam banam wparyayajnanam.
Evaluation of Akhyati
Prabhacandra evaluates the doctrine of Akhyati . According to him, if illusions have no objective substrates (alambana) if they are not excited by external stimuli, by what peculiar mark are we to distinguish one illusion from another ? For instance, how can we distinguish the illusory cognition of water (in the rays of the sun) from the illusory cognition of silver (in a nacre) ? If, again, illusions are not produced by external objects, what is the difference between an illusion and a state of dreamless sleep ? It may be urged that there is no difference between the two, except that in an illusion there is consciousness, while in dreamless sleep there is no consciousness at all ; they agree in having no external stimulus. But Prabhacandra contends that at least the object that appears in consciousness in an illusion must be regarded as the object of that illusion. Thus an illusion can never be held to be a non- apprehension of an object.
THE DOCTRINE OF ASATKHYATI
The Madhyamika holds that in the illusory cognition of silver, there is a cognition of silver as real, though really there is no silver at all. Hence he concludes that in an illusion something non- existent is cognized as existent.
Evaluation of Asatkhyati
Jayanta Bhatta evaluates the doctrine of Asatkhyatt . He argues,what is the meaning of Asatkhyati, or apprehension of a non- existent object ? What is the object of an illusion according to this doctrine ? Is it an absolutely non-existent object like a sky-flower ? Or is it an object existing in some other time and place ? If the latter, then Asatkhyati is nothing but Vipantakhyati, according to which, silver existing in some other time and place appears in the illusory cognition of silver, but not existing in that time and place. If the former, then there would be a cognition of a sky-flower also ; but because such an absolutely non-existent object never appears in consciousness, it cannot be the object of an illusion.
It may be argued that non-existent things appear in consciousness through the intensity of residua or subconscious impressions (vdsanalhyasa). But a residuum (vasana] is not possible without a real object ; it is nothing but a vestige left by the previous perception of an object ; why should such a residuum be the cause of the cognition of an absolutely non-existent object ? If we admit that some other kind of residuum (vasana] produces the cognition of a non-existent object, why should such a residuum produce the cognition of silver and not that of a sky- flower ? What regulates the operation of such a residuum ? An absolutely non-existent object can never appear in consciousness, nor can it induce a person to exert himself to get hold of it. 1 Thus the doctrine of Asatkhyati is untenable.
THE DOCTRINE OF ATMAKHYATI
Vidyaranya Muni, a Samkarite, gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Atmakhyati :According to the Buddhists, mind (citta) and mental states (caltta) are produced by four different causes :
(i) co-operating cause (sahakari-pratyaya}
(2) dominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya)^
(3) immediate cause (samanantara-pratyaya} and
(4) objective datum or external cause (alambana-pratyaya).
Now, in the first place, the illusion of silver cannot be produced by the co-operating cause (sahakari-pratyaya) which, in the present case, is light ; for light is the cause of the distinctness of the perception.
In the second place, it cannot be produced by the dominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya) which, in the present case, is the visual organ, for the visual organ is the cause only of the visual character of the perception , it cannot account for the particular nature of the visual perception, viz. that of silver.
In the third place, it cannot be produced by the immediate cause [samanantara-pratyaya] which is the immediately preceding cognition for the illusory cognition of silver may arise immediately after a cognition of an entirely different kind.
In the fourth place, it cannot be produced by an external cause (Slambana-pratyayd)) for, according to the Buddhist idealist (Yogacara), there is no external reality at all. How, then, can the Buddhist idealist account for the illusory cognition of silver ? The Yogacara holds that it is produced by a vasana or residuum of silver which, at some time or other, arose in the beginningless series of nescience (avidya)) which, again, had been produced by a yet earlier idea of silver, and so on. Thus the idea of silver is the result of a beginningless series of residua ; and owing to error this subjective idea appears to consciousness as something external. An illusion, therefore, is not produced by an external object in contact with a sense-organ ; but it is simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the external world ; it is a purely subjective hallucination.
Evaluation of Atmakhyati
Jayanta Bhatta offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Atmakhyati :
According to this doctrine, a mere idea appears as the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition ; there is neither a subject apart from ideas, nor an object apart from ideas 5 there is simply a series of ideas or cognitions. Thus, if in an illusion a mere idea is manifested in consciousness, and not an external object, then we would have such a cognition as u I am silver “, and not as ” this is silver “. Moreover, this doctrine implies Viparitakhyati, inasmuch as, according to this view, an internal or subjective idea is cognized as something different, viz. an external or objective reality. And this doctrine implies Asatkhyati too, since the cognition of externality has no real objective basis, there being no extra-mental reality.
Prabhacandra also criticisze the doctrine of Atniakhyati . According to him, if all cognitions apprehend only their own forms, and not those of external objects, as the Yogacara holds, there would be no distinction between an illusory cognition and a valid cognition, and con- sequently, there would be neither any sublating cognition nor any sublated cognition. If, again, the forms of illusory cognitions such as silver and the like are not those of external objects, but mere forms of consciousness, then they would be apprehended as such, like the forms of pleasure and pain, and not as something external. And also a person under illusion would exert himself to get the object of illusion, as if it were a subjective momentary cognition, and not an extra-mental reality. If it is urged that an internal momentary cognition is mistaken for an external permanent object owing to the potency of nescience (avidya) then the doctrine of Atmakhyati leads to Viparltakhyati, since the internal form of a momentary cognition appears as an external permanent object. Thus the doctrine of Atmakhyati is untenable.
The arhkara-Vedantist (Vidyaranya) offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Atmakhyati. In the illusion of silver, is the illusory silver devoid of origination, on account of its extra- ordinary nature ? Or does it originate like an ordinary silver ? On the first alternative, it would not be of the nature of an emergent cognition as it really is ; it comes into being, and so it cannot be without an origin. On the second alternative, it must be produced either by a cognition or by an object. It cannot be produced by an object. If it is produced by a cognition, is it produced by a pure cognition or a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause ? It cannot be produced by a pure (visuddha) cognition, as pure cognition constitutes liberation. If it is produced by a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause, is it the same originating cognition which apprehends the silver ? Or is it some other cognition ? The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both being momentary, and hence occupying different points of time, there would be no presentation of silver at all. The second alternative also is impossible. If it is another cognition that apprehends the silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by a non-vitiated cause, as in that case there would be no reason why such a cognition should specially apprehend silver. If, on the other hand, the cognition apprehending the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or it is not silver. It cannot be silver, for, in that case, silver would have causal efficiency and consequently it would have a real existence, which is not admitted by the Yogacara. If silver is not the cause, then it cannot be mani- fested in the illusory cognition. Thus on the doctrine of Atmakhyati the illusory cognition of silver would never come into being.
THE DOCTRINE OF ALAUKIKAKHYATI
Jayanta Bhatta gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyati in Nyayamanjari and says that it is held by a certain Mimamsaka. According to this doctrine, in the illusory cognition of silver it is not a nacre that is the object of the illusory cognition, but it is silver ; but this silver is different from ordinary or laukika silver it is alaukika or extraordinary silver. Just as the valid cognition of silver has for its object ordinary or laukika silver, so the illusory cognition of silver has for its object extraordinary or alaukika silver. What is the difference between laukika silver and alaukika silver ? Whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be regarded as silver ; but some silver known as an object of consciousness serves our practical purposes (vyavahara-pravartaka) while some other silver does not ; the former is called ordinary or laukika silver, while the latter is called extraordinary or alaukika silver. In the illusory cognition of silver it is an extraordinary or alaukika silver that is the object of the illusion ; it is silver because there is a cognition of silver ; and it is alaukika or extraordinary silver because it does not serve any practical purpose.
Evaluation of Alaukikakhyati
Jayanta Bhatta criticiszes the doctrine of Alaukikakhyati . He asks, how do you know that there is extraordinary or alaukika silver corresponding to the illusory cognition of silver ? It is an absolutely new and unperceived object. The contradicting perception u this is not silver ” clearly establishes thealaukikatva or extraordinariness of the silver which existed at the time of the illusory cognition.
Hence there is neither silver corresponding to the illusion of silver, nor is it alaukika or extraordinary. So it is not right to hold that whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be silver ; silver is manifested to consciousness in the illusory cognition of silver, though really there is no silver at all at that time and place. Real silver can be known only through the cognition of silver which is not contradicted by any other cognition ?
Moreover, what differentiates an ordinary or laukika object from an extraordinary or alaukika object ? On what does the distinction depend ? Does it depend upon the distinction of our cognitions (pratibhasa-nibandhana] ? Or does it depend upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of our practical purposes (vyavahara- sadasadbhava-nibandhana) ? The first alternative is not tenable ;forsometimes we are conscious of the existence of silver, and some- times of the non-existence of silver ; but we are never conscious of the laukikatva (ordinariness) and alaukikatva (extraordinariness) of silver. The second alternative also cannot be maintained, for what is the meaning of practical use (vyavahara) ? Does it mean the capacity of being an object of thought and speech (jnanabhidhana- svabhava) ? Or does it mean the capacity of producing an effect or action (arthakriya-nirvartana) ? The first view is untenable, because there is no consciousness of laukikatva (ordinariness) or alaukikatva (extraordinariness) of an object. The second view also is not tenable, for, in that case, the woman embraced in a dream would be laukika^ and a jar which is destroyed as soon as it is produced, and as such cannot serve any practical purpose, would be alaukika. Further, he who does not make an effort to pick up silver at the sight of a nacre does so, not because he recognizes the alaukikatva (extra- ordinariness) of the existing silver, but because he understands that there is no silver in reality. If there is alaukika silver as the object of the illusion of silver, why should a person under illusion make an effort to pick it up ? If it is urged that he perceived the alaukika silver as laukika^ then at last the advocate of the doctrine of Alaukika- khyati comes to adopt the view of Anyathakhyati, according to which, one object appears as a different one in an illusion. 1
THE DOCTRINE OF ANIRVACANIYAKHYATI
The Saihncara-Vedantist holds that the object of an illusion is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable (anirvacantya). This is called the doctrine of Anirvacanlyakhyati. According to this doctrine, whatever is manifested in a cognition is the object of that cognition. In the illusory perception of silver, it is silver that appears in consciousness ; so silver must be the object of this illusion. If something else is regarded as the object of this illusion, as the doctrine of Anyathakhyati holds, why should we call this illusion an illusion of silver and not of something else ? So it is silver that is the object of the illusion of silver. But this silver is neither real (sat)) nor unreal (asat) nor both real and unreal (sadasat)) but it is undefmable (anirvacantya). It cannot be real, for, in that case, the cognition of silver would be valid, and not illusory, and as such would not be contradicted by any sublating cognition. Nor can it be unreal, for, in that case, it would not produce the cognition of silver, and, consequently, it would not lead the person under illusion to exert himself to get hold of silver. Nor can it be both real and unreal, as this supposition would involve both the above difficulties, and further, two contradictory qualities like reality and unreality cannot inhere in one and the same object. Hence the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver must be regarded as undefinable (anirvacamya}}-
The Sarhkarite, therefore, holds that undefinable silver is produced at that time and place and continues as long as the illusion of silver persists. This kind of existence is called by him pratibhasika-satta or apparent existence, which is different from ‘uyavahartka-satta or empirical existence. But what is the use of admitting an undefinable reality to account for an illusion ? An illusory cognition may very well be explained by the doctrine of Anyathakhyati, according to which, an illusion is the misapprehension of one thing as a different thing for example, the illusion of silver is the misapprehension of a nacre as silver which exists in some other time and place. The Sarhkarite urges that silver existing in some other time and place cannot be an object of perception, since it is not present to the sense-organ and there can be no presentation without a present object. The Neo-Naiyayika argues that the silver existing in some other time and place is brought to conscious- ness by association, and produces the perception of silver by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jnanalaksana-sannikarsa). The Sarhkarite urges that in that case, in the inference of fire from smoke, fire which is not present to the sense-organ might be brought to consciousness by association, and produce the perception of fire by means of an extraordinary inter-course whose character is knowledge (jnana-laksana-sannikarsa] and thus there would be no inference at all.
Besides, what is the meaning of Anyathakhyati ? If it means a cognition of one thing as otherwise, to what does the otherwiseness actually belong ? Does it belong to the cognitive activity (the act of cognizing), or to the result of cognitive activity, i.e. the resulting cognition, or to the object of cognition ? The first alternative is impossible. If the act of cognizing the shell is in the form of silver, then the shell cannot be called the objective substrate of the illusory cognition of silver ; because an object can impart its own form to that cognition by which it is apprehended, and hence the shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition which apprehends silver. The second alternative also is not tenable. The otherwiseness (anyathatva) cannot belong to the result of cognitive activity or the cognition itself, for the cognition does not essentially differ, whether it is true or illusory j the cognition does not appear as something different or otherwise. Nor can the third alternative be maintained. In what sense, can the otherwiseness belong to the object, viz. the shell ? Does it mean that the shell identifies itself with silver ? Or does it mean that the shell transforms itself into the form of silver ? In the first alternative, is the shell absolutely different from silver ? Or are they different and non-different at the same time ? The first view is untenable, since things absolutely different from each other can never identify themselves with each other. The second view also is untenable, for, in that case, such judgments as ” the cow is short-horned ” would be illusory. In the second alternative, if the shell actually transforms itself into the form of silver, then the cognition of silver cannot be sublated as it is the cognition of a real change. If it is urged that the shell actually transforms itself into silver for the time being, i.e. so long as the illusion lasts, then silver would be perceived in the shell also by those who do not suffer from any defect of the sense-organs and the like. Thus the doctrine of Anyathakhyati cannot be stated in an intelligible form. It does not offer a better explanation of an illusion than the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati, according to which an undefinable object is produced at the time of an illusory cognition.
But it may be urged that the object of the illusory cognition of silver cannot be illusory or undefinable silver, inasmuch as the cause of silver (e.g. its different parts) is absent at the time. The Samkarite urges that it is produced by amdya in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver perceived in the past, and revived by the perception of its similarity with a nacre which is in contact with the visual organ impaired by a certain derangement. Hence it cannot be said that illusory silver (pratibhasika rajata) cannot be produced at the time, which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver.
Thus the samkarite argues that an illusion is a presentative cognition, and as such it must be produced by a present object ; and the object of a cognition must be that which appears in consciousness ; it cannot be some other object which does not appear in consciousness. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is the object of the cognition as it appears in consciousness ; and that silver must be present at that time and place, when and where the illusion is produced ; otherwise the illusion would not be a presentative cognition. Thus the illusion of silver has silver for its object which is produced then and there and continues as long as the illusion lasts. But this silver cannot be real, as in that case the cognition of silver would not be illusory. It cannot be unreal, as in that case there would be no cognition of silver and consequently no activity for the appropriation of silver. Nor can it be real and unreal both, as it involves self- contradiction. Hence it must be undependable.
Evaluation of Dnirvacamyakhyati
Ramariuja contends that even the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati cannot avoid Anyathakhyati, which it seeks to refute. The very assumption of an undefinable existence to account for an illusion implies that one thing appears as another, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. If an undefinable object were apprehended as undefinable at the time of the illusory cognition, then the cognition would not be illusory, and hence It would not be contradicted by a subsequent cognition. If it is urged that the undefinable object of an illusion does not appear as undefinable so long as the illusion lasts, but subsequently It Is known to be undefinable by rational reflection, then also the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati leads to Anyathakhyati, as an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. Moreover, the doctrine of Anyathakhyati can adequately explain all the facts connected with an illusion, viz. illusory cognition, activity consequent upon an illusion, and the subsequent sublating cognition. What, then, is the use of supposing an undefinable object which is absolutely unperceived and groundless ? Even if we admit that an undefinable object is produced at the time of the corresponding illusion, what is its cause ? In the illusory cognition of silver what is the cause of the undefinable silver which is the object of the illusion ? The cognition of silver cannot originate the undefinable silver, for there cannot be the cognition of silver before origination of the silver. It is absurd to argue that at first a cognition arises without any object, and then this objectless cognition produces the undefinable silver and makes it an object of apprehension. Nor can it be argued that a certain defect in the sense-organs is the cause of the illusory silver ; for a defect abiding in the knowing person cannot produce an effect in an outward object. Nor can the sense-organs, apart from defects, give rise to the illusory silver, for the sense-organs are the causes of cognitions only, and not of the objects of cognitions. Nor can the sense-organs deranged by a certain defect originate the illusory silver ; for they also can produce peculiar modifications only in the cognitions produced by them, but not in the objects of those cognitions. Nor can a beginningless nescience (avidya] be the cause of the illusory silver, for the doctrine of nescience does not stand to reason. Ramanuja has brought seven charges against the Sanhkarite doctrine of nescience (avidya).”
THE DOCTRINE OF SATKHYATI
The Ramanujist holds that an illusory perception has a real object (sat) for its objective substrate. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre the silver that is manifested to consciousness is a real object, for an unreal object can never be apprehended. Otherwise, why is it that only silver is apprehended in a nacre, and not a jar, or a cloth, or some other thing ? It cannot be argued that silver is apprehended owing to its similarity with the nacre, inasmuch as the similarity of the nacre with silver would revive the subconscious impression of silver, and thus produce the recollection of silver, but would never produce the perception of silver. It is real silver that is the object of the illusory perception of silver. But how is it real ? All objects of the world are produced by triplication or quintuplication (pancikarana) of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, so that everything exists everywhere in the form of its elements. Hence silver in which the element of fire predominates exists in part in the nacre in which the element of earth predominates.
Moreover there is a law that an object is similar to that object which contains the parts of the latter. According to this law, a nacre which is similar to silver must contain the parts of silver. Thus in the illusory” perception of silver in a nacre., silver must exist in part in the nacre. But, then, why is the perception of silver in a nacre called illusory ? It is called illusory, not because silver does not exist even in part in the nacre, but because in the nacre the parts of silver are much less than those of the nacre, and they do not serve our practical purposes. Thus every illusory perception has a real object for its objective substrate. This is the doctrine of Satkhyati.
Evaluation of Satkhyati
According to the Ramanujist, all cognitions are real ; even an illusory cognition has a real object for its objective substrate. Thus the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. The samkarite also holds that the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. But, according to the Samkarite, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver has only apparent or illusory existence (pratibhasika-satta)^ while according to the Ramanujist, it has real or ontological existence (paramarthika- satta). But if the object of an illusion has real existence, how can we perceive water in a desert ? It is true that a part of water does exist in earth on account of triplication or quintuplication of the subtle elements. But the distinctive character of water does not exist in a particular earthy substance produced by triplication or quintuplication of the elements. Even if the distinctive character of water exists in the part of water which constitutes a part of that substance, it is not capable of being perceived. Triplication or quintuplication is such a combination of the elements that they cannot be separated. Before triplication or quintuplication the elements are subtle and imperceptible after triplication or quintuplication also the part of water alone cannot be perceived in the earthy substance. Moreover, it does not stand to reason that the elements of water in the earthy substance, though subtle, are perceived from a distance, but they cannot be perceived by those who are near it. The Ramanujist says that fire and earth are not perceived owing to a certain defect of the peripheral organ, and water is perceived owing to demerit (adrsta). But this is no argument.
For the same reason it is wrong to hold that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre because silver really exists in the nacre in the form of the elements of fire, which enter into three-fold or five-fold combination to constitute the nacre. Moreover, why are the elements of fire in the nacre perceived as silver alone ? They might as well be perceived as lightning, the sun, and other fiery objects, because the elements of fire are common to all these objects before combination. It cannot be said that certain particles of the fire (teias) which, by triplication or quintuplication, are transformed into silver, are combined and are perceived in the nacre, for there is no proof of their existence. It cannot be said that the cognition of silver is the proof of their existence, for it would involve a vicious circle. The existence of silver in the nacre would depend upon the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object ; and the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object would depend upon the existence of a part of silver in the nacre. It cannot be said that the existence of a part of silver in the nacre is proved by the perception of similarity of the nacre with silver. The nacre is similar to silver because it is endowed with those qualities which are common to itself and silver, viz. brightness and the like, and not because it contains a part of silver ; there is no law of nature that an object must contain a part of another object with which it has similarity.
If the clothes and ornaments of Caitra are similar to those of Devadatta, Devadatta may mistake the clothes and ornaments of Caitra for his own. But the parts of the clothes and ornaments of Devadatta do not interpenetrate into the clothes and ornaments of Caitra. Hence the doctrine of Satkhyati is groundless.
THE DOCTRINE OF SADASATKHYATI
This doctrine is held by the Samkhya. Kapila criticizes all the rival doctrines of illusion and establishes his own doctrine. And Aniruddha explains his arguments. The Madhyarnika holds that some-thing non-existent, e.g. the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver, appears in consciousness in the illusory perception ” this is silver “. This is wrong, for a non-existent object can neither lead to action nor produce a cognition, e.g. the horns of a man. Prabhakara holds that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” there are two cognitions :
(i) the perception of ” this ” present to the visual organ, and
(2) the recollection of ” silver ” ; and non-discrimination of these two cognitions from each other leads to action.
This also is wrong, for apprehension of non-difference or identity is found to lead to action, and the illusory perception ” this is silver ” is contradicted by the sublating cognition ” this is not silver “, while a valid cognition can never be contradicted. The Samkarite holds that the objective substrate of the illusory perception ” this is silver ” is neither real nor unreal nor both ; if it were unreal, there would be no immediate or presentative cognition j if it were real, there would be no sublating cognition ; and it cannot be both as it is self- contradictory ; hence the object of the illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both, but it is undefmable. This also is wrong, for the illusory perception, in the present case, is defined as ” this is silver “.
The Naiyayika holds that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” it is a nacre that appears in consciousness as a piece of silver. This also is wrong, because it is against experience that one object
should appear in consciousness as another object.
Hence the Samkhya concludes that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” the cognition of ” this ” is real (sat) and the cognition -of ” silver ” is unreal (asat). The cognition of ” this ” has for its object an object present to the visual organ ; so it is real. The cognition of ” silver ” has for its object ” silver ” which is not present to the visual organ and it is contradicted by a sublating cognition ; so it is unreal. So an illusion apprehends both a real object (sat) and an unreal object (asat}. This is Aniruddha’s interpretation of the doctrine of Sadasatkhyati. Vijnanabhiksu says that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” the silver that appears in consciousness is real (sat), since it exists in the shop of a silver-merchant, and it is unreal (asat)> since it is falsely ascribed to a nacre.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRASIDDHARTHAKHYATI
According to this doctrine, a non-existent thing is not the object of an illusory cognition, but a really existent object established by knowledge ; for example, water is the object of the illusion of water,and when the illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, then the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun.
Evaluation of Prasiddharthakhyati
This theory, too, is untenable. If all cognitions were true representations of their objects, there would be no difference between a valid cognition and an illusion, all cognitions would be equally-valid. And a person having an illusory cognition of water and acting upon it would feel the wetness of the ground, etc., which are the effects of water though water itself may be absent, because the effect of water is not momentary like the flash of lightning. And if all cognitions are equally valid, no cognition can be contradicted by another cognition. But it is a fact of experience that some cognitions are contradicted by other cognitions. Hence the doctrine of Prasiddharthakhyati is untenable.
THE DOCTRINE OF VIVEKAKHYATI OR SMRITIPRAMOSA
Prabhakara’s doctrine of Vivekakhyati (non-discrimination) is sometimes called Akhyati (non-apprehension). But in order to distinguish this doctrine from that of Akhyati described above we prefer to call it by the name of Vivekakhyati. According to Prabhakara, whatever is manifested to consciousness must be the object of that consciousness ; and hence there can be no apprehension of an object as a different thing ; there can be no Anyathakhyati or misapprehension. What is the object of the illusion of silver, according to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati ? Is it silver existing in some other time and place ? Or is it a nacre which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver ? Or is it the nacre itself in its own true form ?
The first alternative implies Asatkhyati. If silver existing in some other time and place is the object of the illusion of silver, then silver which does not exist at present becomes the object of the illusory cognition, and thus something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Hence Anyathakhyati implies Asatkhyati.
The second alternative is unintelligible. If a nacre, which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver, is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver, then is there an apprehension of a nacre or an apprehension of silver ? If the former, then there is no illusion, as a nacre is perceived as a nacre. If the latter, then there is no proof of the existence of the nacre there, which is manifested as silver in consciousness. It cannot be said that the nacre is known by the sublating cognition u this is not silver ” ; because the object of the illusion of silver cannot be established by some other cognition. A sublating cognition merely establishes the non-existence of the object of the sublated illusion it does not ascertain the object of the illusory cognition.
The third alternative also cannot be maintained. It cannot be held that a nacre is the object of the illusion of silver. For, in that case, everything present at the time of the cognition, e.g. the proximate piece of land, etc.., would be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition. 1 Hence Prabhakara concludes that whatever is manifested in a cognition must be regarded as the object of that cognition. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is manifested in consciousness ; so silver must be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition of silver. It is foolish to regard a nacre as the object of the illusion of silver.
We have already found that according to Prabhakara, there are two elements in an illusory cognition. It is made up of a presentative element and a representative element which are not discriminated from each other as long as the illusion lasts. This lack of discrimination between the two elements is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element involved in an illusion. In the illusory cognition ” this is silver “, ” this ” is not identical with ” silver “, as the doctrine of Anyathakhyati holds, ” this ” is nothing but ” this ” which is per- ceived, and ” silver ” is nothing but ” silver ” which is remembered ; ” this ” is one thing (e.g. brightness, etc.), and ” silver ” is quite a different thing. The distinction between these two is recognized when there is the so-called sublative cognition c * this is not silver “. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition ? Prabhakara holds that the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to smritlpramosa or obscuration of memory.
Evaluation of Vivekakhyati
Prabhakara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative elements which cannot be discriminated from each other owing to obscuration of memory. But when the illusion is contradicted by a sublative cognition the presentative element is discriminated from the representative element. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre in the form ” this is silver “, there is a presentation of ” this ” and there is a representation or reproduction of silver in memory, which are not distinguished from each other. But the Naiyayika urges that in the illusion of silver there is an actual perception or presentation of silver in this process we do actually feel that we are perceiving silver. But Prabhakara tries to explain away this fact of experience. He cannot account for the fact that as long as the illusion of silver lasts, there is an actual presentation or perception of silver, and not a mere representation of silver. He cannot give a satisfactory account of the so-called non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element in an illusion. He cannot also explain the nature of the so-called smrtlpramosa or obscuration of memory.
Let us consider these in detail.
In the first place, Prabhakara holds that when we have the illusion of silver in a nacre the sense-organ does not come in contact with real silver ; so there is no presentation of silver, but only a representation of silver. In the illusion ” this is silver ” there are two elements, a presentation of ” this ” and a representation of ” silver “, which are not discriminated from each other at the time.
But the Naiyayika and the Vedantist contend that we are conscious of silver as something presented to consciousness ” here and now ” and not as something perceived in the past and remembered now. Nor can it be said that there is only a presentation of ” this ” and not of ” silver “, for we have a direct and immediate knowledge of both u this ” and ” silver ” at the same time so both of them are directly presented to consciousness or perceived at present. Gaiigesa and his followers hold that in the illusion ” this is silver ” both the elements ” this ” and ” silver ” are perceived, the first through the ordinary intercourse between the visual organ and its object, and the second through the extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge {jnana~lak$ana~sannlkar$a)
In the second place, what does Prabhakara mean by non- discrimination ? So long as an illusion lasts there is no apprehension of non-discrimination of its presentative factor from its representative factor. It is apprehended, if at all, when it is sublated. But as a matter of fact, the subsequent sublative cognition testifies to the immediate consciousness of ” this is silver ” at the time of the illusory perception, rather than non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element. Moreover, non-discrimination at the time of an illusion cannot induce exertion in the person under illusion to appropriate or avoid the illusory object. In the illusion ” this is silver ” what moves a person to action ? Is it the actual perception and the recollection together or either of the two ? If the former, then do the two psychoses operate together or in succession ? The first of these latter alternatives is inadmissible, since presentation and representation being distinct psychoses cannot occur at the same time. If the two cognitions are successive, the former can have no casual efficiency with regard to the person’s action, since the latter intervenes between the two. Nor can it be said that either psychosis by itself moves the person to action ; for the particular action follows neither from the perception of ” this ” nor from the recollection of ” silver ” but from the direct and immediate apprehension of ” this is silver “. Thus mere non- discrimination cannot account for exertion induced by an illusion.
In the third place, what is the meaning of smrtipramosa or obscuration of memory ? If it means the absence of memory, then there cannot be a reproduction of silver perceived in the past, and it cannot differ from swoon in which there is no memory. If it means the consciousness of memory not as memory, but as something opposed to it, viz., perception, then the doctrine of smrtipramosa would imply Anyathakhyati. If it means the apprehension of a past object as present, then also it would imply Anyathakhyati. If it means the blending of perception with recollection in such a way that the two psychoses cannot be distinguished from each other, then what is the meaning of blending ? Does it mean the appre- hension of the two different psychoses as non-different or identical ? Or does it mean the actual blending of the two different psychoses ? The first alternative leads to Anyathakhyati. The second alternative is impossible, for two physical things can blend with each other as milk and water, but two psychoses cannot blend with each other. Thus the doctrine of smrtipramosa is unintelligible.
THE DOCTRINE OF ANYATHAKHYATI
According to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati, an object is apprehended as a different object in an illusion which is not a sum of two psychical processes perception and recollection but a single psychosis of a perceptual character. When we perceive silver in a nacre, we perceive in the nacre only the common qualities of nacre and silver, and not the peculiar qualities of the nacre ; the perception of similarity revives the idea of the peculiar qualities of silver in memory ; and the reproduction of silver in memory produces the perception of silver, and so we have an illusory perception ” this is silver “.
Jayanta Bhatta refutes Prabhakara’s objections to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati in the following manner :
First, Prabhakara has urged : What is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver ? Is it silver existing in some other time and place ? Or is it a nacre that conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver ? Or is it a nacre in itself ? He has urged that the first alternative implies Asatkhyati or apprehension of a non-existent object as existent. The Naiyayika replies that silver is not non-existent ; but it does exist in some other time and place. There is a difference between an absolutely non-existent thing (e.g. a sky- flower, etc.) and an object not existing ” here and now “, but in some other time and place. The former is never an object of consciousness, while the latter is an object of consciousness.
Secondly, Prabhakara has urged that the second alternative is absurd and unintelligible. The Naiyayika replies that the nacre is said to conceal its own form, since we do not perceive its peculiar features (e.g. triangularity, etc.), and it Is said to assume the form of silver, since we remember the distinctive features of silver.
Thirdly, Prabhakara has urged that the third alternative also is unreasonable. One object can never be apprehended as a different one \ for, In that case, whatever is present to the sense-organ at the time of the illusory perception of silver would be regarded as the substrate of that illusion. The Naiyayika replies that he does not mean that whatever is present to the sense-organ is the object of consciousness, so that the piece of land before the eyes may be regarded asthe object of consciousness. What he means is that the nacre is the cause of the illusion of silver ; it is not an object of the illusory perception of silver. So all the charges of Prabhakara against Anyathakhyati are groundless,
References
History of Indian Logic, by S. C. Vidyabhusan (1921),
Indian Logic and Atomism , by A. B. Keith (1921).
Kiranavall of Udayana (Benares, 1885 and 1887).
Nylyamanjari of Jayanta. (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).
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Prameyakamalamartanda of Prabhacandra Bombay, 1912
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The Sadholal Lectures on Nyaya by Dr. Ganganstha Jha on Indian Thought),
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Ramanuja’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra.
Tarkikaraksa of Varadaraia (Benares, 1003),
Yogabliasya of Vyasa (Benares, 191 1).
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