Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.
Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee,India
Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.
Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India
“Whatever time is, it is not “time.” “Time” is the most common noun in all documents on the Internet’s web pages; time is not. Nevertheless, it might help us understand time if we improved our understanding ofthe sense of the word “time.” Should the proper answer to the question “What is time?” produce a definition of the word as a means of capturing its sense? Definitely not–if the definition must be some analysis that provides a simple paraphrase in all its occurrences. There are just too many varied occurrences of the word: time out, behind the times, in the nick of time, and so forth.’
Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
One answer to the question “What is time?” is that it is a collection of objects called “times” that ultimately reduce to relationships among events. A competing answer is that time is a substance, not a relationship among events. A more popular answer post-Einstein is that time is not a substance but space-time is, and time is a part of space-time. Before the creation of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, it might have been said that time must provide these four things:
(1) For any event, it specifies when it occurs.
(2) For any event, it specifies its duration—how long it lasts.
(3) For any event, it specifies what other events are simultaneous with it.
(4) For any pair of events that are not simultaneous, it specifies which happens first.
It was realized that these questions can get different answers in different frame of reference.
The Indian philosophers are of opinion that time is a coefficient of all consciousness including external perception and internal perception. They do not recognize the perception of time as an independent entity. They believe that time is related to events or changes, and succession and duration are the two important constituents of time. They derive the perception of succession from the perception of changes, and the perception of duration from the perception of the ” specious present “. They regard the perception of the “specious present “as the nucleus of all our time-consciousness. They derive the conception of the past and the future from the perception of the ” specious present ” in which there is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future. In it there is a rudimentary consciousness of the past and the future which are clearly brought to consciousness by memory and expectation respectively.
The Buddhists philosopher, however, do not agree with the concept of the ” specious present “. They believe only in succession and the mathematical present. They recognize succession alone as the only constituent of time, and identify the perception of time with the perception of succession. And they regard the perception of succession as identical with the perception of changes. They do not believe in time apart from changes. They identify time with succession, and succession with changes. Thus they identify perception of time with the perception of changes. They do not believe in the perception of time as a qualifying adjunct of all events or changes. But the consciousness of change is not identical with change-consciousness. The consciousness of transition is not the same as transition-consciousness. So the Buddhists try their best to derive duration from succession, and explain away the unity and continuity of time.
The Indian philosophers discuss quite comprehensively the problems of temporal perception. The first question that arises in connection with temporal perception is whether time is an object of perception or not. According to the Vedantist philosophers, time is a coefficient of all perception. The Bhatta Mlmamsaka philosophers and Naiyayika philosophers too hold that time is perceived by both the external and the internal sense-organs as a qualification of their objects of perception.
Visual perception of time
Jayanta Bhatta has discussed the possibility of the visual perception of time. Can time be an object of visual perception ? According to the philosophers of Vaisesika philosophy, an object of visual perception must have extensity or appreciable magnitude (mahattva) and manifest or sensible colour (udbhutarupa). But time is colourless. How, then, can it be an object of visual perception ? But the Naiyayika philosophers argues : How is colour perceived though it is colourless ? Certainly an object has colour which inheres in it ; but colour itself has no colour inhering in it. And if colour can be perceived, though it is colourless, then time also can be an object of visual perception, though it is colourless. Jayanta Bhatta says that time is perceived through the visual organ ; it is a fact of experience, and so it cannot be denied, though we may not account for it as a fact of experience cannot be argued out of existence. As a matter of fact, that is visible which can be perceived through the visual organ, be it coloured or colourless ; and time can be perceived through the visual organ, though it is colourless hence none can deny the visual perception of time,
Ramakrsnadhvarin, the author of Sikhamani rightly points out that if we deny the visual perception of time because it is colourless, we cannot account for our visual perception of an object as existing at present, e.g. ” the jar exists now ” (idanlrh ghato vartate). If the present time were not an object of this perception, then there would be no certainty as to the time in which the jar is perceived to exist, but there would be a doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. But, in fact, the jar is definitely perceived as existing now; the actual perception of the jar is not vitiated by the least doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. Such an undoubted perception of an object as existing “now ” clearly shows that besides the object, an element of time also, viz. the present time, enters into the visual perception of the object.
But if time is regarded as an object of visual perception, though it is colourless, because of our visual perception of an object as existing ” now “, then it may equally be argued that akasa (ether) also is an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of a row of herons in akasa (akase valaka). But akasa is not admitted to be an object of perception it is regarded as a supersensible object which is inferred from sound as its substrate. And if, in spite of our visual perception of a row of herons in akasa (akase valaka} akasa is not regarded as an object of visual perception, or of any kind of perception, whatsoever, then why should time be regarded as an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of an object as existing ” now ” ?
It may be argued that the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa is an acquired perception like the visual perception of fragrant sandal. Just as in the visual perception of fragrant sandal the visual presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) is blended with the representation of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion and revived in memory by the sight of the sandal, so in the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa the visual perception of the row of herons (valdka) is blended with the idea of akasa which is represented to consciousness by another cognition by association, and so akasa is not an object of visual perception. But if this argument is valid, then it may as well be argued that the element of time which enters into every perceptive process is not an object of perception, but it is represented in consciousness by another cognition, with which it is associated in experience, and thus the element of time entering into every perception is not an object of direct perception.
The truth is that the visual perception of an object as existing ” now ” is not an acquired perception like the acquired perception of fragrant sandal, because in this perception the element of time (now) is felt as an object of direct visual perception nor is it like the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa because akasa does not enter into the perception as a qualification (visesana} of its object. The present time is perceived as a qualification of every object of perception. Whenever an object, event, or action is perceived, it is not perceived as timeless, but as existing or occurring in time, or qualified by the present time.
And time is not only an object of visual perception, but of all kinds of perception. It is perceived by all the sense-organs, external and internal, as a qualification of their objects. Here we are reminded of Kant’s doctrine that time is the form of external and internal perception.
Perception of Time as an Independent Entity
But though time is an object of perception, it is never perceived as an independent entity. One of the essential characteristics of time is succession, and succession is never perceived apart from changes. So we can never perceive time apart from actions or changes which occur In time. The temporal marks of before and after, sooner and later, etc., are never perceived apart from actions or changes. And if there is no distinct perception of time apart from that of changes, is it not natural to conclude that there is no perception of time, but only a perception of changes? Is time nothing but change or action ? Some hold that time apart from action is a fiction of imagination; time is identical with action or change ; time and action are synonymous. Hence there is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions(karyamatravalambana).
The Naiyayika philosopfers admits that there is no perception of time apart from that of actions. But from this it does not follow that there is no perception of time at all ; for an element of time always enters into the perception of actions as a constituent factor actions are never perceived without being qualified by time ; actions unqualified by time or timeless actions are never perceived. The perception of time is inseparable from the perception of actions but they are not identical with each other. Hence the legitimate conclusion is that time cannot be perceived as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct (visesana) of events or actions ; there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content, but only of filled time or time filled with some sensible matter. Just as there is no perception of mere actions unqualified by time, so there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content. When we perceive succession or simultaneity, sooner or later, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive something else which qualifies these actions, and that is time. Time, therefore, is perceived not as an independent entity, but as a qualification of the objects of perception ; there is no perception of empty time.
But it may be seen that,if time is an object of perception, why is it perceived not as an independent entity, but only as a qualification of perceptible objects ? Jayanta Bhatta says that it is the very nature of time (vastusvalhava] that it can be perceived only as a qualification of perceptible objects. This is the final limit of explanation. We can never account for the ultimate nature of things.
So time is an object of perception. The Bhatta Mlmaiiisaka also admits that time cannot be perceived by the sense-organs as an independent entity, but it is perceived by all the sense-organs as aqualification (visesana) of their own objects.
This psychological analysis of the perception of time is parallel to that of William James. ” We have no sense,” he says, ” for empty time. . . . We can no more intuit a duration than we can Intuit an extension devoid of all sensible content” Kant’s notion of a pure intuition of time without any sensible matter is psychologically false.
Perception of the Present
Time could be linear or closed. Linear time might have a beginning or have no beginning; it might have an ending or no ending. There could be two disconnected time streams, in two parallel worlds; perhaps one would be linear and the other circular. There could be branching time, in which time is like the letter “Y”, and there could be a fusion time in which two different time streams merge into one. Time might be two dimensional instead of one dimensional. For all these topologies, there could be discrete time or continuous time.
Some deny the existence of the present time and consequently of the perception of the present. When a fruit falls to the ground, it is detached from its stalk and comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground, traversing a certain space and gradually passing from one position to another, say, from A to B from B to R, and so on until it comes to the ground. When the fruit has passed from A to B the space between A and B is the space traversed, and the time related to that traversed space is that which has been passed through (patitakala or the past) ; and when the fruit will pass from B to R, the space between B and C is the space to be traversed, and the time related to this space is that which is to be passed through (patitavyakala or the future) and apart from these two spaces, the traversed space and the space to be traversed, there is no third space left intervening between them which may be perceived as being traversed and give rise to the perception of the present time. So the present time does not exist. Here by the present time is meant the mathematical time-point which is the boundary line between the past and future. But such a time- point is never an object of actual perception. Hence there is no present time at all. This argument reminds us of Zeno’s dialectic against the possibility of motion.
Vatsyayana rightly points out that time cannot be conceived in terms of space but only in terms of action. 2 Thus Vatsyayana holds that there can be no spatial representation of time. According to him, time is perceived as qualifying an action an action is perceived as occurring in time. When, for instance, the action of falling has ceased, and is no more, it is perceived as past ; and when the action of falling is going to happen and not yet commenced, it is perceived as future ; and when the action of falling is going on, it is perceived as present. Thus time- consciousness is found in the perception of action. When an action is no more it is perceived as past , when it is not yet begun, it is perceived as future ; and when it is going on it is perceived as present.
If an action is never perceived as going on, how can it be perceived as no more or as not yet ? For instance, if the action of falling is not perceived as going on, how can it be perceived as having ceased, or as going to happen ? As a matter of fact, what is meant by the past time or the time ” that has been fallen through ” (patttakala] in the present case, is that the action of falling is over or no more and what is meant by the future time or the time ” to be fallen through ” (patitavyaksla) is that the action of falling is going to happen and not yet begun, so that at both these points of time, past and future, the object is devoid of action ; but when we perceive that the fruit is in the process of falling, we perceive the object in action. Thus time is perceived not in terms of space but in terms of actions when they are perceived as going on or in the process of happening, they are perceived as present , when they are perceived as over or no more, they are perceived as past, and when they are perceived as going to happen and not yet begun, they are perceived as future. The consciousness of the present is the nucleus of the” consciousness of the past and the future the past and the future are built upon the present. Time is perceived only through an action ; the actual happening of an action is perceived as present ; and unless an action is perceived as happening or present, it can never be perceived as past or future, inasmuch as the action does not really exist in the past or in the future but only in the present. Hence the perception of the present cannot be denied as all our time- consciousness is centred in it.
The whole controversy hinges on the meaning of the present time. Vatsyayana takes it in the sense of the ” specious present ” or felt present .which is a tract of time. His opponent takes It in the sense of the mathematical time-point or indivisible instant which is never a fact of actual experience. Vatsyayana is right in so far as he gives a psychological explanation of the specious present which is the basis of our conception of the past and future.
The one issue upon which philosophers are deeply divided: What sort of ontological differences are there among the present, past and future? There are three competing theories. Presentists argue that necessarily only present objects and present experiences are real, and we conscious beings recognize this in the special “vividness” of our present experience. So, the dinosaurs have slipped out of reality. However, the past and present are both real, but the future is not real because the future is .The third point of view is that there are no objective ontological differences among present, past, and future because the differences are merely subjective. This view can be called eternalism.”
According to the Buddhist View, time has two essential characteristics, viz. succession and duration. But the Buddhist philosophers do not recognize the existence of duration or block of time. They identify time with mere succession of ideas. The Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no abstract time apart from presentations. Time is not a substantive reality, as the Naiyayika philosophers hold, but it is a cluster of successive presentations an abstract time apart from momentary impressions is an artificial conceptual construction. And according to the Buddhists philosophers , there are no continuous and uniform impressions (dharayahika-jnana] but only a series of detached and discrete impressions, a perpetual flux of successive presentations (ksanabhangura-jnana). Continuity is only an illusory appearance due to our slurring over the landmarks of impressions owing to their similarity. Momentary sensations alone are real ; there is no continuity among discrete sensations. The seeming continuity of impressions is nothing more than the rapid succession of impressions owing to the rapidity and uniformity of stimulations.
Time may be viewed either as one-dimensional or as bi-dimensional. Either it may be regarded as having only linear extension or succession, or it may be regarded as having simultaneity and succession both. The Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no synchronousness or simultaneity; there is only succession or sequence among our presentations. So a momentary presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future, but it apprehends only the present which has no duration. Thus according to the Buddhist philosophers , the sensible present has no duration ; it is an instant or a ” time-point “.
The Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold that the sensible present is not a mathematical point of time but has a certain duration ; the sensible present is a tract of time extending over a few moments it is an extended present or the ” specious present ” (vitata evakalah). According to them the ” specious present” having a certain duration yields us one unitary presentation without flickering of attention.
But the Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no ” specious present ” the present has no duration ; it is instantaneous or momentary inasmuch as our impressions are momentary. Our presentations are not somewhat prolonged processes, but instantaneous or nonduring events. And there are no continuous and uniform impressions, as the Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold.
According to Prabhakara, in the consciousness ” I know this ” (aham idam janami) there is a simultaneity of three presentations, viz. the presentation of the knower , the presentation of the known object (this)) and the presentation of knowledge (or the relation between the knower and the known). This is Prabhakara’s doctrine of Triputl Samvit or triple consciousness.
The Buddhist philosophers hold that the three elements are not simultaneous ; but they are discrete and detached from one another , there is no relation among them ; there can be no relation between the knower and the known. They hold that at first there is a particularized presentation (sakara-jnana) of ” I ” (aham), then that of ” this ” (idam)) and then that of ” knowing ” (janami). Thus these discrete and momentary impressions flow in succession. But when the first impression of ” I ” vanishes, it leaves a residuum which colours and modifies the second impression of ” this ” ; and when the second impression vanishes, it leaves a residuum which colours and modifies the third impression. Thus though these three impressions are discrete and isolated from one another, there is a cumulative presentation of these momentary impressions owing to the transference of residua from the preceding impressions to the succeeding ones (vasana-samkrama) and the residua of the former colouring or modifying the latter (upaplava}. Thus the Buddhist philosophers have invented the hypotheses of residua (vasana}) transference of residua (vasanasamkrama), and modification of impressions by residua (upaplava} to explain away the fact of continuity or the consciousness of transition ; a succession of presentations is certainly not the consciousness of succession. The Buddhiss philosophers do not explain, but explain away the fact of unity and continuity of consciousness.
The Buddhist philosophers examine the perceptive process and show that perception cannot apprehend the ” specious present “. A perception is nothing but a presentation ; and a presentation is the presentation of a single moment ; it cannot apprehend the past and the future. If there is a series of presentations, is it the antecedent presentation (uttaravljnana}, or is it the succeeding presentation that takes hold of the preceding presentation by the hind part, as it were ? The Buddhist philosophers answer that B can neither take hold of C, nor can it take hold of A. The past as past is not present and the future as future is not present. Hence the present presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future presentation, and consequently, there can be no direct apprehension or perception of the past and future.
But the Buddhist philosophers hold that the past enters into the present at the time of passing away, and the future also enters into the present, though it is not yet come, so that the present presentation is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future.
Thus the Buddhist philosophesr surreptitiously introduce an element of linking or transition between the past and the present, and between the present and the future to explain our consciousness of the continuity of time. But though they admit that the past and the future enter into the present, they insist that it is only the present that is perceived and not the past or the future which enters into the present. Such is the nature of our experience that it unfolds successively one presentation appearing and then disappearing. And in this scries of presentations an antecedent state (purvadasa) cannot come in contact with a subsequent state (aparadala)^ and a subsequent state cannot come in contact with an antecedent state. All sense-presentations apprehend the present alone which is instantaneous or momentary,
Some Naiyayika philosophers hold that sometimes the present is perceived as extended or with a certain duration, for instance, when we perceive a continuous action, e.g. cooking, reading, etc. The sensible present is not momentary, but has a certain length of duration (vartamanaksano dtrghah) ; it is not made up of a single moment, but composed of a number of moments (ndndksanaganatmaka).
The Naiyayikaphilosophers and the Vedantist philosophers hold that a continuous and uniform impression bears clear testimony to the unbroken and uninterrupted existence of its object ; and consequently, it apprehends an extended present with a certain duration.
The Buddhist philosophers urge that time cannot be a composite whole made up of parts ; it cannot be a cluster of simultaneous presentations because there is no simultaneity among presentations. Time is not bi-dimensional, as some Naiyayikas hold, but it is one-dimensional .There is no simultaneity, but only succession among our presenta- tions. It is foolish to hold that perception apprehends an extended present with a certain duration.
The Buddhist philosophers object that there is no uniform impression (avicchinna-drstt). Every impression is momentary ; there cannot be a continuous impression. When there is a rapid succession of momentary impressions, they appear to be continuous, though they are not really so. And because there is no continuous impression, there can be no perception of the ” specious present ” with a certain duration. 4 Even if there were a continuous impression, it would not be able to apprehend the ” specious present ? , because an object must be presented to consciousness in order that we may have a prcsentative knowledge of the object, and the object cannot be presented to consciousness for more than one moment, since all objects are momentary. But, as a matter of fact, there can be no continuous and uniform impression ; consciousness must always apprehend itself as momentary and not only consciousness is momentary., but also the consciousness of the momentariness of consciousness is momentary, of impressions must be enduring ; momentary impressions are apprehended as momentary by a consciousness which must be permanent. Thus, according to the Buddhist philosophers, all presentations are momentary, and as such they can apprehend only the present which has not a length of duration, but is constituted by a single moment ; the sensible present, therefore, is instantaneous or momentary.
The Buddhist philosophesr recognize only one aspect of time, viz. succession. They try to explain away the other aspect of time, viz. duration. But some Naiyayika philosophers and the Vedantist philosophesr clearly recognize the importance of duration apart from which succession has no meaning. The Buddhist philosophers have argued that a presentation cannot apprehend the past and the future as they are not presented to consciousness ; it can apprehend only the present which is constituted by a single moment. The Naiyayika philosophers urges that even a momentary glance (nimesa-drsti] can apprehend the continued existence of an object. Why should, then, perception be regarded as apprehending the instantaneous present ? Even supposing that a momentary glance cannot apprehend the past and the future, but only the present, what is the span of the present time perceived by a continuous and uniform impression (animesa-drsti} ? Is it a time-point or a tract of time ? Is it an instant or a length of duration ? The sensible present continues as long as the continuous and uniform impression persists without an oscillation of attention, and as long as it is not interrupted by another impression ; so that this single unitary presentation apprehends not an instantaneous present but a lengthened or extended present with a certain duration.
Most philosophers believe time travel is physically possible. To define the term, we can say that in time travel, the traveller’s journey as judged by the traveller’s correct clock takes a different amount of time than the journey does as judged by the correct clocks of those who do not take the journey. The physical possibility of travel to the future is well accepted, but travel to the past is more controversial, and time travel that changes the future or the past is generally considered to be impossible.
You may have heard the remark that you have no time to take a spaceship ride across the galaxy since it is 100,000 light years across. So, even if you were to travel at just under the speed of light, it would take you over 100,000 years. Who has that kind of time? This remark contains a misunderstanding about time dilation. This is 100,000 years as judged by clocks that are stationary relative to Earth, not as judged by your clock. If you were in the spaceship that accelerated quickly to just under the speed of light, then you and your clock might age hardly at all as you traveled across the galaxy. In fact, with a very fast spaceship, you have plenty of time to go anywhere in the universe you wish to go.
Indian philosophers also believe the difference in time dimensions in other planes .we can find references of travelling to different planes and outer space and its impact on time status,in many mythology events,(like marriage episode of Balram, the brother of Lord Krishna , with Raveti, the daughter of King Raivat, who just returned from Swarga after one month and find one complete yuga has passed here.)
The Buddhist philosophers may urge that such an extended present is a tract of time made up of a number of moments ; but the present is really a single moment ; the immediately preceding moment is past and the immediately succeeding moment is future ; so they cannot be perceived. The Naiyayika philosophers replies that in determining the span of the sensible present we must not assume at the outset that it is momentary, but we must determine it by an appeal to experience.
A psychological investigation must not be guided by metaphysical speculation ; but metaphysics must be based on psychology. Psychologically considered, there is no mathematical point of time, but only a tract of time. That time must be regarded as present which is grasped by a single continuous impression without a break or interruption. And such an unbroken and uninterrupted impression apprehends the present as an unbroken and uninterrupted block or duration of time. Hence the sensible present is not an instant, but has a length of duration.
The Buddhist philosophers may urge that even according to the Naiyayika philosophers there cannot be a stable consciousness (sthirajnana) but only a series of momentary impressions 5 how, then, can he hold that there can be a perception of the ” specious present ” ? Though all Naiyayikas hold that a psychosis extends over three moments the moment of production, the moment of existence, and the moment of destruction and there can be no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the central sensory or manas y yet there are some Naiyayikas who hold that a continuous and uniform impression is not destroyed at the third moment. Besides, the temporal mark of a consciousness need not necessarily correspond with the temporal mark of its object.
An object is apprehended by consciousness as having a continued existence. A pulse of consciousness, though existing at present can apprehend the past as well as the future as past and future. The feeling of the past is not a past feeling and the feeling of the future is not a future feeling. For instance, a present recollection apprehends the past ; a present flash of intuition (pratibha jnana) apprehends the future ; and a present inference apprehends both the past and the future.
The Buddhist philosophers may urge that the operation of the sense-organs does not exist for more than a single moment ; and in the absence of a continued peripheral action there cannot be a perception of an extended time or the ” specious present “.
The Naiyayika philosophers replies that peripheral action does not exist for a moment, but continues for some time. The perception of an object depends upon the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and this intercourse is not momentary, but persists for some time ;peripheral stimulation is not a momentary act, but a somewhat prolonged process ; and consequently perception does not apprehend an instant or a ” time-point “, but a tract of time with a certain duration,
Vatsyayana says that sometimes the present is perceived as unmixed with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive that a substance exists. And sometimes the present is perceived as mixed up with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive the continuity of an action, e.g. cooking, cutting, etc. Thus Vatsyayana admits that the present is sometimes perceived as having a certain duration.
According to the Vedantist phjlosophers , too, a continuous and uniform impression (dharavahikaluddhi] is a single unitary psychosis with a certain duration ; it is not a series of momentary impressions in rapid succession, as the Buddhist philosophers hold. In the continuous impression of a jar the mental mode which assumes the form of the jar is one and undivided as long as the jar is presented to consciousness without any flickering of attention, and is not interrupted by another psychosis. It is not made up of many momentary psychoses, because according to the Vedantist philosophers , a psychosis continues in the field of consciousness as long as the mind does not assume the form of a different object. So the Vedantist also admits that a continuous and uniform presentation does not apprehend an instantaneous present, but an extended present with a certain duration. Thus the Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold that the sensible present has duration, while the Buddhist philosophers hold that the sensible present is instantaneous or momentary. Certainly the former view is psychologically correct. The Buddhists deny the specious present ” because it contradicts their fundamental doctrine of impermanence or momentariness.
The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle- back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration with a bow and a stern, as it were, a rearward and a forward looking end.”
Time is a real however it has many facets and it may not be possible to nail down our perception of time to any single one.
Is time more like a straight line or instead more like a circle? If your personal time were circular, then eventually you would be reborn. With circular time, the future is also in the past, and every event occurs before itself. If your time is like this, then the question arises as to whether you would be born an infinite number of times or only once.
Indian philosophers strongly believe the essentiality of time as a dimension for the existstence. That is why they believe in the existence of past , present and future. According to them past provide base and future is the by-product of present. Time is continuity. Remotely it appears that this concept of time gave the base to the theory of reincarnation and rebirth.
The present is a fleeting moment; whatever is happening now (present) is confined to an infinite simply narrow point on the time line which is being encroached upon by what we think of as the past and the future. Present resembles the sharp point of a recording laser or needle; it may be mental awareness of the recording of memory as it is being inscribed into our brain..
Unlike the present we see past and future as measurable durations of time. Past historical events, are all measurable durations or extensions in time, just like a recorded material on tape. This similarity suggests that past is just a recorded memory, while future can be compared to an unrecorded tape. Historical events have in them the same time characteristic as stories that are just creations of human imagination. Both contain in them the time concepts of earlier, the later, the past present and the future; this again suggests that past really is similar to memory of events.
Future appears to be a projection created by our past experiences stored in our memory. The fact that the present which gives us the most real feel of time cannot be measured while the inaccessible past and future can be measured as durations strongly suggest that the way we perceive time is an illusion. Time is most likely is a concept created by our mind by merging consciousness, memories, anticipation, perception, change and motion. There however is a real underlying process and there is a cause for this process the Time is a real phenomenon a continuous change through which we live. Time becomes evident through motion; sunrise sunsets, night and day, the changing seasons, the movement of the celestial bodies all is indicative of continuous change.
References
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NyayavartikatatparyatikS of Vacaspati Misra (V.S.S., Benares),
Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya
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