The Concept of Student in Philosophies of Education

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India


“A parent gives life, but as parent, gives no more. A murderer takes life, but his deed stops there. A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops.”
Henry Adams The Education of Henry Adams

Behind every school and every teacher is a set of related beliefs–a philosophy of education–that influences what and how students are taught. A philosophy of education represents answers to questions about the purpose of schooling, a teacher’s role, and what should be taught and by what methods. Student-centered philosophies of education emerged as a response to the limitations of traditional, authoritarian models of education.

The Concept of Student in Idealism

There is much in idealism of the “personality cult.” As Horne has pointed out, “No civilization or culture of a people surpasses that of its greatest leader.”

The learner is a spiritual being in the process of becoming. His is a finite personality which, with prober molding and guidance, might more like the Ideal or the Absolute. Man is, in a sense, a small representation of the Absolute Self. The student must bring himself closer to the Absolute through imitation of the exemplar (the teacher) and through study of those subjects (the humanities) which best represent or symbolize the true ideas of which the human race has knowledge.

The learner, if the is an idealist himself, or if the idealist philosophy can be inculcated into his being, tries to do the very best he can, striving constantly toward perfection. Horne has described the “Idealistic Pupil” as follows:

The Idealistic pupil is characterized by that admirable trait, the will to perfection. Whatever he does as well as he can. He is ambitious to deserve honors in scholarship. He wants to grow in knowledge and wisdom, to appreciate the aesthetic things in life to deserve approbation, and to be a worthy person…. He strives for perfection because the ideal person is perfect.

The Concept of Student in Naturalism

Rousseau once commented that “Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the author of nature. Man meddles with them and they become evil.

True, all God’s creation was good, but man’s own free acts had ushered in sin and evil. No small wonder, then, the following statement by Rousseau fell upon Christendom like a bombshell. Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man…. He will leave nothing as nature made it, not even man. Like a saddle-horse that must be trained for man’s service he must be made over according to his fancy, like tree in his garden.

One of the clichés which has been current in education for some time is to the effect that “teachers do not teach subjects, they teach pupils.” Whatever this slogan may convey in meaning, it does direct attention to the importance of the pupil, the person being taught, the educed. Though philosophies do not teach subjects, they teach pupils.”

The pupil is to the teacher what man is to the philosopher. For man who is interpreted by the philosopher also has various practical engagements, one of which is being a pupil at school in his formative years, may be a student in institutions of  advanced learning during his more mature years, and we hope a learner throughout life. If a philosopher is also a teacher and at the some time is consistent in both though and practice, he will view man as a pupil in the classroom in the same way he thinks of him when philosophizing. So the doctrine of the pupil is virtually the doctrine of man in the classroom. Jean Jacques Rousseau‘s most famous educational treatise is Emile, a novel written in 1762, which tells the story of the education of a boy from ―Infancy‖ to ―Adulthood‖. Rousseau stated that Humanity has its place in the scheme of human life. We must view the man as a man, and the child as a child. Nature wants children to be children before they are men. If we deliberately depart from this order we shall get premature fruits which are neither, ripe nor well flavoured and which soon decay. He recognized stages of human growth and development. In his explanation there are five stages of growth: infancy, childhood, boyhood, adolescence and youth.

Rousseau‘s first stage, infancy (from birth to five), sees the human being as essentially helpless and dependent on others. The infant needs freedom to move and to exercise his body. He needs to make his first contacts with the objects of the environment.

During childhood (from five to twelve) the child is growing physically stronger. He is beginning to develop his own personality as he becomes aware that his actions have either painful or pleasurable consequences. During this stage, he explores the environment and learns about the world through his senses. In the boyhood, ages twelve to fifteen the boy‘s bodily strength is still increasing. The child‘s strength increases far more rapidly than his needs. Next, in Rousseau‘s developmental schema, come the years of adolescence, fifteen to eighteen. He learns about love and is ready to return to society. Last stage, from xxii

eighteen to twenty, Emile travelled to Paris and foreign countries to see different people and societies. (Ornstein, 1984) Naturalism accords an importance place to the child in the educative process.  Naturalism advocates education in accordance with the nature of the child . Naturalism considers natural environment as an important source of education . Naturalism gives an important place to the present life of the child and makes it the basis of education

The Concept of Student in Pragmatism

Children are to be treated as rational creatures.-John Locke

The student is an experiencing organism capable of using intelligence to resolve its problems. He learns as he experiences; as he dose and as he undergoes. As a thinking organism his experiences, and his reflections upon those experiences become a part of him determining his likes, dislikes, and the future direction of his learning. The pragmatist views the student as a whole organism constantly interacting with the environment. The school is both a part of this environment and a special manmade environment designed to provide the best possible educative experience to the learner. For this reason the student is especially involved in interaction with the school.

The whole organism which is the child consists of the biological child, the psychological child, and the social child. The experiencing organism that is the learner brings to school with him all the meanings, values, and experiences that constitute his personality : his self.

The Concept of Student in Humanism

Learner is highly motivated and self-directed; assumes responsibility for learning and self-development He has continuity formal structure antecedents in the past and a yearning toward the future. His experience has some continuity throughout changing events and places and in order to explain this we must recognize that the self is a common factor in all of these experiences. The self has form as well as continuity.

The learner possess a unique selfhood, self-realization supplements freedom as such with value concerns. Freedom does not carry built-in guarantees that it will be turned to good ends. In order to be freedom it must be free to make us miserable. The how of choosing, as well as the what which is chosen is a necessary ingredient of the good life.

The student is an experiencing organism capable of using intelligence to resolve its problems. He learns as he experiences; as he dose and as he undergoes. As a thinking organism his experiences, and his reflections upon those experiences become a part of him determining his likes, dislikes, and the future direction of his learning. The Humanist views the student as a whole organism constantly interacting with the environment

“Humanism in education recognizes the importance of the child. The child is a real unit which    has real existence. He has some feelings, some desires and some powers. All these can not  be overlooked. These powers of the child shall have to be given due regard at the time of  planning education. Child can reach near reality through learning by reason. Child has to be given as much freedom as possible. The child is to be enabled to proceed on the basis of facts, The child can learn only when he follows the laws of learning.”

The Concept of Student in Realism

Realism in education recognizes the importance of the child. The child is a real unit which    has real existence. He has some feelings, some desires and some powers. All these cannot be overlooked. These powers of the child shall have to be given due regarding at the time of planning education. Child can reach near reality through learning by reason. Child has to be given as much freedom as possible. The child is to be enabled to proceed on the basis of facts; The child can learn only when he follows the laws of learning.”

Broudy describes the pupil by elaborating four principles which, according to him, comprise the essence of the human self. These are the appetitive principle the principle of self-determination the principle of self-realization and the principle of self-integration.

The appetitive principle, mentioned first, has to de with the physiological base of personality. Our appetites disclose the need of our tissues to maintain and reproduce themselves. Physiological life, and therefore the life of personality, cannot go on unless these necessary tissue needs are supplied. In order for us to do anything about our tissue needs, except on an animal level, we must be aware of them; and in being aware of them, we realize that pleasure and pain are central.

The self has continuity formal structure antecedents in the past and a yearning toward the future. Our experience has some continuity throughout changing events and places and in order to explain this we must recognize that the self is a common factor in all of these experiences even though there are gaps in consciousness such as when we are asleep or under anesthesia. The self has form as well as continuity. As for determinism rationality requires that we recognize the validity and dependability; of cause-and-effect relations but we do not need to hold to determinism with the meaning that all of our experience is the result of physical forces. Our power to symbolize is one element of our experience that does not bear out the truth of this kind of determinism.

The third principle of selfhood, self-realization supplements freedom as such with value concerns. Freedom does not carry built-in guarantees that it will be turned to good ends. In order to be freedom it must be free to make us miserable. The how of choosing, as well as the what which is chosen is a necessary ingredient of the good life.

The child is to be understood a creature of the real world there is no sense in making him a God. He has to be trained to become a man only.  To the realist, the student is a functioning organism which, through sensory experience, can perceive the natural order of the world. The pupil, as viewed by many realists, is not free but is subject to natural laws. It is not at all uncommon to find realists advocating a behavioristic psychology. The pupil must come to recognize and respond to the coercive order of nature in those cases where he cannot control his experiences, while learning to control his experiences where such control is possible. At its most extreme, the pupil is viewed as a machine which can be programmed in a manner similar to the programming of a computer.

The Concept of Student in Existentialism

The question “who should be educated?” would appear to be a rather simple one for the existentialist. One might expect him to answer to anyone who so desires should be given all the education he wants. This response is probably correct as far as education in general is concerned, since the broad meaning of education includes more than schooling. In other words a person can educate himself in many ways such as by reading, by working, and perhaps, most important, by living – by willing and acting.

However, some existentialists have been quite clear in advocating a culture and education for the elite. Nietzsche was very outspoken in his scorn of “equality of opportunity” for all the children of all the people. The education of the masses cannot, therefore, be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great and lasting works…… What is called the “education of the masses” cannot be accomplished except wit difficulty; and even if a system of universal compulsory education be applied, they can only be realized outwardly: those individuals of lower levels where, generally speaking, the masses come into contact with culture – all these levels can scarcely be reached by direct means…..In this context Nietzsche was not peaking only of college or university education but of the lower levels, elementary and secondary. He felt the public education, which attempted to educate the masses, was bound to fall short of the aim of true education simply because the masses were involved.

The existentialists want to give full freedom to the child. But the child should know the nature of his ‘self’ and recognize his being and convert imperfection into perfection.     They do not want the child to become selfish, autocratic and irresponsible. Freedom is needed only for natural development. Education should be provided according to the child’s powers and the needs. The relation of the child with his ‘self’ should be strengthened rather than severed. The child has to make ‘choices’ and decisions.

Child thrives better when relieved from intense competition, harsh discipline, and fear of failure. Thus each child can grow to understand his own needs and values and take charge of the experiences for changing him. In this way self-evaluation is the beginning and end of the learning process, as learning proceeds, child is freely growing, fearless, understanding individual. Primary emphasis must always be on the child, as learner and not on the learning programmed. Child needs positive evaluation, not labels.

The Concept of Student in Perennialism

The student is seen as a rational being with tendencies toward Truth and knowledge. But the learner also has a spiritual side. It is the responsibility of the school to help him develop both. The rational power of the learner tend to be viewed from a position of faculty psychology. Thus, the faculty of reason is trained through the formal discipline of those subjects with the most logical organization. This would include subjects such as mathematic and logic. The faculty of memory is trained by having students memorize. Any foreign language which requires extensive memorization both of forms and content would seem to be desirable. The faculty of will is trained by having the students engage in tasks which are unpleasant enough to require a high degree of perseverance to complete. By engaging in these three types of exercise the student develops to the fullest his basic faculties : reason, memory, and will. The lay perennialists, represented by men such as Adler, have long emphasized the detailed study of the classics in light of their view of the student.

The Concept of Student in Analytic Philosophies

The analysits  have not had much to say yet about who is entitled to how much education and why. They have of course, suggested a mythology for resolving this and all questions, as shuffler points out. It seems probable that this methodology will lead at last to the conclusion suggested by Plato, and so often studiously ignored in the name of ‘democracy’ that each person should receive the amount and kind of schooling from which he proves able to profit.

The question that should be educated would appear to be a rather simple one for Analysis’s. One might accept him to answer that anyone who so desires should be given all the education he wants. This response is probably correct as far as education in general is concerned, since the broad meaning of education includes more than schooling. In other words, a person can educate himself in many ways such as by reading, by working, and perhaps most important, by living-by willing and acting.

However like existentialists some Analysis’s have been quite clear in advocating a culture an education for the elite. Nietzsche was very outspoken in his seorn of ‘equality of opportunity’ of all the children of all the people. He felt that public education, which attempted to educate the masses, was bound to fall short of the aim of true education simply because the masses were involved.

George Kneller does not object to universal education at least at lower level. But he does level. But he does point to the grave danger that compulsory public education might well engulf the individual in the sea of complete, depersonalized anonymity. Also the ‘compulsory’ aspect of public education seems to cause him concern since it removes completely the individual’s freedom of choice in education matters.

The Concept of Student in Marxism

The equalization of educational opportunity is one aspect of the Communist program which has been most successful. The achievements of the Communists in making the benefits of education available to all at little or no cost to the individual have been the more startling since prior to the revolution education in those countries was limited to the upper socioeconomic classes. All citizens have the “guaranteed” right to free, universal, compulsory primary and secondary education. Those citizens who have talents which make them greater service to the state are assured of higher and professional education by a system of scholarships which include the cost of schooling, materials, room and board and a stipend, recreation, travel and the like. For those who are not able to pass the entrance examinations for the universities and professional schools a multiplicity of technical institutes and adult-education programs is available to all who wish to enroll. The communists boast that their free educational programs cover the span from the cradle to the grave.

 

 

 

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Instructional Methodology- The Philosophical Rationale

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

The bad teacher’s words fall on his pupils like harsh rain; the good teacher’s, as gently as dew. Talmud: Ta’anith 7b

Interdependence of philosophy and education is an essentially for human development .both represents two side of a coin, both are equally important. PHILOSOPHY DETEMINES THE VIEW OF LIFE WHILE EDUCATION DETERMINES THE WAY OF LIFE. They are so interlocked that without the one the existence of the other is beyond comprehension.

In the words of Ross “philosophy is the contemplative side while education is the active side”. Philosophy deals with the ends while education deals with the means and techniques of achieving those means.

Furthermore no theory is fully expressed until it is expressed in practice. Not being an end in itself, theory becomes the evident enjoyment of the dilettante when pursued without responsible reference to practice. It might be said that there can be no practice without thinking ,  practice always merges into action and action emerges out of thought.

Education and philosophy are inseparable because the ends of education are the ends of philosophy i.e., wisdom; and the means of philosophy is the means of education i.e. inquiry, which alone can lead to wisdom. Any separation of philosophy and education inhibits inquiry and frustrates wisdom.

The chief task of philosophy is to determine what constitutes good life whereas the main task of education is how to make life worth living. So philosophy and education are mutually re-constructive. They give and take from each other. Philosophy deals with the goals and essentials of good life while education provides the means to achieve those goals of good life. In this sense philosophy of education is a distinct but not a separate discipline. It takes its contents from education and its methods from philosophy.

Instructional methodology, depends quite directly upon the nature of knowledge, which depends quite directly upon the nature of man. The aims of education, the role of teacher, The concept of student, the curriculum, the concept of discipline, importance and involvement of social agencies ,etc have determining influence of Philosophy .

If different areas of education are observed In relation to philosophy we will conclude that philosophy is an essentiality for a productive and progressive outlook on education Rusk had rightly commented’ from every angle of educational problem comes thus the demand for a philosophical basis of the subject….There is no escape from a philosophy of life and of education.

Instructional methodology describe the teaching process; most decisions a teacher makes are on these procedures. Proper management of this component results in those changes in student behaviour which we call learning or achievement. As the means of reaching predetermined ends methods form the most important link in the total teaching learning chain. It is the middle link connecting the objectives with its value. Generally instructional procedures describe procedures for teaching skills, language, concepts, principles, and problem solving.

Instructional Methodology of Idealism

Plato’s idealism suggested moving from opinion to true knowledge in the form of critical discussions, or the dialectic.  All thinking begins with a thesis. The dialectic looks at all points of view. At the end of the discussion, the ideas or opinions will begin to synthesize as they work closer to truth. Knowledge is a process of discovery that can be attained through skillful questioning.Idealist education involves depth of learning, a holistic approach that involves teaching the whole rather than its parts. The best method of learning for Plato was the dialectic, a process where ideas are put into battle against each other, with the most significant idea winning the battle.  Knowledge was not important just for the material needs that it met.  Idealists would feel that much of the great literature of the past would be useful in the solving many of today’s problems. The idealist is not concerned with turning out students with technical skills so much as having students with a broad view and understanding of the world in which they live. Idealism emphasizes the role of the teacher, a skillful questioner, who should be a model for the person we want children to become. While the lecture method is still important in an idealist’s education system, it is considered more of a way to convey information and to help students comprehend ideas.  Self realization and self education are very important in idealism.  While teachers cannot always be present when learning occurs, they must attempt to stimulate students so that learning occurs even when they are not present.  Project based learning is on example of a self directed learning activity where learning can occur without a teacher’s presence

As the curricular emphasis is subject matter of mind: literature, history, philosophy, and religion. Teaching methods focus on handling ideas through lecture, discussion, and Socratic dialogue (a method of teaching that uses questioning to help students discover and clarify knowledge). Introspection, intuition, insight, and whole-part logic are used to bring to consciousness the forms or concepts which are latent in the mind. Character is developed through imitating examples and heroes

The classroom structure and atmosphere should provide the learners with opportunities to think, and to apply the criteria of moral evaluation to concrete within the context of the subjects. The teaching methods must encourage the acquisition of facts, as well as skill in reflecting on these facts. It is not sufficient to teach pupils how to think. It is very important that what pupils think about be factual; otherwise, they will simply compound their ignorance. Teaching methods should encourage learners to enlarge their horizons; stimulate reflective thinking; encourage personal moral choices; provide skills in logical thinking; provide opportunities to apply knowledge to moral and social problems; stimulate interest in the subject content; and encourage learners to accept the values of human civilization.

The methods preferred by the idealists are the logical outgrowth of their acceptance of the doctrine of the primacy of ideas. If experience, as he have seen, is an inferior of the primacy of ideas. If experience, as we have seen, is an inferior reflection of Reality, the only purpose experience has for the idealist is to distort the Truth. Since the Truth can be reached through the abstract activities of the mind, it is in these that method must lie.

Methodology, for the idealists then, consist for the most part of lectures, discussion, and imitation. Learning is an exercise in stretching the mind to its fullest so that it can absorb and handle ideas. Imitation should be of some exemplary person or persons who by their behavior give evidence that they are close to the nature of reality.

All three methods employed by the idealists are open to criticism. All rely on ideas that are already know and allow little or no opportunity for the student to explore new ideas and new areas of interest. Because of this there is a tendency to reinforce the cultural lag between education and the society.

Instructional Methodology as per Naturalism

Methods of instruction should be inductive. This follows from Nature’s advice that teaching make fullest use of the self-activity of the pupil, telling him as little as possible and encouraging him to discover as much as possible for himself. To tell a child this and to show him that only make him a recipient of another’s observations. If the learning intellect is to be guided to its appropriate food, children must master the art of independent observation and direct acquaintance.

The educational  implications of the naturalistic theory holds that good education is pleasurable, thus, methods of teaching should be based upon the belief that the child is not averse to learning, but enjoys it. Teaching methods and materials will appeals to student’s natural inclination to learn. Difficult tasks are not to be excluded, however, for even they can be made pleasant

It is the area of methodology, perhaps, that naturalism has had the greatest effect on education. Since this philosophy constitutes both a reaction against traditional educational methods and a proposal for substituting “natural” methods in their place .The natural mode of self expression is Play and learning should be done through cheerful spontaneous and creativity of play. The process of discovery is given importance. The activities like excursions, fieldtrips and practical experiments are recommended to enhance learning

Education’s methodology perhaps exemplifies this shift from traditionalism most clearly. All of Rousseau’s recommendations on “how to teach” is based on the belief that experience is the only teacher. Spencer, the scientific naturalist, enthroned experimentation, the usual method of empirical sciences, as the only valid method of teaching.

In the first place, the naturalist is opposed to the formalized teacher-centered methods of the medieval and Renaissance scholars, many of which persist to this day. In such methods the teacher was viewed as the teaching-learning process, whereas the student was presumed to be the recipient of the Knowledge presented to him. In their worst form such approaches made of the pupil’s role a very passive one indeed. His only activity was “giving back” to the teacher that which he had learned from the teacher or from books.

This pupil activity usually took the form of recitation or written and oral examinations. It might be argued that such passivity on the pupil’s part a characteristic of all traditional teaching methods. Another characteristic was the repression of the pupil’s natural instincts and desires. In some instances educators such as Cotton Mather believed that education’s most important task was to “drive the devil out” of the pupil. Therefore, the naturalist objected to all harsh methods of discipline; he opposed the view that Children should be seen and not heard Originally applied specifically to (young) women. Hyt ys an old Englysch sawe [saying]: ‘A mayde schuld be seen,

Naturalism maintains that all teaching methods should be based on experience. Since they relies on the inductive method, they  insists that the first criterion for judging the value of a teaching method should be based on self-activity of the pupil finding the answers for himself. The pupil himself must observe nature in order to find facts and discover answer to his problems. To tell the pupil all the facts, to show him the procedures, to give this the answers, merely makes him a recipient of reports of others’ experiences. The child has not learned but merely memorized or “absorbed” what he has been told. Thus all teaching methods should be characterized by pupil activity involving direct or at least vicarious experience; the pupil must educate himself.

A second characteristic of naturalistic teaching learning methods is found in their conformity to the natural development of the pupils. It means readiness of the organism for any given learning. Negatively stated, this principle means that it is not the teacher or society that determines what the child should learn, but his own developmental level. Positively stated, it means that when the organism is ready for a certain type of learning activity it will seek in naturally, that is, without being forced by the teacher or by adult society. Thus the pupil will learn about his physical environment when his interests and instincts lead him to such learning; boy-girl relationships will be developed when children reach the age for such relationships; pupils will learn to read when they are ready.

A third characteristic of naturalistic methodology is that all educational activities should be enjoyable to the child. The tasks assigned by traditionalist teachers were designed to discipline the student and therefore were considered unpleasant by the student, but the naturalist felt that any task that went “against the grain” for the pupil should be avoided. Note how quickly and easily children (or adults) learn what they enjoy. Number games, word games (Scrabble), reading interesting stories, studying plants or animals in their natural habitats, the skills of wood wording, household arts, dramatics, and the like, constitute real enjoyment for the learner.. Thus any teaching-learning methods which make the material distasteful to the pupils should be avoided.

Rousseau advocates negative education – which is typical of naturalistic philosophy – the subordination of the child to natural order and his freedom from the social order. He defines negative education as one that tends to perfect the organs that are the instruments of knowledge before giving them this knowledge directly. The child should be left free to develop his body and senses. He attaches great importance to sense training as he believes senses are the gate ways of knowledge

Instructional Methodology as per Pragmatism

To discuss the methods of teaching employed by the pragmatist is to open up a veritable Pandora’s box. The widest variety of techniques have been justified in the mane of pragmatic philosophy, ranging from the almost complete laissez-faire to the relatively structured. Probably the most common method employed by those most in line with the Thinking of the pragmatists is the project method. Classroom discussion in a free and open atmosphere is encouraged, as well as individual problem solving research. All of this may well involve a tremendous amount of reading, studying, and traditional subject matter mastery.

The methods of educating are unique to each individual. This philosophy believes that not all children learn the same way, so it is important to vary educational methods. This philosophy supports large print text, small desk, and things that move easily. The classroom would be a functional atmosphere with the interest of the children at hand. Problem solving, themes, experiments are all parts of the pragmatic philosophy. The curriculum for the pragmatic philosophy supports a connection between knowledge and experience. It is important for children to connect the two so learning can become meaningful. According to Dewey, children must be interested in the subject matter to gain meaning. Subjects that are difficult and cause children to struggle should be organized and designed to build motivation about the topics. Children should enjoy learning and leave with a sense of accomplishment.

The problems around which education is centered must be the real problems of the students, not problems from text books, or even problems thought up by the teachers which have a neat solution that can be revealed at the end of the exercise. True learning in no way resembles the magician’s trick of pulling rabbits or pigeons out of top hats. Pragmatic method is rooted in the psychological needs of the students rather than in the logical order of the subject matter. Thus, method is nothing more than the helping of the students to use intelligence and the scientific method in the solution of problems that are meaningful to the child.

The process involved in the mediation of experience and which is required to first transform the experience to knowledge an second to aid in the determination of new direction has been variously called the experimental method, the five-step though process, and the scientific method. What it amounts to are the following five steps. First is the vague uneasiness that lets us know we have a problem that has upset our equilibrium.

Second is the refinement of the problem. This is the detailing of the problem, the bringing it into the light to take a look at it and the focusing out of irrelevant and extraneous matters.

Third is the forming of hypotheses or tentative solutions to the problem.

Fourth is the considering of the consequence of various activities, and the mental testing of alternative solutions. This is one of the most important steps since it is here that the fifth step  in the process will be decided upon.

The fifth step is the actual testing our solution under so – called field conditions. This is where the result of our intelligence are applied. In many cases it will not matter if we have made a mistake. It will simply mean “back to the drawing board,” and it is for this reason that many people underrate the importance of the fourth step in this process

.In the actual process of teaching there are a number of things that need to be kept in mind. First, we must start where the learner is. As William Heard Kilpatrick has pointed out, Kilpatrick goes on to suggest that the teacher discuss with the students the interests of the class and the types of things they would like to study. Interest is not enough. It is necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for selecting an area of concern. It should also offer a challenge and significant educational value. It is important that the subject selected by the students be one to which they are committed as wholeheartedly as possible. For if the topic has their commitment, then the value of self direction may be implemented. the teacher will from start to finish encourage in the pupils as high a degree of self-directed responsible acting on thinking as it is possible to get. To feel one’s self acting responsibly and so helping to create what is being done, and to do this in a way to deserve respect from others, is one of the very keenest of satisfactions. Thus, the method is primarily one of guidance

Finally, Kilpatrick gives some practical suggestions which deal with methodology. As the man whose entire academic career at Teachers College, Columbia University, was dedicated to putting into educational practice the theories arrived at by John Dewey, they may be said to represent the best thinking on the subject of education method done by a pragmatist.

The teacher will as well as possible help the learners at each stage of the effort: (i) to initiate the activity (to form or choose the purpose); (ii) to plan how to carry the activity forward, (iii) to execute to plan: (iv) to evaluate progress during the activity and the result at the end. While all this is going forward the teacher will also (v) encourage the learners to think up and note suggestions or new leads for other and further work; (vi) help them to formulate these suggestions both for clarification of thinking and for later recall and possible use (perhaps writing them in a book or on the board for future reference); (vii) help pupils criticize their thinking en route or at the close, as may seen wise; and finally (viii) look back over the whole process to pick up and fix important kinds of learning as well as draw lessons for the future from both successes and failures.

Instructional Methodology as per Humanism

Even though some scholars of the Renaissance discussed the problems of methodology, the teachers in the lower schools failed to make any significant changes in their approach to teaching. As we mentioned above, the Renaissance scholar clamored for freedom and creativity – for himself, but not for school boys. Instead they demanded perfect imitation, on the part of students, of the classical style of the ancients. Teachers even employed the exact methods of the ancient educationists, especially Quintilian’s

Later on, the Jesuits, develop a new teaching method.. This method, called the prelection, was devised by experienced classroom teachers At the highest level, where the teacher sought to perfect style and eloquence, the teacher explained a selection chosen from the classics until he was quite certain his students understood it. He then analyzed the selection for its artistic structure, pointing up the basic principles or art, narration, and persuasion. If the passage contained any material of an ethical, theological, or historical nature, it was brought up at this time. Finally ,the teacher analyzed each word or phrase and pointed out its grammatical and syntactical structure, its beauty, variety, and rhythm in the context of the whole passage. At this level, the method proceeded from the general to the specific – from an entries selection to each word in it.

At the next level down the educational ladder the teacher spent more time on etymology, the beauty and forcefulness of Latin style, and the many variations possible in writing and speaking Latin. Attention was given to explaining the historical context of such writers as Caesar, Livy, and Tacitus. All of these teacher activities were considered necessary so that the student imitated the style of the classical author.

At the lower levels the technique was reversed. The analysis proceeded from individual words to the whole passage. This approach was considered essential since, at he lower level, the purpose of the lesson was mastery of grammar. Thus the teaches would first translate each world and sentence, explaining subjects, predicates, and modifiers. Exact meanings of words, proper word sequence in sentences, correct placement of modifiers were “drilled into” the students. Students were expected to copy the teacher’s  explanation and assigned themes based on the most beautiful passages in the material translated. When this procedure was completed the teacher culminated the lesson by translating the whole passage. If need be the teacher would repeat the entire lesson one or more times until the student had mastered the material.

Several other points about this method, especially at lower levels, are worth noting. The method was mainly teacher centered. The teacher introduced each new passage : the student not permitted to go ahead on his own lest he make mistakes. The teacher conducted the many vocabulary and grammar drills. Students were to write only the items in their notebooks which the teacher dictated. Students were expected to repeat verbatim what the teacher had given in the lesson. This approach, it was believed, would provide the student with the mental discipline imposed by the subject matter itself (grammar and syntax) coupled with that of the teacher’s logical analysis of the material.

Instructional Methodology as per Realism

The method of the realists involves teaching for the mastery of facts in order to develop an understanding of natural law. This can be done by teaching both the materials and their application. In fact, real knowledge comes only when the organism can organize the data of experience. The realist prefers to use inductive logic, going from the particular facts of sensory experience to the more general laws deducible from these data. These general laws are seen as universal natural law.

When only one response is repeated for one stimulus, it conditioned by that stimulus. Now wherever that situation comes, response will be the same; this is the fact.

For Herbart, education was applied psychology. The five-step method he developed was as follows:

Preparation: An attempt is made to have the student recall earlier materials to which the new knowledge might be related. The purpose of the lesson is explained and an attempt to interest the learner is made.

Presentation: The new facts and materials are set forth and explained.

Association: A definite attempt is made to show similarities and differences and to draw comparisons between the new materials and those already learned and absorbed into the apperceptive mass.

Generalization: The drawing of inferences from the materials and an attempt to find a general rule, principal, or law.

Application: In general this meant the working of academic exercises and problems based on both the new information and the relevant related information in the appreciative mass.

“(There are and can be only two ways for investigation and discovery of truth. One flies from senses and particulars, to the most general axioms and from these principles and infallible truth determines and discovers intermediate axioms….the other constructs axioms from the senses and particulars by ascending continually and gradually, so as to teach most general axioms last of all.)” – Bacon.

In their method, the realist depends on motivation the student. But this is not difficult since many realists view the interests of the learner as fundamental urges toward an understanding of natural law rooted in our common sense. The understanding of natural law comes through the organizing of data through insight. The realist in their method approves anything which involves learning through sensory experience whether it be direct or indirect. Not only are field trips considered valuable, but the realist advocates the use of films, filmstrips, records, television, radio, and any other audiovisual aids which might serve in the place of direct sensory experience when such experience is not readily available. This does not mean that the realist denies the validity of symbolic knowledge. Rather it implies that the symbol has no special existential status but is viewed simply as a means of communicating about, or representing, the real world.

A teacher should always keep in mind-

  • Education should proceed from simple to complex and from concrete to abstract.
  • Students to be taught to analyze rather than  to construct.
  • Vernacular to be the medium of instruction.
  • Individual’s experience and spirit of inquiry is more important than authority.
  • No unintelligent cramming. More emphasis on questioning and understanding.
  • Re-capitulation is necessary to make the knowledge permanent.
  • One subject  should be taught at one time.
  • No pressure or coercion be brought upon the child.
  • The uniformity should be the basic principle in all things.
  • Things should be introduced first and then the words.
  • The entire knowledge should be gained after experience.
  • There should be a co-relation between utility in daily life and education.
  • The simple rules should be defined.
  • To find out the interest of the child and to teach accordingly.

Instructional Methodology as per Existentialism

Existentialist methods focus on the individual. Learning is self-paced, self directed, and includes a great deal of individual contact with the teacher, who relates to each student openly and honestly. In reality, the way in which subject matter is handled seems to be more important to the existentialist than the subject matter itself

To recognize the ‘individual differences’ and wish to have diverse curricula suiting the needs, abilities and aptitudes of the individual. Existentialist methods focus on the individual. Learning is self-paced, self directed, and includes a great deal of individual contact with the teacher, who relates to each student openly and honestly.

Perhaps the most significant assumption or underlying belief regarding educational methodology is that any teaching method must place the responsibility for choosing what to learn tend actually learning it upon the individual. This assumption is entirely in harmony with the existentialist’s insistence upon the absolute freedom of the individual. Obviously, on self-respecting existentialist would employ the traditional lecture-recite-assign-test method. He would reject with equal zeal the problem-solving method of instrumentalism because of its social emphasis. Any method which fosters group thinking or group action would be alien to the existentialist,

Perhaps, then, the only criterion for method is that the teacher show by his example that education is a concentration on personal freedom – one which encourages the student to accept the facts and beliefs which have relevance for him. Nietzsche states this position very vigorously in criticizing the traditional method (historic-scholastic method) of teaching the mother tongue: The historical method has become so universal in our time, that the living body of language is sacrificed for the sake of anatomical study …. The historical method may certainly be a considerable easier and more comfortable one for the teacher. It also seems to be compatible with a much lower grade of ability and, general, with a smaller display of energy and will on his part. But we shall find that this observation holds well in every department of pedagogical life. .

Similarly, a science should be considered a personal, human activity in which the student relives the great moment of discovery in the history of science. It should not be taught as an exercise in laboratory technique nor as a cold lifeless body of content to be mastered. The existential way to teach science is to have the students live it. This approach to teaching proposed by Kneller seems to be the same as that which Nietzsche implied in his criticism of traditional methods

Existentialists favor the Socratic Approach to teaching, “The existentialist favors the Socratic method, not so much because it involves ‘induction’ or the collection and analysis of all available evidence, nor because of its complementary process of ‘definition’, whereby general values are reached from particular instances; but chiefly because it is a method that tests the inner-life-as a stethoscope sounds the heart.” Socratic ‘Problem Method’ should be accepted if the problem originates in the life of the one who has to work out the solutions. But it is unacceptable if the problem is derived from the needs of the society. Like Socrates, ‘personal reading’ should be stressed.

They reject the group method, because in-group dynamic, the superiority of the group decision over individual decision is prominent. There is a danger of losing unique individualism and free choice. Methods of teaching must develop the creative abilities in children. The world and man reveal themselves by their undertakings

Instructional Methodology as per Analytic Philosophy

Problems about instructional methodology have also been tackled by the analytic philosophers. Boxberger distinguished a performance sense of explaining from a text book sense. Brown has argued that a student can learn testing should concern both. Green has distinguished among a family intelligent performance. Of course some of those who in effect make linguistic analysis of educational problems do not accept the basic premises of Analytic philosophy.

Since the resolution of semantic differences is itself a method. One may presume that the analyst would recommend it to the classroom teacher. For example the elementary teacher whose charges readily understand the assignment? “Write a story with 500 words” might stimulate thought by asking them “What is a word?” Like most notions which seem plain and uncomplicated, this one dissolves into mistakes of obscurity at some point. Is a word a sound which means something? It so then why is not a scream a word, since it warns of danger? Also what about written language? It a word is a constituent part of a sentence, then why is not a subject together with an appositive (“Ram, my best friend”) a word. What about the “word from our sponsor” that lasts for five minutes.

Instructional Methodology as per Marxism

Marx made no specific recommendations for teaching school children. Nor did the early leaders of the revolution concern themselves with such matters. During the educational chaos, which followed the revolution, educators tried all kinds of methods, exerting special care to avoid using methods in vogue prior to the “people’s liberation.” For a time they eve gave serious thought to adapting progressive method to the schools. But this experiment was short-lived since progressive methods granted too much freedom to pupils failed to “discipline them” in obedience and conformity.

Instructors in polytechnic institutes use a great variety of methods (even the lecture-recitation method is still employed); both group and individual techniques are used. In the industrial arts classes – which they try to keep to fifteen students – the teacher states the aim of he course, lectures to the students o the theory of the machine, etc., and demonstrates the processes involve. When the students begin working on the machines the class is divided into smaller groups and their work is closely supervised by the instructor. The teachers use audio-visual aids and texts when available. Whenever possible individual instruction is used (and this method seems to be the most popular among polytechnic instructor). The teacher explains and demonstrates the process to each student and then observes the student’s work. This procedure is repeated until the student masters the skill. As standard manual serves as a guide for both teacher and student. In most respect the methods and materials of Soviet polytechnic education are quite similar to those used in this country.

At the university level, the lecture method is used almost exclusively. Of course,  in the sciences, laboratory work plays an important role in the teaching-learning process.

Underlying the externals of the methods described above, one finds the theoretical basis for all methodology in Communist schools, namely discipline., Discipline ranks high in the family of values which make up Communist morality. It seems correct to say that Communist educators are not overly concerned with teaching methods or techniques. Any method or techniques is acceptable so long as it contributes to the general aim of producing a disciplined member of the collective

One final theoretical consideration in connection with teaching methods is the relationship that exists between method and habit formation. The building of good habits which will make the student an effective member of the collective appears to be a primary goal of all teaching methods. Early in his school career the pupil must from habits that will enable him to perform most actions without having to ponder over them. By so doing he will “free himself” for more significant tasks. But a person who has been properly adjusted to life in the collective must be able to put aside old habits and acquire new one when those in authority or the situation call for a change. Thus a university student will have to abandon some habits he acquired in the university collective when he becomes a member of the armed forces. This change will call for a relatively quick removal of some habits and a rapid acquisition of new habits. “Adjustment to the collective” is a habit which all good Communists should possess.

The educators insist that creative potentialities in children be developed from their early school days. Group games and socially useful activities are considered excellent means of developing initiative. Teachers are encouraged to be alert for suggestions from children regarding excursions, holiday plans, assemblies, and club organizations. All of these will develop creative abilities and leadership qualities in youth.

Secondary school pupils do a few individual projects in the sciences and in the applied sciences such as agriculture and technology. It appears that the greatest opportunity for self-expression and activities related to pupil interests is afforded by the extensive programs outside school. Such extracurricular activities are under the direction of experienced teachers and often result in spectacular creative works by the pupils.. Rewards, such as certificates of merits and medals, are awarded to those students who produce outstanding work in extracurricular and class activities. Teachers encourage students to go beyond the basic requirements set down for all pupils.

Even the best curriculum and the most perfect syllabus remains dead unless quickened into life by the right method of teaching and the right kind of teachers.

 

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PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION- A Historical retrospect

 

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India


examination of its own history and of the forms of thought given the name “philosophy” indicates that “philosophy” has itself borne many fundamentally different meanings through the years, and from one school or movement to another.”

Gregory B. Sadler

History is a means to understand the past and present.   History is the analysis and interpretation of the human past that enables us to study continuity and change over time.. It is an act of both investigation and imagination that seeks to explain how people have changed over time. Historians use all forms of evidence to examine, interpret, revisit, and reinterpret the past.

The purpose of historical inquiry is not simply to present facts but to search for an interpretation of the past. Virtually every subject has a history and can be analyzed and interpreted in historical perspective and context;

The different interpretations of the past allows us to see the present differently and therefore imagine—and work towards—different futures.   Through the study of history we can investigate and interpret why society developed as it has and determine what influences have affected the past and present and shape the future. It helps one to understand the immense complexity of our world and provides insights to help cope with the problems and possibilities of the present and future.

It is commonly acknowledged that an understanding of the past is fundamental to an understanding of the present. The analysis and interpretation of history provide an essential context for evaluating contemporary  cultures. Understanding the present configuration of society is not the only reason to study the past; history also provides unique insight into human nature and human civilization

Historical Retrospect of Idealism

Pre-Christian Origins: Plato

The beginnings of the idealist philosophical position are generally attributed to Plato, but may be traced back to the thought of his teacher, Socrates. Plato, father of Idealism, espoused this view about 400 years BC, in his famous book, The Republic. Plato believed that there are two worlds. The first is the spiritual or mental world (World of Ideas ), which is eternal, permanent, orderly, regular, and universal. There is also the world of appearance, the world experienced through sight, touch, smell, taste, and sound, that is changing, imperfect, and disorderly. This division is often referred to as the duality of mind and body.

In his writings Plato is most concerned with separating the permanent from the temporary, the real from that which is merely illusory. To this end, Plato separates the day to day reality of things seen and felt from the eternal reality which can only be known through the thought processes. Those things that we see and feel and experiences are simply temporary, they are merely reflections.

Plato distinguished between the use of reason and the use of the senses. His position was that in order to know something of the Real World (the realm of pure Ideas) we need to withdraw from the use of our senses and rely on a purely intellectual approach. Plato, then, was the first philosophy to lay the logical groundwork necessary to support a theory of immaterial reality.

Plato argued that only concepts are real since they do not change over time as do the objects they represent. Nothing exists until the idea of it exists, hence some supreme power must have conceived of the universe before it came into existence. Real objects are the concepts in one’s mind, which must be delivered by the teacher, a kind of mental midwife (see “maieutics” in the Archives). This was the original, philosophical meaning of “idealism,” seldom used any more outside the philosophy classroom

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century:

From this movement came the development of the modern idealistic views of Descartes,Berkley, Kant, Hegel and Royce.

Rene Descartes -Modern idealism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is largely defined by a group of philosophers who were writing at the time. In his Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes arrived at his Cartesian first principle Cogito, ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am.”  Descartes decided that he could throw all things into doubt except that he was thinking and doubting. This supports the concept of idealism because it emphasizes the centrality or importance of the mind.  Descartes, divided his world into two areas. For Descartes the two areas were the cogito and the Deity Descartes was a true doubter.  He attacked his thought processes by challenging the existence of every idea including his own existence.  The one truth that he proved was that in doubting everything he arrived at the consensus that even if one doubted every issue – the truth that couldn’t be denied was that one was thinking.

George Berkeley -Berkeley is commonly considered the father of modern idealism. He argues that what we experience does exist in a real physical sense, but only because it exists in the mind. A thing is the sum of our ideas of it. Common sense would indicate the absurdity of this position. If we held to the idea that a thing did not exist unless we were thinking of it we would too easily fall into a position philosophers call solipsism. Solipsism says that nothing has an existence beyond the individual’s mind and what appears to have an existence is simply in the mind of the beholder.

Berkeley carefully avoided the pitfalls of this variant of idealism and with it the problem of things winking in and out of existence. Instead, he suggested that ideas exist in the mind of God as well as in our more finite minds, thus allowing for the continuity of existence by making the universe the product of God’s thoughts. The great value in this form of idealism is that it allows for stability, complexity, and sophistication. Man may only be able to think or conceive of a limited number of dimensions; God can think of them all.

Immanuel Kant -In writing his Critique of Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason, Kant tried to make sense of rationalism and empiricism within the idealist philosophy. In his system, individuals could have a valid knowledge of human experience that was established by the scientific laws of nature.. He believed in the importance of treating each person as an end and not as a means. He thought that education should include training in discipline, culture, discretion, and moral training.  Teaching children to think and an emphasis on duty toward self and others were also vital points in his philosophies. The desire to grow in ones understanding of being is supported through knowledge.  His views were influenced by his strong religious beliefs.  He held the existence of God to be the Idea and without belief in God then things would not exist.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -Three of Hegel’s most famous books are Phenomenology of Mind, Logic, and Philosophy of Right. In these readings, Hegel emphasizes three major aspects: logic, nature, and spirit. Hegel maintained that if his logical system were applied accurately, one would arrive at the Absolute Idea, which is similar to Plato’s unchanging ideas. Nature was considered to be the opposite of the Absolute idea. Idea and nature together form the Absolute Spirit which is manifested by history, art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel’s idealism is in the search for final Absolute Spirit. Examining any one thing required examining or referring to another thing.  Hegel’s thinking is not as prominent as it once was because his system led to the glorification of the state at the expense of individuals. Hegel thought that to be truly educated an individual must pass through various stages of the cultural evolution of mankind.

Josiah Royce. -Royce’s Ideas were best desired as plans of actions.  It was his belief that the strongest things for a person to develop is loyalty and to be of a high moral character.  He supported the idea that education should be more than just a literal qualifying of information, that the moral lessons held high merit for creating a good society

Royce conceived of ideas as purposes or plans of action. He considered purposes as incomplete without an external world, and the external world as meaningless unless it was the fulfillment of these purposes. Royce believed in the importance of developing a sense of morals. This thought influences education that involves teaching about our purpose in life and how we become active participants in these purposes.

The post-Kantian German idealism of J. G. Fichte and Friedrich von Schelling, which culminated in the absolute or objective idealism of G. W. F. Hegel, began with a denial of the unknowable thing-in-itself, thereby enabling these philosophers to treat all reality as the creation of mind or spirit. Forms of post-Kantian idealism were developed in Germany by Arthur Schopenhauer and Hermann Lotze and in England by Samuel Coleridge; forms of post-Hegelian idealism were developed in England and France by T. H. Green, Victor Cousin, and C. B. Renouvier. More recent idealists include F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce, Benedetto Croce, and the neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer and Hermann Cohen

Historical Retrospect of Naturalism

Ancient period

Naturalism appears to have originated in early Greek philosophy. The earliest pre –socratic philosophers, such as Thales, Anaxagoras or most especially Democritus, were labeled by their peers and successors “the physikoi” physikos, meaning “natural philosopher,” borrowing on the word physis, meaning “nature”) because they sought to explain everything by reference to natural causes alone, often distinctly excluding any role for gods, spirits or magic in the creation or operation of the world..

As for as the history of philosophy is concerned, naturalism is the oldest philosophy. The earliest figures with whom our histories of philosophy commonly begin were naturalists.

Thales The father of western philosophy ( 640 B.C.- 550 B.C.)  was a mathematician, astronomer, and businessman.

For Thales, . “The principle of all things is water; all comes from water, and to water all returns, the principle of things is water, or moisture, which should not be considered exclusively in a materialistic and empirical sense. Indeed it is considered that which has neither beginning nor end – an active, living, divine force. It seems that Thales was induced to proffer water as the first principle by the observation that all living things are sustained by moisture and perish without it.

Anaximander ( 611 B.C.- 547 B.C.)  was probably a disciple of Thales  According to him” The principle of all things is infinite atmosphere, which has a perpetual vitality of its own, produces all things, and governs all things.:”

For Anaximander, the first principle of all things is the “indeterminate” – apeiron. There are no historical data to enlighten us as to what Anaximander may have meant by the “indeterminate”; perhaps it was the Chaos or Space of which physicists speak today .All things originate from the Unlimited, because movement causes within that mysterious element certain quakes or shocks which in turn bring about a separation of the qualities contained in the Unlimited.

The first animals were fish, which sprang from the original humidity of the earth. Fish came to shore, lost their scales, assumed another form and thus gave origin to the various species of animals. Man thus traces his origin from the animals. Because of this, Anaximander has come to be considered the first evolutionist

Anaximenes (end of the sixth century B.C., -524 B.C). He was probably a disciple of Anaximander and he composed a treatise of unknown title.According to Anaximenes the first principle from which everything is generated is air. Air, through the two opposite processes of condensation and rarefaction, which are due to heat and cold, has generated fire, wind, clouds, water, heaven and earth.He reduces the multiplicity of nature to a single principle, animated and divine, which would be the reason for all empirical becoming.

But the ancient roots of naturalism have much fuller body in four other men who have been called atomists, only two of whom were contemporaries. Leucippus and Democritus,. Epicurus (341-270 b.c.), more than a century later, whose carrier was largely subsequent to Aristotle’s was devoted to the ideas of Democritus. And Lucretius (96-55 b.c.), though not even a Greek and born almost two and one half centuries after Epicurus, was a great admirer of Epicurus. All four are called atomists because they conceived of reality as fundamentally a matter of atoms moving in space.

Leucippus and Democritus explained the Nature by  two simple things: empty space and atoms. This empty space they considered to be the same as nothing, nonexistence, or nonbeing. About the substance filling empty space, giving us all the things making up the world, they reasoned that it must be constituted by small indivisible units piled one upon another. These hypothetical units they called atoms. Theoretically, at least, division of parts into smaller parts can go on indefinitely. There may  be some infinitesimal unit which is elemental and cannot be divided further. This, because of its imputed indivisibility, they called an atom.

Little was said about empty space, nor could there be; it was a void in which atoms could move. The atoms, however, were considered to be of an infinite variety of sizes, shapes, and weights. Everything in Nature as we now behold it is the result of atoms moving through space. When the atoms come together in clusters, things come into being; when they move apart, objects dissolve and fall into nonexistence. Even mind and soul are made up of atoms, evolving and dissolving in the same manner. But mind and soul are made of fine, smooth atoms which are perfectly round, similar to the atoms of which fire was supposedly composed. Mind and soul, like fire, have great mobility; and their atoms therefore must be very active.

The motion of atoms in space be described as random, in the sense that there is movement in all kinds of different directions. Such random movement resulted in atoms colliding with one another, thence forming clusters and accumulating the mass to constitute such objects as rocks, trees, and planets.

From this elemental ground, Nature as we now know it has evolved Worlds whirled together as the atoms formed large masses in vast swirling motions. Vegetation grew, animals developed, and man arose, his speech and institutions resulting with the same kind of necessity as produced minerals and vegetation. .

Epicurus does go definitely beyond Democritus in considering the knowledge problem .he was at least aware that if objects are made of atoms, and the mind and soul are also made of atoms, some explanation must be found, harmonizing with the atom-space description of reality, making somewhat clear how the impression of an object gets into the mind of the man who beholds it. His solution was that objects give off a kind of film of atoms which is transmitted to the mind through the sense, anther yields a king of photographic replica of the object. This replica is not a copy pure and simple, for it is constituted by atoms given off by the object itself. It is a valid image of the object, in which the very qualities of the object are  retained, having been transmitted to the mind by the particles given off by the object.

Thomas Hobbes Like the ancient naturalists, Hobbes conceived Nature as an affair of bodies moving in space.. A body he defined as a thing which exists in and of itself and has no dependence what so ever upon our though about it. Bodies exist outside of us and do not depend on any relation to us. By space Hobbes meant a place outside of the mind which can be filled by an object There yet remains one other item in Hobbes’ description of Nature, namely, motion; and motion he defined as :the privation of one place and the acquisition of another.” It is that way of behaving seen in Nature by which a body can first occupy one spot, then another, and still another, and so on. Motion is as fundamental as rest; it is not caused by something other than motion; it is its own cause. If a body is in motion, some body which is at rest will have to impeded its movement in order for it to come to rest. Contrariwise, when a body is at rest it does not get into motion unless it is pushed by another body endeavouring to get into its place.

Combining these definitions, we have Nature described by Hobbes as an aggregate of things existing outside of our minds, and therefore evidencing the reality of a space beyond us, but also an aggregate of things moving from one place to another in that space which is beyond us.

Jean Jacques Rousseau in his A Discourse on Inequality, an account of the historical development of the human race, distinguished between “natural man” (man as formed by nature) and “social man” (man as shaped by society). He argued that good education should develop the nature of man. Yet Rousseau found that mankind has not one nature but several: man originally lived in a “pure state of nature” but was altered by changes beyond control and took on a different nature; this nature, in turn, was changed as man became social. The creation of the arts and sciences caused man to become “less pure,” more artificial, and egoistic, and man’s egoistic nature prevents him from regaining the simplicity of original human nature. Rousseau is pessimistic, almost fatalistic, about changing the nature of modern man.

According to Francis Bacon, man would be able to explain all the processes in nature if he could acquire full insight into the hidden structure and the secret workings of matter. Bacon’s conception of structures in nature, functioning according to its own working method, concentrates on the question of how natural order is produced, namely by the interplay of matter and motion. In De Principiis atque Originibus, his materialistic stance with regard to his conception of natural law becomes evident. The Summary Law of Nature is a virtus (matter-cum-motion) or power in accordance with matter theory, or “the force implanted by God in these first particles, form the multiplication thereof of all the variety of things proceeds and is made up” . Similarly, in De Sapientia Veterum he attributes to this force an “appetite or instinct of primal matter; or to speak more plainly, the natural motion of the atom; which is indeed the original and unique force that constitutes and fashions all things out of matter” . Suffice it to say here that Bacon, who did not reject mathematics in science, was influenced by the early mathematical version of chemistry developed in the 16th century, so that the term “instinct” must be seen as a keyword for his theory of nature Bacon’s theory of active or even vivid force in matter accounts for what he calls Cupid in De Principiis atque Originibus . Bacon’s ideas concerning the quid facti of reality presuppose the distinction “between understanding how things are made up and of what they consist, …. and by what force and in what manner they come together, and how they are transformed” . This is the point in his work where it becomes obvious that he tries to develop an explanatory pattern in which his theory of matter, and thus his atomism, are related to his cosmology, magic, and alchemy.

Middle ages to modernity

With the rise and dominance of Christianity and the decline of secular philosophy in the West naturalism became heretical and eventually illegal, thus making it difficult to document the history of naturalism in the Middle Ages. When the Renaissance reintroduced numerous lost treatises by Greek and Roman natural philosophers, many of the ideas and concepts of naturalism were picked up again, contributing to a new Scientific Revolution that would greatly advance the study and understanding of nature Then a few intellectuals publicly renewed the case for  naturalism, like Baron d’Holbach in the 18th century. In this period,  naturalism finally acquired a distinct name, materialism, which became the only category of metaphysical naturalism widely defended until the 20th century, when advances in physics as well as philosophy made the original premise of materialism untenable

Today, noteworthy proponents are too numerous to count, but prominent defenders of naturalism as a complete worldview include Mario Bunge ,Richard Carrier ,  Daniel Dennett , and David Mill. Certain extreme varieties of politicized naturalism have arisen in the West, most notably Marxism in the 19th century and Objectivism  in the 20th century.

Historical Retrospect of Realism

Although some of the early pre-Christian thinkers dealt with the problems of the physical world (most notably the early Greek physicist- philosophers, Democritus and Leucippus) the first detailed realistic position is generally attributed to Aristotle..

Reality, according to Aristotle was distinguishable into form and matter. Matter is the substance that all things have in common. For Aristotle these to substance were logically separable although always found together in the empirical world. The more closely anything approaches pure form, the higher it reigns in the Aristotle hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy is pure form which may be viewed as the highest form of reason. It is the Prime-Mover which gives the universe its orderly nature. Matter, which is at the base of the hierarchy, is nothing by itself. Further up the scale come man, the heavens, and finally the Prime-Mover which is pure form and reason.

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century: Comenius and Locke

Throughout his writings, John Amos Comenius emphasizes the primary importance of the gathering of knowledge or sense data.. Comenius felt that the human mind, like a mirror, reflected everything around it.

John Locke was a philosopher as Comenius was an educator, and Locke’s writings reflected this orientation just as Comenius’ showed his lifelong interest in pedagogy. Locke’s greatest contribution both to philosophy and to philosophy of education was his doctrine that ideas are not innate but that all experience is the result of impressions made on the mind by external objects. The implication of this are spelled out in his concept of the tabula rasa or the mind as a blank sheet on which the outside world must leave its impressions. At the time of birth, man’s mind is a blank slate upon which sensory experiences of the world create impressions. All ideas, according to Locke, must come from either sensation or reflection.

Nineteenth Century: Herbart

Herbart argued that all subjects are related and that Knowledge of one helps strengthen knowledge of the others. He also held that we acquires new contents they are assimilated with the existing contents.

The relationships between new ideas and old ideas occurred in what Herbart called the apperceptive mass. Within the mind, new apperceptions or presentations united with older apperceptions and struggled to rise from the unconscious level of mind to the conscious.

American Realism: The New Realists and the Critical Realists

The New Realists were so named because they emerged as a reaction to idealism. Where idealism give special status to mind, seeing it as basically the stuff from which all other things are created, the New Realists, particularly the American school, rejected this notion, giving mind no special status and viewing it as part of nature. For them things could pass in and out of knowledge and would in no way be altered by the process. Existence, they argued, is not dependent upon experience or perception, thus mind ceases to be the central pivot of the universe. Speculation, according to the New Realists, was not as fruitful as the use of the empirical methods of science.

Historical Retrospect of Humanism

Humanism is a fairly new name for a very old philosophy. The basic principles of humanism — claims and an emphasis on living a fulfilling and ethical life without religion — have been embraced by a wide variety of thinkers in different cultures for thousands of years. But not until the twentieth century did the word “humanism” become the common term for this worldview.

Humanism is a fairly new name for a very old philosophy. The basic principles of humanism — claims and an emphasis on living a fulfilling and ethical life without religion — have been embraced by a wide variety of thinkers in different cultures for thousands of years. But not until the twentieth century did the word “humanism” become the common term for this worldview..

Many of these humanist traditions have survived in some form to contribute to the humanist philosophies of the twenty-first century. Important humanist traditions include the great teachers and philosophical movements of Ancient China and India between three thousand and two thousand years ago; the philosophies of classical Greece and Rome, which survived in the Muslim world during the European

.Historical Retrospect of Perennialism

Pre-Christian Origins: Aristotle

Perennialism is not rooted in any particular time or place. Perennialism is open to the notion that universal spiritual forms Aristotle contributed to the basis realist position with his conception of form and matter. Form, it will be recalled was viewed as being at the apex of the pyramid or hierarchy while matter was at its base. Matter existed as pure potentiality. It acquired meaning only as from was imposed on it. It was form that was seen as the principle of actuality. All things were composed of form and matter. Man, for example, had a physical being composed of matter and mind composed of form. From was equated with pure rationality while mater was equated with pure    materiality.

Christianity: The First Thousand Years

One of the great voices during this first thousand years of Christendom was the voice of St. Augustine. Since the works of Aristotle were lost for the first thousand year of Christianity, the great influence on the early medieval thinkers was Plato. Plato, indirectly, and Augustine, directly, set much of the pattern of Christian theology until the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. For Augustine, reason was subservient to religious dogma and the material and practical aspect of life were to play only a minor role as compared with the spiritual aspects. First came faith and then came reason.

The Thirteenth Century: St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic  took the work as Aristotle and after accepting his form and matter thesis, added to it the concept of existence. He reconciled the Christian principles of his faith with the realism of Aristotle by insisting that beyond essence (the combination of form and matter) lay existence. Aristotle, according to St. Thomas, was right in what he said, but had failed to raise the question of the existence of essence. Thus, for Aquinas, essence becomes the principle of potentiality while existence becomes the principle of actuality.

Pure Existence or Pure Actuality is, of course, God. We can know Pure Existence only through revelation although we can know about it through reason. In this manner Aquinas postulated a realistic world in which man must make his way while preparing for life in the here after. While reason is able to deal with the world of nature, revelation deals with the world beyond nature. For St. Thomas, the natural world was open to all the tools of the scientist. This natural world was clearly distinguished from the world of theology where faith and revelation hold sway. The two worlds of St. Thomas Aquinas, the world of faith and the world of reason were set apart; as long as there was no interaction between the two, all was well.

Contemporary Thinkers: Maritain and Adler

a. Jacques Maritain is usually considered the most prominent contemporary spokesman of the Perennialists position.. As an educator he has written and taught both in his own country and in the United States. Maritain’s position is typical of the Neo-Thomists, with a strong reliance on reason and faith. His writings often deal with education and he has been particularly concerned with reconciling the democratic conception of education and the Perennialists point of view.

b. Mortimer Adler Although a non-Catholic, Adler has been welcomed into the perennialist camp with open arms because of his strong support of the philosophical position they espouse. Adler goes on to out that the education of man is not complete without religious education, and that there is a whole realm of knowledge with which this deals which is not attainable through rational means

Historical Retrospect of Pragmatism

One of the most important schools of philosophy of education is pragmatism. It is also as old as idealism, naturalism and realism since it is more an attitude, than a philosophy. In the fifth century B.C. Heraclitus said, “One can not step twice into the same river.” Thus, Reality is a flux, things are ever changing. Modern pragmatists agree with the Greek sophists. According to Protagoras, “Man is the measure of all things.” This maxim is the basis of modern humanism. Another famous sophist Gorgias used to say, “Nothing exists and if thing exists we can never know it.” This agnosticism has led to relativism in pragmatic epistemology.

The Nineteenth Century:

Chauncey Wright, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William James.Chauncey Wright is perhaps the least know of the nineteenth century contributors to the pragmatic movement. William James wrote of him that, ……he was not merely the great mind of a village – if Cambridge will pardon the expression – but either in London or Berlin he would, with equal ease, have taken the place of master which he held with us.

Charles Sanders Peirce, Although considered the founder of the American school of pragmatism, Peirce’s major contribution to the intellectual stream of pragmatism was his criterion of truth or meaning. simply says that a sentence’s meaning is the sum total of all of the sensory experience which might be conceptualized.

William James arrived on the scene at a critical time in America thought. As Americans reacted to the increasing technological and scientific changes in this country they turned philosophically to “science”. As Morton White has pointed out, “He came upon the scene when philosophy was being bullied by a tough and militant scientism, but he only organized alternative seemed to be the absolute idealism of the neo-Hegelians [sic] which he could not stomach. “

The Twentieth Century: John Dewey’s Instrumentalism

There are several philosophers that were advocates of pragmatism.;

Francis Bacon had a significant influence on pragmatism. He suggested an inductive approach, which became the basis for the scientific method.

John Locke was a philosopher that believed that the mind at birth is blank. He disagreed with Plato in that a person learns from experiences.

Auguste Comte, who was not a pragmatist, influenced pragmatism to use science when problem solving. His dream was to use science to help reform society.

Charles Darwin, was considered the most important and influential with regards to pragmatism. He was attacked because of his religious theories. He believed that nature operates without an intended end or result. Organisms will live and then die out when changes in nature occur.

Charles Sanders Peirce was an American pragmatist that never received the recognition he deserved. He believed that ideas were nothing until they have been tested in actual experiences.

William James, made pragmatism a wider public view. He believed that an idea must be tried before it can be considered good.

John Dewey. The final philosopher, which is considered to be the greatest asset to pragmatism,  has been described as the greatest as American philosophy, Dewey move from the idealist’s camp to the beginnings of a pragmatic philosophy which he was to characterize with the name of instrumentalism .In later years there were many “disciples” of John Dewey who in trying to elaborate some of his ideas went to extremes that appalled their mentor Dewey was a frequent critic of what came to be known in American educational circles as “progressivism” or the “progressive movement”.

Historical Retrospect of Analytic Philosophies

Logical positivism can be looked as the direct ancestor of Analytic philosophy. August Comte’s statements have meaning become the rallying cry among the scientists and former scientists who were interested in philosophy. The group grew out of a seminar conducted by Moritz Schlick in 1923 n Vienna. They often criticized philosophy of few like David Hume, were treated with scorn. Even the fundamental laws of Physics were rejected as meaningless by some, but Carnap insisted these laws were related to experience, albeit in a suitable way.

The earlier Analytic philosophers admitted that there are statements which are a PRIORI and yet dependable, but this they said is because such statements do not really asserts anything. The predicated simply spells out something implicitly contained in the subject, as in “Bulbs have filaments”. Synthetic statements (those in which the subject does not imply the predicate) which are not testable by observation may have a certain function but they are not, strictly speaking meaningful. Thus, the general statements like being and change good or bad and other staples of widely used traditional metaphysics and ethics are, literally make no sense.

The Analytic philosophic acquired their independent identity through the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is a difficult thinker to summaries, for much of his techniques seems to consist in shaking the reader up somewhat after the manner of a Zen masters whacks and inscrutable aphorisms. His earlier positions later modified considerably are set forth in his work. “Tractus Logico-philosophies” in the year 1922. Later on Wittgenstein concerned himself more and more with detail of ordinary language, less and less with building a formal philosophical system.

There is another reason to study history: it’s fun. History combines the excitement of exploration and discovery with the sense of reward born of successfully confronting and making sense of complex and challenging problems.

–Frank Luttmer (1996)

 

 

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ETHICS-What ought to be aspect of philosophy

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

A man without ethics is a wild beast loosed upon this world.
Albert Camus

What are the important values which are to be desired in living? Are these values rooted in reality? And how can they be realized in our experience? The branch  of philosophy dealing with such questions are these is named AXIOLOGY . Axiology, then  is the subject area which tries to answer  these Ethics is a general term for what is often described as the “science (study) of morality”. It is concerned with questions on morality and values and how they apply to various situations. It can be divided into the branches of meta-ethics, normative and applied ethics. Ethics seeks to understand the basis of morals, how they develop and how they are and should be followed

In philosophy, ethical behaviour is that which is “good” or “right.” The Western tradition of ethics is sometimes called moral philosophy. It is concerned with questions on morality and values and how they apply to various situations. It can be divided into the branches of meta-ethics, normative and applied ethics. Ethics seeks to understand the basis of morals, how they develop and how they are and should be followed. The study of values in human behaviour or the study of moral problems: e.g.,

(1) The rightness and wrongness of actions,

(2) The kinds of things which are good or desirable,

(3) Whether actions are blameworthy or praiseworthy, the nature of good and evil. The problems of conduct and ultimate objectives of life.

The field of ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behaviour

ETHICS IN PERENNIALISM

Just as man tends towards knowledge, so he tends towards the moral life. And, just as knowledge is attained through reason, so the moral life is the life consonant wit reason. The good act is the act controlled by man’s rationality. But man does not always act in terms of his rationality; hi is sometimes controlled by his will, which bay err, or his desires. The good man is one whose will is habituated to and subservient to the intellect. The ecclesiastical perennialists hold that where sin exists (the will acting in opposition to the intellect), forgiveness may be attained if the sinner can show his intentions were good. By the same token, if a man dose not know his is wrong, he cannot be held responsible for his acts.

ETHICS IN PRAGMATISM

Pragmatism is essentially a humanistic philosophy, maintaining that man creates his own values in the course of activity that reality is still in the making and awaits its part of completion from the future, that to an unascertainable extent our truths are manmade products.;  Ross, James, S.,

Ethical values are a product of the transactional functioning of man and society. The good is that which resolves indeterminate situations in the best way possible. Thus, the use of the intellect in the solving of problems is considered good by the pragmatists while total avoidance of human problems or unthinking reliance on some “higher” authority would be considered bad. Values emerge from the process of reflective deliberation and the accepted only after reflective deliberation. In each generation must create new values and new solutions to deal with new problems. The values of the crossbow, the pragmatists would say, are no longer necessarily applicable or relevant to the day of the hydrogen bomb.

The question still remains, though, how are we to know what is the best solution to a problem? Dewey finds growth the basis of all ethics. That which contributes to growth is good. That which would stunt, deflect, or retard it is bad. But, since man is not completely independent unto himself, what may appear good in the private sense must also be explored in the public sense. We must ask two questions then about an act or decision. First, what are the individual consequences? And second, what are the public consequences? We must also consider whether these consequences will contribute to or retard, growth.

Morals are personal because they spring from personal insight, judgment, and choice. Such facts as these, however, are wholly consistent with the fact that what men think and believe is affected by common factors, and that the thought and choice of one individual spread to others. They do not militate against the fact that men have to at together, and that their conjoint action is embodied institutions and laws……The material of personal reflection and of choice comes to each of us from the customs, traditions, institutions, policies, and plans of these large collective wholes.

Ultimately, for the pragmatists, morality demands the use of the experimental method. If we do not, the pragmatists argue, have a morality which emerges out of the observance of and reflection on a variety of situations we accept the alternative course which is commitment to a dogmatic morality.

ETHICS IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHIES

The analysists, like the positivists before them, stress that religion and logical deduction can not under write moral or aesthetic values. This can only be done by experience. Such concepts as beauty and goodness are urgently in need of reformulation. Values are not necessarily subjective, but they need to be brought into the sphere of the observable. Some of the concepts upon which moral judgments traditionally have depended, such as that of free will, are debunked as murdy. The analysis’s holds that the study of ethics is reducible to psychology and should act; C.L.Stevenson held that ethical terms have only emotive meanings. “Stealing is wrong” means, “The idea of stealing fills me with horror” ethics can only state that certain action usually have certain consequences one like these consequences or doesn’t.

ETHICS IN MARXISM

Marxists have been somewhat ambivalent in their acceptance or rejection of traditional beliefs. In the areas of curriculum and methodology, they have reinstated much from pre-revolutionary times In the realm of values, Marxism holds many of the ancient beliefs such as patriotism, love and respect for parents and elders, honesty, and distributive justice.

In spite of the many statement that Marxists have no concern for values (especially moral values) a perusal of Communist technical and educational literature reveals that more attention it paid to the moral behavior of the “faithful Communist” than any other aspect of life. The school, for example, is given the major responsibility for developing “ethical character” in pupils so that they will be law-abiding, productive citizens of the communities in which they live. Only by living the good life can they contribute to the ultimate triumph of Marxism. It is true that the leaders of Marxism rejected the traditional foundation of morality and subordinated all value theory to the interests of the working class in its struggle against the oppressors.

A person with proper moral training is one who subordinates all his actions, interests, and desires to the service of the Communist state and the “People.” In order to achieve this perfect moral state, the child must learn to hate all that is contrary to the principles. Furthermore, the morally perfect Communist must be willing to sacrifice everything, including his life, to defend the doctrines of Communism.

One of the first moral principles children must learn is the respect for public property. Teachers should inculcate this principle by using stories from history but, above all, by example. If neither of these approaches succeeds in convincing the pupil, the teacher must use force to convince him of his error. The child should not be allowed to harm others by his lack of conformity to rules demanding respect for public property.

Respect for authority is another moral principle which children must learn early in life. This respect is not to be based upon fear of punishment  for, as Anton Makarenko says, cruelty begets cruelty in children. Rather, the child should learn to respect the authority of the teacher and others because these people have been helpful, understanding, fair, and firm. “True authority is founded on the making of reasonable demands on the child, combined with respect for his personality, devotion to his interests, ability to help him, clarity, firmness of educational purposes, and worthiness of personal example.”

ETHICS IN HUMANISM

Humanism is a philosophy for the here and now. Humanists regard human values as making sense only in the context of human life rather than in the promise of a supposed life after death.Humanism is a philosophy of compassion. Humanist ethics is solely concerned with meeting human needs and answering human problems–for both the individual and society–and devotes no attention to the satisfaction of the desires of supposed theological entities.

Humans evolved as social animals, which is the only reason humanity has developed culture and civilization, and now in fact depends on them. Therefore the pursuit of human happiness requires the pursuit of a healthy society so people can live in it, interact with it, and benefit from it.

Humanism is in tune with today’s enlightened social thought. Humanists are committed to civil liberties, human rights, church-state separation, the extension of participatory democracy not only in government but in the workplace and education, an expansion of global consciousness and exchange of products and ideas internationally, and an open-ended approach to solving social problems, an approach that allows for the testing of new alternatives.

Humanism is, in sum, a philosophy for those in love with life. Humanists take responsibility for their own lives and relish the adventure of being part of new discoveries, seeking new knowledge, exploring new options. Instead of finding solace in prefabricated answers to the great questions of life, Humanists enjoy the open-endedness of a quest and the freedom of discovery that this entails.

The Humanist Manifesto goes on to state, “we can discover no divine purpose or providence for the human species. While there is much that we do not know, humans are responsible for what we are or will become. No deity will save us; we must save ourselves.”

And humanism has a firm position on ethics. “Moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational.” In other words, morals are not derived from absolutes given by God, but are determined by the individual from situation to situation. By and large, the humanists deplore any reference to them as being “religious.”.

ETHICS IN EXISTENTIALISM

Kierkegaard reacted to this way of thinking by saying that it was up to the individual to find his or her own moral perfection and his or her own way there. “I must find the truth that is the truth for me . . . the idea for which I can live or die” he wrote.

Existentialists have a special connotation of the Authentic man According to the existentialists, becoming authentic allows one to determine how things are to count towards one’s situation and how one is to act in relation to them.

Generally the existentialists consider authentic individuals to take responsibility for determining and choosing possibilities and not to simply become a determined product of a cultural moment. One can choose one’s own identity and possibilities rather than have these dictated by the crowd.

According to existential ethics the highest good for humans is “becoming an individual or “authenticity” = psychological coherence + integrity = not merely being alive but having a real life by being true to yourself

The very essence of good is choosing.It seems them, that man never chooses evil. A man “becomes a man” when he makes choice. When he makes choices he creates his own values. When he creates his own values, he creates his own being or essence.

ETHICS IN   REALISM

The realist believes in natural laws. Man can know natural law and live the good life by obeying it. All man’s experience is rooted in the regularities of the universe or this natural law. In the realm of ethics this natural law is usually referred to as the moral law. These moral laws have the same existential status as the law of gravity in the physical sciences or the economic laws which are supposed to operate in the free market. Every individual has some knowledge of the moral and natural law, but this knowledge may be minimal.

Among realists, there are at least two general theories of value: (1) that values are simple indefinable elements, which are experienced for what they are when we experience them, and  that values are dependent upon the attitudes of the sentient beings experiencing them.

According to the first of these theories, those qualities of our experience, which we prefer or desire, and to which we attach worth, have something about them which makes them preferable or desirable. But according to the second theory, the key to the evaluation is to be found in the interest.

Montague finds the ethics of John Stuart Mill to be quite acceptable: for him, the moral good can be defined from the vantage point of society as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.”

ETHICS IN NATURALISM

Naturalism believes that “A refined moral life is just as much a work of Nature as much a work of Nature as is a coarse and vulgar immortality. You are wrong in implying, first of all, that a natural life is an immoral life. And furthermore; your religious experience that a power from beyond yourself is sustaining you in doing good is a natural phenomenon. Nature is versatile. This experience is no doubt a valid one. You are being sustained in living a good life. For it is in harmony with Nature, when it is inclusively, to do well and avoid evil”

To naturalists, values arise from the human beings’ interaction with the environment .Instincts. Drives and impulses need to be expressed rather than repressed. According to them, there is no absolute good or evil in the world. Values of life are created by the human needs

Ethics of naturalism is hedonistic, as long as this characterization is accompanied by the caution that in the conscious though at least of many naturalists the highest good is the most highly refined and abiding pleasure.

Pleasure is easily discerned as the highest good in the thought of the ancient naturalists. It is not hard to feel what they must have felt when they desired quietude and freedom from struggle, pain and fear as the predominant inner possessions continuing uninterrupted through as many of their experiences as possible. Most of us share their desire for this same peace and happiness, although we may not make it such a supreme value hat we will sacrifice all other possible values for it. The important thing to note about this highest moral good, first of all, is a thing to be enjoyed; it is some thing, more on the feeling side of experience, which the person who possesses it undergoes and enjoys as contentment or satisfaction. To a person so framing his conception of moral values, the pleasure ethics of naturalism may seem weak and selfish, because private enjoyment, even though it may be in no way contrary to convention, is placed prior to all other considerations.

To summarize, we may say then that for naturalism pleasure is the highest good and therefore the basis of marl judgments; but this pleasure is very subtle and highly refined for many naturalists. To the extent that a person is consciously naturalistic in his ethics, he will make his day-by-day moral choices so as to claim for himself the fullest measure of abiding pleasure and satisfaction. The evil which it is hoped will be avoided in this way is purely a product of Nature. It is largely inflicted evil, toward which the attitude of individual man is rightly passive avoidance. Although men in the mass certainly inflict large-scale social evils on other men, it is not necessarily so that individual man unwittingly becomes a cause of evil to his neighbour and to himself.

ETHICS IN IDEALISM

What is Good (Ethics) – As to ethics, idealism holds that the goodness of man’s individual and social life is the conformity of the human will with the moral administration of the universe. Idealists generally root all values either in a personal God or in a personal spiritual force of nature. They all agree that values are eternal. Theistic Idealists assert that eternal values exist in God. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness are known to the extent that the idea of good and the idea of beauty are consistent with the absolute good and the absolute beauty found in God. Pantheistic Idealists identify God with nature. Values are absolute and unchanging because they are a part of the determined order of nature

In ethics it implies a view of life in which the predominant forces are spiritual and the aim is perfection For the idealist the good life in living in harmony with the universe. If the Absolute is viewed as the final and most ethical of all things and persons, or as God, who is by definition perfect and it thus perfect in morals the idealist’s epitome of ethical conduct and morality will lie in the imitation of Absolute Self. Man is mot moral when his behaviour is in accord with the Ideal and Universal Moral Law which we can and do recognize. Even if we do not recognize it as individuals, there are in not societies those whose special function it is, either as teachers or as ministers, to instruct, clarify, and inform us as to what behaviour is in accord with the Universal Moral Law.

Conclusion

There seems to be adequate evidence for the conclusion that man’s ultimate moral success is by no means guaranteed by his own nature and potentiality. Fundamentally, man is made for fellowship with God, and accordingly, man does not find true equilibrium in stable goodness, either individually or socially, unless he is in relation to God and in harmony with His purpose. There are at least three aspects of this moral tension which can be made more explicit and thereby help to characterize man’s moral condition.

The first of these, and really the heart of the matter, is that the ultimate good and the spiritual fellowship of the divine society are so closely identified that goodness apart from fellowship is a contradiction.

The second aspect of the moral nature of man to be mentioned is that the freedom of man is not only, nor primarily, a freedom in the choice of means to the ultimate good, but it is also, and more especially, a freedom in the choice of the ends.

The third aspect of man’s moral situation, and distinctly of secondary importance in comparison to the first two, is that the end for which man is intended is most difficult of realization.

Ethics is knowing the difference between what you have a right to do and what is right to do.
Potter Stewart

 

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Philosophies of Education-A critical evaluation

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

Since philosophy is the art which teaches us how to live, and since children need to learn it as much as we do at other ages, why do we not instruct them in it? But in truth I know nothing about the philosophy of education except this: that the greatest and the most important difficulty known to human learning seems to lie in that area which treats how to bring up children and how to educate them. – (de Montaigne, on teaching Philosophy of Education)

Before analyzing the educational implications of general philosophy, we should know the concept of “Philosophy” and “Education”. Each one of us has a personal philosophy which we apply consciously and unconsciously in our daily life

Interdependence of philosophy and education is an essentiality for human development .both represents two side of a coin, both are equally important. PHILOSOPHY DETERMINES THE VIEW OF LIFE WHILE EDUCATION DETERMINES THE WAY OF LIFE.. They are so interlocked that without the one the existence of the other is beyond comprehension.

EVALUATION OF IDEALISM IN EDUCATION

Idealism is a philosophical approach that has as its central tenet that ideas are the only true reality, the only thing worth knowing. In a search for truth, beauty, and justice that is enduring and everlasting; the focus is on conscious reasoning in the mind.

The main tenant of idealism is that ideas and knowledge are the truest reality.  Many things in the world change, but ideas and knowledge are enduring.  Idealism was often referred to as “idea-ism”. Idealists believe that ideas can change lives.  The most important part of a person is the mind. It is to be nourished and developed.

From this very general philosophical position, the Idealist would tend to view the Learner as a microscopic mind, the Teacher as a paradigmatic self, the Curriculum as the subject matter of symbol and idea (emphasizing literature, history, etc.) The educational approach of this philosophy is of a holistic nature.  In which self-realization and character development is strongly supported.  The idealist feels that with the growth of a fine moral character as well as personal reflection, wisdom is gained.  Information across curriculum

Idealism has been influential in education for a considerable amount of time. It is considered a conservative philosophy because of its emphasis in preserving cultural traditions. The strengths of idealism include encouraging thinking and cognition, promoting cultural learning, and providing for character development of students. Teachers are considered valuable parts of the educational process who should strive to provide a comprehensive, systematic, and holistic approach to learning that stresses self realization.

Idealism justifiably makes the reality of the self the focal point of philosophizing. The fact that the basic intuition that the self is real is so strong in every one of us makes it essential that any philosophy to beat all adequate must do justice to this intuition. Sometimes can be said for the focal points of the other philosophies, each one has as a focal point a basic intuition common to most men.. However none of the other focal points are as immediate to each individual person as the self is real.

Idealism is a comprehensive philosophy. It deals with both metaphysics and epistemology as equally primary considerations; there is a consistency and inter-relationships of principles found necessary in both of these fields; the same consistency also follows through into matters of logic and into various realms of value; and the comprehensive system, of thought resulting has been richly and fruitfully practiced in such important area as education.This comprehensiveness is a quality which contrasts with the other philosophies.

Critics of the idealist philosophy of education have been vocal and consistent, and there is, indeed, no lack of arguments opposing the position both philosophically and educationally. Here are the most common criticisms of this philosophical school.

One weakness of idealism, which may be unavoidable, is the great difficulty with which it is correctly understood. This difficulty is made evident by the abundance of misconceptions concerning idealism.

A-Probably the most common one is that idealism is a visionary utopianism, either individual or social both.

B- Another probably not so much a misconception as a mistaken identity, is the occasional identification of philosophy of idealism with some of the occult groups which luxuriate in a vague spiritualism, removed from the quite out of joint with empirical and social processes.

C- A third misinterpretation is the version of idealism which makes it a subjectivism holding that nothing exists except in the mind of the individual.

D- The last misconception here is the version that idealism teaches that the conceptions or ideas which a given mind, or which the social mind, forms concerning reality are identical with reality. This again is a kind of subjectivism and also an identification of specific ideas with reality.

Idealism is  linked with traditional religion. The weakening of religion has led to the weakening of idealism as a philosophy.  Through Plato’s ruler kings, and Augustine’s emphasis on the monastic life, it has been said that idealism leads to intellectual elitism. In the past, education was considered important for the upper classes of society, marking education as a luxury.   Vocational and technical studies were considered good enough for the general public.

Idealistic education was considered bookish and lacking relevance. It is argued that the character development aspect of the philosophy involved conformity and subservience on the part of the learner. This type of character development was considered to stifle creativity and self direction, making students gullible and ready to accept ideas without serious examination.

Lack of emphasis on the importance of science and technical education. James Madison’s quote that knowledge is power, which sits front and center on my class webpage, seems to agree with this premise.  Because I believe strongly in project based education as a way to have students discover and learn new information, I also began to view the idealism in my thinking. However, as much as I value these things and continue to believe in the importance of continually gaining knowledge, the fact that I view science and technology as a valued part of all education, sets me apart from the philosophy. While the idealist considered science and technical studies good enough for the general public, I consider them an integral part of any education. However I do believe in the importance of teaching children to think, for not doing so results in children with book learning and no common sense.

Idealism sets Unobtainable Goals for education .For the educator who is concerned with having the child reach out and grasp the Ideal there are two significant problems. First, if perfection is unreachable there is very little desire on the part of most to become perfect. For the idealist student the goals are often too far away. Second, the idealists have set up a final goal: to know the Ideal and become part of it. This implies a finite tend and as such means that we have a final end in view. It argues strongly against those who take the point of view that man is infinitely perfectible.

Idealism ignores the Physical Self .The body cannot be ignored. If we try to ignore the body it soon intrudes itself upon us. We do, whether we like the idea or not, react to and fake into our mind an deal with, on the intellectual level, such question as whether or not we are hot, cold, hungry, tired, happy, or sad. We will often give our greatest thought to changing or modifying our physical realm, particularly where we are trying to avoid discomfort. In the classroom the teacher who would forget that the student has a body as well as a mind will soon be faced with discipline problem as youthful spirits react to bodily demands. Thus, to try to separate mental activity from the physical and to try to place Ideas in a realm unrelated to the existent world becomes nothing more than an exercise in futility.

Idealism reemphasizes experience . Many ideas cannot have meaning apart from experience. The ideas of heat and cold are not simply logical constructs, but ways of describing certain sensations found only in experience. This is not meant to imply that all things must be rooted in experience. If this were true, we would have great difficulty in dealing with the study of sub-atomic particles, and the whole field of mathematics might well be called into question. But, most ideas do find their roots in experience, and to deny the validity of this experience is to make the universe sterile.

Idealism leads to totalitarianism. Some of the critiques of idealism is that is discourages the progress of science and our modern discovery.  It also serves as somewhat of an elitist view in that although the classics have merit for use in the classroom, they are not necessarily the choice for all students.  To only concentrate on the classic writings is to waste a vast amount of wonderful knowledge that has been gained through contemporary writings and art.    Further more; creating a society in which students are taught to be docile and accept without challenging those areas held to be absolute could essentially be creating an environment in which students are subservient and quick to confirm. The whole doctrine of idealism may lead to a rigid and often totalitarian social order. It may become the very antithesis of Democracy since it argues that the best equipped for leadership are those who are closest to the Ideal. Plato, in the Republic, sets up a perfect society in which the leaders are the Philosopher-Kings; of the Ideal. Gentile, in twentieth century Italy, provides another example of the dangers of what can happen when the social theory inherent in the idealistic philosophy is put into practice in the ruling of nations.

Idealism emphasizes humanities. Science today has challenged idealism .Science is based on hypothesis and tentativeness, but idealism promotes a finished and absolute universe waiting to be discovered The idealist philosopher demands that all must conform to the laws which are the immutable working of the Ideal. There is, in idealism, the assumption of a universal morality which will lead to the perfect moral and ethical order. Since much, if not all, of this has an optimistic, humanities oriented outlook, it may lead to a rejection of the whole concept of a technological society which is mechanistic and “scientifically” oriented.

Idealism overlooks possibility of error .Perhaps the greatest failing of any philosophical system is that it fails to take into account the possibility that it may be in error. This is especially true of idealism since its truth is immutable and unchanging. Even were the Ideal to change, as long as the notion of the Ideal is accepted as such then idealism has built into it its own verification.

One final comment seems called for before moving on to the next philosophical –educational system. Idealism, like many other systems, is dependent at any given time for its definition of truth upon certain spokesmen who would seen to be better able to know the Ideal. This can often lead to conflict as to the Truth of one world system as opposed to another. The whimsical sight of two idealist scholars standing off and yelling at each other, “My Truth is right, your truth is wrong,” is tempered somewhat by the picture of two hydrogen bomb holding despots standing off and yelling the same thing at each other.

EVALUATION OF NATURALISM IN EDUCATION

Naturalism is a concept that firmly believes that ultimate reality lies in the nature of the matter. Matter is considered to be supreme and mind is the functioning of the brain that is made up of matter. The whole universe is governed by laws of nature and they are changeable. It’s through our sense that we are able to get the real knowledge. The senses works like real gateways of knowledge and exploration is the method that helps in studying nature. Naturalism is a term loosely applied in educational theory to systems of training that are not dependent on schools and books but on manipulation of the actual life of student. Naturalism is an artistic movement advocating realistic description: in art or literature, a movement or school advocating factual or realistic description of life, including its less pleasant aspects. In literature, the doctrine rejecting spiritual explanations of world: a system of thought that rejects all spiritual and supernatural explanations of the world and holds that science is the sole basis of what can be known. a belief that all religious truth is derived from nature and natural causes, and not from revelation

In naturalism, perhaps the most controversial from the point of view of many philosophers is the absence of any permanent goals for education. Without some permanence of aims education can easily become a haphazard, day to day activity without any central focus.

By designating experience as the sole source of knowledge naturalism limits itself to one methodology and to a narrow curriculum divested of much of the knowledge acquired by past generations as well as of the many artistic production of the human race.

From various points of view naturalistic epistemology is too limited. To reduce knowing to experience preludes many possibilities of knowing about ethical and aesthetic values and the realm of the metaphysical.

The somewhat naïve view that human nature is essentially good resulted in the elevation of pupil freedom to the detriment of even the minimal order and discipline essential from optimal learning.

On the other hand the most significant educational reform proposed by the naturalists flows from their belief that the natural growth pattern of children should determine the content and method of education. The modern concept of “readiness,” accepted by educators of all persuasions, is a result of this principle.

A corollary of this generalization reminds the educator that content and method should be adjusted to the individual differences of the pupils. Naturalists recognized the failure of traditional education in regard to this rather obvious fact and offered both theoretical and practical means for adapting content and method to individual differences.

Another principal advocated by the naturalists and generally accepted by all modern educators stresses the pedagogical value of “learning by doing.” Much of traditional teaching was highly verbal and abstract, even when the occasion did not call for such an approach. The naturalist reminds all educators to utilize direct experience whenever possible to insure meaningful and lasting learning.

One final contribution suggested by naturalistic theory which has been a value to all educators can be traced to the dictum that “learning is naturally pleasurable.” Too often, the traditionalists preached that learning was pleasant, but their practices belied their principles. In many traditional schools, especially at the lower levels, it was assumed that “good education” must be unpleasant because children were unwilling to learn. But the naturalist argued that if education utilized the natural interests of student as the starting point for learning even the most difficult tasks could become pleasant. If nature itself contains those ingredients necessary for the improvement of the species, it behooves the educator to formulate his aims, devise educational methods and procedures, create a curriculum, and strengthen educational agencies according to the natural tendencies found within man. Then and only then can one be assured of the continued progress of the human race. Any appeal to sources outsider nature for improvement of the educative process is miseducative since it violates the very foundations upon which education should be built. Nature must be accorded free play if there is to be improvement in the child. Nature itself experiences seems to guarantee progress .

One final comment will be made concerning naturalism in education. As to naturalism as a philosophy of education, the chief criticism is that, it is not sufficiently complete and comprehensive, although what it does say is said quite well. It is rather earthbound to define objectives of education, as those activities for which the study of science can equip us. This becomes evident in relation to the objective that the study of science can equip us for leisure activities. Geometry, perspective, and mathematics may have some connection with the appreciation of art, for example, but they are a small part of this flight from the earthbound, and it is likely that there are many people who have rather rich aesthetic experiences without benefit of the rites of science. Secondly, the student is not done justice when he is conceived of as a little animal; he is more than this, and any education will be inadequate which does not propose to deal with something more than little animals. The call to design the educative process more in harmony with the rhythms of Nature, to make still another comment, is a call; which still needs to be heard today. But such a design for education needs to be supplemented by harmonizing it with personal and spiritual rhythms as well.

However, evaluations of naturalism from  other than the supernaturalism point of view are possible. The notion that man is innately good appears too optimistic in the light of events of the past century. One might argue that man has become less human as he becomes more advanced in his evolutionary development. The cruel wars, injustice toward minorities, and many of the ills of modern man hardly suggest such optimism.

EVALUATION OF PRAGMATISM IN EDUCATION

Pragmatism in education came into prominence to fulfil an obvious need in the educational thought of America. With education becoming available to all men rather than to a select few, the country was searching for a way of viewing the educational process other than through the framework provided by the older “elitist” philosophies of You see by his what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and reconciler……. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, and no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field she is at a great advantage over both positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way of conception.— William James

The pragmatic philosophy of education has probably been subjected to more criticism, both valid and invalid, than any other education philosophy. This is, in part, because of its liberal orientation. Social, economic, political and educational conservatives have found it a useful target for the pointed finger and the cry of “anathema.” To some extent the criticisms have been justified, but for the most part the pragmatists have simply stood as a convenient scapegoat for the demagogues. Even today, in many parts of the nation, conservative candidates for political office are expected to swear their eternal opposition to “progressive education” and the prime devil of the movement, John Dewey. In None Dare Call It Treason by John Stormer, a book which  became a major campaign document for conservatives during the political wars of 1964, John Dewey is characterized as “Denying God, he held to the Marxist concept that man is without a soul or free will.” His educational experiments in Chicago are dismissed in the following tow sentences. “They were dismal failures.” “Children learned nothing.” As for Dewey’s philosophy orientation toward education, Stormer describes is as follows.

Taken to a logical conclusion. Dewey’s theory would have the child who finds himself in the company of thieves become a thief also. The tendency to justify immoral or unethical conduct by rationalizing that “everybody dose it” is rooted in Dewey’s teaching.

Strict acceptance of Dewey’s theories would eliminate teaching world geography unless the child can take a trip around the world. History would be eliminated from the curriculum, because it is past and will not be relived by the student.

While it would be impossible to refute all of the fallacious criticisms to which John Dewey and his philosophical statements have been subjected, it is perhaps worth noting that John Stormer’s book, between February and July of 1964, went through eleven printings with a total of 1,400,000 copies coming off the presses. The author was, as that time, chairman of the Missouri Federation of Yong Republicans and as member of the Republican State Committee of Missouri. Thus, because of the author’s political position, the strategic time of publication, and the subject matter, the book received widespread publicity and was widely read. Unfortunately many Americans received their basic introduction to John Dewey and his philosophy in its pages. How accurate it may be can perhaps be determined through use of the following quote form John Dewey’s most popular book on education, democracy and Education, which sets forth his view on the subject of history and geography. “……..geography and history supply subject matter which gives background and outlook, intellectual perspective, to what might other wise be narrow personal actins or mere forms of technical skill. With every increase of ability to place our own doings in their time and space connections, our doings gain is significant content. We realize that we citizens of no mean city in discovering the scene in space of which we are denizens, and the continuous manifestation of endeavor in time of which hw ear heir and continues. Thus our ordinary daily experiences cease to be things of the moment and gain enduring substance”.

Aside from the criticisms of those who seek to make political or social capital from Dewey and his educational theories, there are a number of critics and a variety of criticisms which need to be heard with regard to the pragmatic position in both philosophy and education.

Pragmatism has weak ontology.It has been argued that the whole structure of the pragmatic position is relatively unstable due to its lack of a sound ontological base. The contention that eh pragmatist do not concern themselves with the clarification of their ontological assumptions is valid. Because of their general orientation, the pragmatic movement has emphasized concerns of an epistemology nature.

Pragmatism is considered anti-Intellectual .Another criticism often leveled at he pragmatic movement is that it is essentially anti-intellectual. While this is perhaps an perhaps an overstatement, it is true that the main area of concern for pragmatists is the marketplace of daily life. Thus, those philosophies oriented toward a rather rationalistic a priori type of though will find the pragmatists empirical and anti-intellectual.

Theory of Truth of Pragmatism seems quite weak. One of the seemingly weakest points in the pragmatist’s chain of though, and the one that has probably subjected the pragmatists to more valid and invalid criticism than any other theory of truth. If truth is seen as constantly being changed and tested, rather than as a stable body of knowledge, the whole stability of the universe is previous experience, which has been oriented toward finding and cataloging such truths, will go for naught. All other major philosophical systems are concerned with the nature of truth, and historically the vast majority have found a core of stable, unchanging, absolute values on which they could rely. The very fact that pragmatism challenges the existence of this core makes it, for many, a dangerous and radical philosophy.

Pragmatism  treats School as Instrument of Social Change. For school men the idea that there are no absolute and unchanging truths offers another dangerous challenge that many feel unable or unwilling to accept. Traditionally the school has been viewed as society’s instrument for the preservation and continuation of our cultural heritage. While the pragmatists would not argue with this, they would carry it a step further. The school and the whole process of education should be an instrument of social change and social improvement. Not only should students be taught  (and even here the pragmatists would probably prefer to say “not only should students be helped to learn….”) factual materials, they should deal with social problems. More conservative school men will argue that this is not the function of the school and that if the school and the classroom become instrument of inquiry and of social change, we are moving away from stability and toward anarchy.

Pragmatism is more theoretical than practical .Perhaps the greatest criticism that can be leveled at the pragmatic philosophers in the field of education is that while they have madder great inroads in educational theory, and some inroads in educational practice in the elementary schools, they are, from most educators, a group of thinkers largely ignored beyond the payment of ritual lip-service. This should be especially painful to those who would support a philosophy that measures much in terms of the practical consequences of a course of action. In fact, pragmatism in education is for the most part nothing but a straw man set up by the critics so they may knock it down. While preached loudly in the classroom of institutions of teacher education, it is not practiced in these very same classrooms or very many others around the country.

Pragmatism develops cult of Personality. Pragmatism has had a wide appeal to the mind of educators despite its general failure to emerge into practice. Because of this, and because of the many years of teaching by such pragmatists as John Dewey, Boyd Bode, William Heard Kilpatrick, and others, a whole cult grew up calling themselves progressive educators. For inspiration they largely turned toward Teachers College, Columbia University; but while turning in the direction of this fount of educational wisdom, they too often took as the gospel of progressive education third, fourth and fifth-hand accounts of what the intellectual leaders of the movement said and meant. This cult of personality and hero worship, coupled wit the failure or inability of many progressive educators to either read or understand the thinking of the educational theorist, too often led to a warmed over form of laissez-fair freedom in the classroom. The progressive education movement was, in fact, guilty of what must have been for the leaders of the pragmatic movement the greatest of all sins, reliance on authority as absolute. Because of this, and because of the burden of cliches the progressive movement has had to bear, it has had little opportunity to try its wings in the arena of public education.

Pragmatism as a philosophy of education has not totally been used correctly.Many schools have used certain parts of the philosophy, but not many use it consciously. Most people were interested in using the practical parts than focusing on the philosophy. Pragmatism as an educational belief does not have everyone agreeing. Some believe that it is too vague and others believe it is too watered down.

After analyzing pragmatism, we feel that this philosophy best describes our teaching style. This philosophy was easier to understand and make connections. Pragmatism reminds teachers to individualize their instruction to meet the needs of each learner. One must remember to keep old traditions, but incorporate new idea.

EVALUATION OF  REALISM  IN EDUCATION

From this very general philosophical position, the Realist would tend to view the Learner as a sense mechanism, the Teacher as a demonstrator, the Curriculum as the subject matter of the physical world (emphasizing mathematics, science, etc.), the Teaching Method as mastering facts and information, and the Social Policy of the school as transmitting the settled knowledge of Western civilization. The realist would favor a school dominated by subjects of the here-and-now world, such as math and science. Students would be taught factual information for mastery. The teacher would impart knowledge of this reality to students or display such reality for observation and study. Classrooms would be highly ordered and disciplined, like nature, and the students would be passive participants in the study of things. Changes in school would be perceived as a natural evolution toward a perfection of order.

For the realist, the world is as it is, and the job of schools would be to teach students about the world. Goodness, for the realist, would be found in the laws of nature and the order of the physical world. Truth would be the simple correspondences of observation. The Realist believes in a world of Things or Beings (metaphysics) and in truth as an Observable Fact. Furthermore, ethics is the law of nature or Natural Law and aesthetics is the reflection of Nature

In educational theory and practice, the scientific realists might be criticized for the following reasons:

Realism treats metaphysics as meaningless. The realists make no provision for the world of supernature and takes an agonistic view towards it. Most  of the propositions of traditional metaphysics are relegated to the realm of irrelevancy.

There is no role for functions as creative reason in realism.  One reason for  this flows from the monoistic assumption that the known and the knower are of the same nature. There is no role for such functions as creative reason- in the sense that reason can form abstractions from sense data.

The epistemology of the realists is inadequate. In realism only empirical knowledge is recognized as valid with in their system. The passive aspects of the knowing process are overemphasised by realists.

There is too much emphasis on the individual in realism .Some of them place too much emphasis on the individual in the educational program. Such preoccupation with the individual flouts the reality of the complexity and interdependence of modern society.

Stress on content much more than the methods:  The scientific realists with the exception or Russell stress content much more than the methods of acquiring knowledge. This emphasis often leads to rote memorization one of the major weaknesses of the traditional school. Thus lip service may be paid to the goals of developing critical thinking understanding and other complex intellectual functions but little is done by the student to attain these goals.

In realism there is little attention for developing an educational theory. Most of the philosophical realists of this school pay little or no attention to developing an educational theory consistent with their basic philosophical beliefs as Dewey, broody, Adler, And Martian have done

There is too much emphasis on sense experience in realism .The realist does not accept the existence of transcendental ( not based on experience or reason ) being. How could be know the non-existence of that which does not exist? Has non-existence got  no existence ?  Void ness and non-existence also are the parts of existence. Here the realist is dumb completely.

The realist recognizes the origin of knowledge from the datum achieved by senses and asserts that only objects are main and it is through their contact that knowledge is acquired. Then how does our illusion arise ? How does knowledge become fallacious? Where does the external object go in dream ? The realist is unable to answer these questions satisfactorily.

The curriculum proposed by most realist is one-sided. Today the effect of realism has given rise  to the wave of science. It is right, but there should be no indifference towards art and literature. The realist supports this negligence The curriculum proposed by most scientific realists is one-sided since empirical knowledge holds a position superior to that of the humanistic studies. This neglect is evident in the absence of a well defined theory of age and art education.

There is no place to imagination ,pure thoughts  and sentimentsin realism. Realism admits real feelings and needs of life on the one hand, gives no place to imagination and sentiment, on the other. What a contradiction? Are imaginations, emotions and sentiments not real needs of human life? Is emotionless life not almost dead life? Can life be lead on the basis of facts only?

The realist claims to be objective. Objectivity in knowledge is nothing but the partnership of personal knowledge. Knowledge is always subjective.”

Realism recognizes only the real existence of the material world. This recognition remains not objected to unless he says that only material world really exists. The question arises- Is there no power behind this material world? Does it have its own existence? What is the limit of the universe? The realist does give reply to these questions but these replies are not found to be satisfactory. The real existence of material world may be admitted but how can the existence come to an end in the world itself.

Realism enthuses disappointment in students and teachers. No progress can be made by having faith in the facts of daily life and shattering faith in ideals. Life is but full of miseries and struggles. Sorrow is more predominant than joy in the world. A person becomes disappointed by this feeling. That is why realists often appear to be skeptics, Pessimists and objectionists,

Realism encourages formalism. The Herbartian movement in the United States reached its peak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Because of its formalism it allowed a teacher to substitute technique for knowledge a long distance. It became a popular technique to impart to future teachers in normal schools and in other institutes for teacher preparation. Its very formalism was also its greatest weakness since it allowed a teacher slavishly to develop a lesson with allowed the rigid teacher to teach rigidly. Herbart himself would probably have shuddered at the misuse of what he conceived of as creative method for teaching children.

Both the New Realists and the Critical Realists failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of error. The New Realist position is the weaker of the two since direct cognition does not permit error and the rationale employed by Wild, that “Error is the creation of the erring subject” is most unsatisfactory if the mind is viewed purely as relational with no contents of its own with which to create error. The Critical Realists have solved the problem of error, but in doing so through the use of an intermediary or vehicle of knowledge; they have created a whole new host of problems in terms of defining and explaining the nature of the vehicle. Whether it is of the substance of mind, matter, or some neutral substance is unclear and varies with the particular philosopher one is reading. Both positions, despite their differences, create problems for the educator. The New Realist position with regard to error is manufacture unable, and the

There is danger of encouraging elitism. Finally, the same criticism of absolutes applies to the realists as applied to the idealists. There is the constant danger that there will arise a class of persons who be the ones with the responsibility of identifying and arbitrating questions concreting absolutes. These may be priests in an idealist society or scientist in a realist society, but whatever they are, they become an external source of authority in an area in which people should be speculating and the danger of an inquisition is always inherent in such a social structure. Whenever we allow any person or group of persons to tell us what is Truth and what is not Truth, and permit them the authority to force this point of view on us, we are in danger of losing the very essence of the truly democratic society.

Realism depends on cause- effect  relationships. The next criticism deals directly with the philosophical underpinnings of the realist position. Almost all the laws of nature that the realists stress are dependent upon cause- effect relationships. Most philosophers and scientists are chary of such absolutes. They prefer to deal in the realm of probability. Past activity is no guarantee of future activity. Because the sun rises in the East every day is no guarantee that it will rise there tomorrow, although the probability is ridiculously high.. Thus, to teach moral absolutes and natural laws is a highly questionable procedure.

Realism fails to deal with social change. Like the idealists, the realists are basically conservative in education. Rather than concern themselves with social change and educational progress they are most concerned with preserving and adding to the body of organized truth they feel has been accumulated. In a period when there was little social change occurring this type of philosophy may have been adequate. But in an increasingly automated society operating on an ever-expanding industrial base, many educators feel that education must be a creative endeavour, constantly looking for new solutions to problems. This role appears to be incompatible with the realist’s fundamental conception of the role of education in the society.

In short realism rejects or disregards the supernatural, and likewise denise duality in man’s nature or any distinction of cognitive powers into sensory and intellectual. Realists hold that man can know reality, and that he does so through inductive experience.

EVALUATION OF EXISTENTIALISM  IN EDUCATION

Just as its namesake sprang from a strong rejection of traditional philosophy, educational existentialism sprang from a strong rejection of the traditional, essentialist approach to education. Existentialism rejects the existence of any source of objective, authoritative truth about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Instead, individuals are responsible for determining for themselves what is “true” or “false,” “right” or “wrong,” “beautiful” or “ugly.” For the existentialist, there exists no universal form of human nature; each of us has the free will to develop as we see fit.

Existentialism is the most individualistic of all modern philosophies. Its overriding concern is with the individual and its primary value is the absolute freedom of the person, who is only what he makes himself to be, and who is the final and exclusive arbiter of the values he freely determines for himself. Great emphasis is placed on art, on literature, and the humanistic studies, for it is in these areas that man finds himself and discovers what values he will seek to attain.

Existentialism represents a protest against the rationalism of traditional philosophy, against misleading notions of the bourgeois culture, and the dehumanizing values of industrial civilization. Since alienation, loneliness and self-estrangement constitute threats to human personality in the modern world, existential thought has viewed as its cardinal concerns a quest for subjective truth, a reaction against the ‘negation of Being’ and a perennial search for freedom..

The evaluation of existentialism has been quite negative. Some even view it as an anti philosophical movement. Others, however, do not take such a dismal view of it. James Collins believes that it is a challenging and instructive philosophy

After studying the philosophy of Existentialism, the question will arise in anybody’s mind: how can the aims, curricula and methods in a school depend upon the individual’s choice and freedom.The teacher’s individual relationship and close understanding of every pupil’s personality would require a great deal of time and effort.

The concepts of ‘Being’, ‘meaning’, ‘Person’ are not very clear and appear nebulous. It is not easy to build up an educational programmed when the terminology for the objectives of the educational process is not clear…

There are some major areas of conflict between atheistic existentialism and traditional. The former’s complete denial of any forces outside the “human situation” and its rejection of any essential characteristic in man are contrary to traditional metaphysical beliefs. The radical subjectivity of existentialist epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics is also not in harmony with both traditional and many modern views of these issues.

Other limitations of existentialism lessen the acceptability of this school of thought as a philosophy for modern man. The most glaring one seems to be the naïve view the existentialists take of the “social realities” of the modern industrial, urban world. They offer no social theory for solving the complex problems of our scientific age Thus proposals for “individual living “ might appeal to the hermit or the frontiersman but they are of little help to the people who must spend their lives in large cities, work for large companies, worship in large congregations, and even recreate in crowds.. Man is responsible, not only for himself but for his fellowmen.

Yet another weakness might be noted in existentialist philosophy which limits its application to the modern world, namely, the neglect of the scientific mode of knowing in their general theory of knowledge. After all, this is the “age of science” and complete philosophy of life cannot relegate the philosophy of science to a position of minor importance.

As an educational philosophy, existentialism, at least in its present form, does not provide an adequate basis for educational theory. Perhaps this state of affairs is due to the fact that most existentialists have given no serious consideration to the development of the educational implications of their fundamental philosophical tenets.

There is no place in existentialist philosophy for social theory as developed within the other philosophies The existentialist often is accused of being “antisocial” in his behavior as well as in his philosophy. If existentialists have no theory of society, it might be more accurate to ask how they view other men. First, they would grant to others the same existential freedom which they demand for themselves. That is, man is never to be viewed as a means but rather as an end.

The school itself has become a place where the individual is “socialized” so that he can be a good group member, a good citizen rather than a good person. If existentialism does nothing else but bring about a proper balance between the individual and society, it will have merited the praise of educators.

In contrast, existentialism’s protagonists see it as the only hope for human survival as in existentialism.   Since existentialism is optimistic, the preaches the doctrine of action and emphasizes the concept of freedom, responsibility and choice, it has exerted an increasing appeal to the educator, who has been shown the new horizons

Interest is directed on the ‘man’ – his genuine or authentic self, his choices made with full responsibility of consequences, and freedom. It describes and diagnoses human weaknesses, limitations and conflicts

In short Existentialism is the most individualistic of all modern philosophies. Its overriding concern is with the individual and its primary value  is the absolute freedom of the person, who is only what  he makes himself to be, and who is the final and exclusive arbiter of the values he freely determine for himself. Great emphasis is placed on art, on literature, and the humanistic studies, for it is in these areas that man finds himself and discovers what values he will seek to attain.

EVALUATION OF PERENNIALISM  IN EDUCATION

Perennialists philosophers, despite a variety of minute distinctions, generally feel that they are advocates of the True Philosophy and with it the True Philosophy of Education. They are often unwilling to concede the possible validity of different interpretations of the same data. Adler, in his article aptly titled, “In Defense of The Philosophy of Education,” has this to say about the possible validity of any other system of philosophical inquiry:

Education is a preparation for life, not an imitation of life; or as the progressive insist it is not “life itself.” Education should be basically the same for all men.

Perennialism philosophy of education is a very conservative and inflexible philosophy of education. Students are taught to reason through structured lessons and drills. They are stressing reading, writing and arithmetic in education but the decline of the music and art. Perennialism philosophy of education is what helps in educators is to equip them with “universal knowledge

Perennialists believe in acquiring understandings about the great ideas of civilization. These ideas have the potential for solving problems in any era. The focus is to teach ideas that are everlasting, to seek enduring truths which are constant, not changing, as the natural and human worlds at their most essential level, do not change. Teaching these unchanging principles is critical. Humans are rational beings, and their minds need to be developed. Thus, cultivation of the intellect is the highest priority in a worthwhile education. The demanding curriculum focuses on attaining cultural literacy, stressing students’ growth in enduring disciplines. The loftiest accomplishments of humankind are emphasized– the great works of literature and art, the laws or principles of science

The perennialists, despite their many claims to the contrary, are advocates of a regressive social philosophy. They would have us solve our twentieth century problems by turning back the clock to a system of belief prevalent in the thirteenth century. They would have us turn the clock back to a time when the source of authority was external to man an when man stood in the very center of the universe;  to a time when, the perennialists would have us believe, man was at a moral and spiritual peak from which he has since declined. The moral, intellectural, and spiritual reaction that the perennialists advocate is seen as coming, of necessity, from the church and the university. The lower schools have little to do with social change, since the school must transcend society and deal wit the teaching of first principles, the permanent base of Eternal Truth which is true in all times and in all places.

Perhaps the most openly peresonalistic philosophy we have discussed, perennialism is subject to a variety of criticisms. Certainly there has been a great deal of criticism which can only be categorized as rooted in religious bigotry and which is violently anti – Catholic in nature. On the other hand, there are many criticisms which are valid whether on is discussing lay or ecclesiastical perennialism.

Whenever the question of immutable Truth is raised it is a proper response to ask, “Whose immutable Truth?” The perennialists rely on intuition, revelation and dogma of the Church and at time all three of these have been found wanting. If they were absolute and accurate guides to knowledge and Truth then surely the advocates of other position would long since have been convinced of the futility and error of their positions, and would have been become either lay or ecclesiastical perennialists.

It is not that who have rejected the perennialist position are stupid, this would be the easy answer. Even the most convinced perenniailst would not label an Einstein, an Oppenheimer, a Freud, a James, or a Dewey ignorant because they questioned the validity of the revelations or intuitions of the perenniaists.

There is reliance on Intermediaries in perennialism. Aside from the question of whether or not we can trust immutable truth, the perennialist philosophy relies on an intermediary of some sort to explain the supernatural. Thus, the perennialists are dependent upon authority. The authority, whether lay or ecclesiastical, is not open to question. Catholics rely for their authority no the dogma of the church and the body or revelation which the church has sanctioned. But the very fact that the church has argued and fought over what constitutes “correct” dogma raises doubts as to the validity of its absolute authority. One can only remember how close Galileo came to flames of ta heretic’s death for supporting a position which subsequently became the accepted norm in the civilized world. The lay perennialist, on the other hand, is somewhat less susceptible to the hierarchical authority of the Church. Nonetheless, he too finds his sources of authority in the great thinkers of the past and their statements as to the body of knowledge and Truth.

For perennialism knowledge as an end in itself. Finally, many educators would argue that knowledge as an end in itself is not a sufficient rationale for education. As we shall see in the next section, pragmatists would take immediate exception to statement such as Maritain’s that “Knowledge is a value in itself and an end in itself; and truth consists in the conformity of the mind with reality.”

Perennialism focus on past. In an increasingly technological society the perennialist philosophy is quite openly regressive. It is a longing not just for the status quo, but rather a desire to return to the good old days. The whole social theory of the perennialist has tended to ignore progress and has, for the most part, focused on a social order which has not existed since the middle ages.

In a simpler society there may be no danger is such a regressive social policy, but in an age of automation, over-production, over-abundance for some and starvation for others, in an age of atomic and hydrogen over-kill, and an age of red buttons that could destroy all human life leaving this planet nothing more than a charred ember in the universe, we cannot risk looking only into the past to find solution to problems of the present and the future

 

 

 

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MODELS OF TEACHING

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

The term model is used to mean a teaching episode done by an experienced teacher in which a highly focussed teaching behaviour is demonstrated, in it an individual demonstrating particular patterns which the trainee learns through imitation. It is a way to talk and think about instruction in which certain facts may be organized, classified and interpreted.

Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weil describe a Model of Teaching as a plan or pattern that can be used to shape curricula, to design instructional materials and to guide instruction in the classroom and other settings.

Thus teaching models are just instructional designs. They describe the process and producing particular environmental situations which cause the student to interact in such a way that specific change occurs in his behaviour.

.According to  N.K.Jangira and Azit Singh (1983): “A model of teaching is a set of inter-related components arranged in a sequence which provides guidelines to realize specific goal. It helps in designing instructional activities and environmental facilities, carrying out of these activities and realization of the stipulated objectives.”

Models of Teaching are designed for specific purposes-the teaching of information concepts, ways of thinking, the study of social values and so on-by asking students to engage in particular cognitive and social tasks. Some models centre on delivery by the instructor while others develop as the learners respond to tasks and the student is regarded as a partner in the educational enterprise.

These are based on the following specifications:

a-Specification of Environment- It specifies in definite terms the environmental conditions under which a student’s response should be observed.

b- Specification of operation- It specifies the mechanism that provides for the reaction of students and interaction with the environment.

c- Specification of criterion of Performance-It specify the criterion of Performance  which is accepted by the students The behavioural outcome which the learner would demonstrate after completing specific instructional sequences are delineated in the teaching models

d- Specification of learning outcome- It specifies what the student will perform after completing an instructional sequence.

Effects of teaching by modelling

Models of Teaching are really models of learning. As we helps students acquire information ideas skills, values, ways of thinking, and means of expressing themselves, we are also teaching them how to learn . ln fact the most important long term outcome of instruction may be the students ‘increased capabilities to learn more easily and effectively in the future ,both because of the knowledge and skills they have acquired and because they have mastered learning processes.

According to Joyce and Weil, Each model results in two types of effects Instructional and Nurturant.

A- Instructional effects are the direct effects of the model which result from

the content and skills on which the activities are based.

B- Nurturant effects are those which are implicit in the learning environment.

They are the indirect effects of the model.

Bandura and Walters have formulated three kind of effect in teaching by modelling:

1-     Modelling effect- The learner acquires new kind of response pattern.

2-     -Inhibitory and disinhibitory effect- The learner increases or decreases the frequent, latency or intensity or previously required responses.

3-      Eliciting effect- The learner receives from a model merely a cue for realising a response.

Modelling effect can be seen when a teacher demonstrates to a student how to hold a pencil or write capital A and thus shows a new behaviour. Through modelling the teacher lets the student know that it is not permissible of obscene nature in art book. The eliciting effect takes place when through modelling; a teacher tries to teach students to get up when he enters the room. Thus it provide a cue eliciting a response neither new nor inhibited. Gagne feels that learning through imitation seems to be more appropriate for tasks which are a little cognitive in nature.

Utility of Teaching Models in Teaching

  • Teaching models are useful in developing social efficiency, personal abilities, cognitive abilities and behavioural aspects of the students. It helps in selecting and stimulating situations which causes the desirable changes in students
  • Teaching models help to establish teaching and learning relationship empirically. It helps in making the teaching more effective.
  • Teaching models helps in providing a theoretical rationale to the teaching, which will provide changes and rectifications in teaching.
  • Teaching models stimulates the development of new educational innovations in teaching strategies and tactics, which may replace the existing ones in schools of today.
  • Teaching models assist makers of materials to create more interesting and effective instructional materials and learning sources.
  • Teaching models assist teachers to develop their capacities to create conductive environment for teaching, as its nature is practical.
  • Teaching models help curriculum planners to plan learning activities and content material which provide a variety of educational experiences to learners.
  • Teaching model evaluates the behaviour of the students. For this important task, it presents such a criterion with the help of which the changes in the students behaviours can be easily evaluated.

Characteristics of a Teaching model

1-     Encourage Art of Teaching- Teaching is considered as an art.. Teaching models encourages this art by providing learning environment.

2-     Development of Inherent Abilities -Teaching models bring about the qualitative development of personality as it helps in developing human abilities. It also increases the teacher’s social competency.

3-     Based on Individual Differences- Teaching model uses the student’s interest, as it is constructed on the basis of individual differences.

4-     Influenced by Philosophy- Every teaching model is influenced by the philosophy of education. Hence, teachers formulate different models of teaching under the influence of the philosophy they believe.

5-     Answers Fundamental Questions- In every teaching model answers to all the fundamental questions pertaining to the behaviour of students and teachers are included.

6-     Providing Appropriate Experiences- Teaching models provides proper experiences to both teacher and student. Selecting the content and presenting it for learning  before the students is the main essentiality of teaching. This difficulty is solved when a teacher presents appropriate experience before the students.

7-     Maxims of Teaching- The basis of teaching model is the maxims of teaching.  They are the foundation of each teaching model.

8-     Practice and Concentration- The development of a teaching model is based on regular and continuous practice and concentration. The proper development of a teaching model is only possible when the assumptions are made clear by related thinking.

Fundamental Elements of a Teaching Model:

Normally majority of teaching models are based on the following six elements:

Focus

Focus is the central aspects of a teaching model.  Objectives of teaching and aspects of environment generally constitute the focus of the model. Every teaching model is based on one or the other objective as its focal point. Any teaching model is developed by keeping this focal point in mind.  Every teaching model differs from another in terms of its objectives. It is the nucleus of a teaching model. Every model is developed by keeping in view its focal point or objective . Every model has various phases, some particular types of competencies are developed by it.

Syntax

Syntax  of the model describes the model in action. Syntax includes the sequences of steps involved in the organization of the complete programmed of teaching. It is the systematic sequence of the activities in the model. Each model has a distinct flow of phases. It means the detailed description of the model in action. In it, the teaching activities and interactions between a pupil and the teacher are determined .The syntax of any teaching model means those points which produce activities focused on educational objectives at various phases. Under syntax, the teaching tactics, teaching activities and interaction between a student and the teacher are determined in such a pattern of sequence that the teaching objectives are achieved conveniently by providing desirable environmental situations.

Principles of Reaction

Principles of Reaction tell the teacher how to regard the learner and to respond to what the learner does. This element is concerned with the way a teacher should regard and aspects respond to the activities of the students.  These responses should be appropriate and selective. They provide the teacher with rules of thumb by which to select model, appropriate responses to what the student does. This element is concerned with the teacher’s reaction to the students responses. In it,he comes to know that how he has to react to the responses of the students and has to see whether the learners have been actively involved in the process, or not.

The Social System

This element is concerned with the activities of pupil and the teacher and their mutualrelationships.   Every teaching model has separate objectives and will have therefore separate social systems. It is related with the  interactive roles and relationship between the teacher and the student, and the kinds of norms that are observed and student behaviour which is rewarded. The Social System describes the role of and relationships between the teacher and the pupils. In some models the teacher has a dominant role to play. In some the activity is centred around the pupils, and in some other models the activity is equally distributed.  This element is based on the assumption that every class is a miniature society. In it also discussed the selection of motivating strategies and tectics for the students. Naturally social system occupies a central position in making the teaching impressive and successful in relation to the previously selected objectives. .

Support system

Support System describes the supporting conditions required to implement the model. ‘Support’ refers to additional requirements beyond the usual human skills, capacities and technical facilities. The support system relates to the additional requirements other than the usual human skills or capacities of the teacher and the facilities usually available in the ordinary classroom. Teacher requirements refer to special skills, special knowledge of the teacher and special audio-visual material like films, elf-instructional material, visit to special place etc.This includes books, films, laboratory kits, reference materials etc. It means the additional requirements beyond the usual human skill, capacities and technical facilities. In it, the evaluation is done by oral or written examination, whether the teaching objectives have been achieved or not. On the basis of this success or failure, clear idea is achieved regarding the effectiveness of  strategies, tactics and techniques used during teaching.

Application

It is an important element of a teaching model. It means the utility or usage of the learnt material in other situations. Several types of teaching modes are available. Each model attempts to desirable the feasibility of its use in varying contexts related with goal achievements in terms of cognitive, and affective behaviour modification.

Types of Teaching Models:

Every teaching model has its specific objective. In order to achieve the objective of a teaching model, the teacher has to choose right type of model for achieving the particular objective. The teaching models have been classified into three main types:

1. Philosophical teaching models: Israel Saffer had mentioned such types of models. These include

A- The Insight model (Plato).-The insight model discard the assumption that the meaning of of a teaching model is merely deliver the knowledge or ideas through teaching to the mental domain  of the students. According to this model the knowledge can not be provided merely through the expression of sence organs, but the knowlnd principles of language are most important.edge of the content is also a necessity. The knowledge can not be provided merely by speaking the words or listening them. Mental processes and language both work together.

B- The Impression model of teaching (John Locke).-It is based on a general assumption the the child’s brain is like a clean slate at the time of birth. Whatever experiences are provided through teaching, creates impression on child’s brain. These impressions are termed as learning. In the learning process the sense organs .

C- The Rule model ( Kant)-In this model much importance is given to the logic. Kant gives importance to logic, because in it following certain rules is essential. The objective of rule model is to devlop the logical reasoning capacities of the student. Some particular rules are followed. Planning, organisation and interaction of teaching is performed under specific rules.

2- Psychological model of teaching: John P. Dececco had mentioned such types of models. It includes

A-  Basic Teaching model (Robert Glaser)- Robert Glaser (1962)  has developed a stripped-down teaching model which, with modifications, is the basic teaching model. The basic teaching model divides the teaching process into four components or parts. It will be useful in several ways.. The four parts  of the model  represent the basic divisions. Instructional objectives, Entering behavior, instructional procedure, and finally performance assessment.

B- An Interaction model of teaching (N.A. Flander).- Flander considered teaching process as an interaction process. He divided class-room behaviour in ten categories known as Flander’s ten category system. In this model the behaviour of student and teacher is analysed. An interaction between a teacher and the student is more emphasised in this model.

C-Computer based teaching model ( Daniel Davis )-It is the most complicated model having , entering behaviour, determination of objectives and teaching aspect as fundamental elements. In this element computer teaching plan is selected according to the entering behaviour and instructional objectives. The performances of the student are evaluated. Accordingly alternative teaching plan is presented. In this model, the diagnosis and teaching go side by side. Remedial teaching is provided on the basis of diagnosis .Individual differences are also given importance.

3- Modern teaching models (Joyce and Weil)

Eggen, Kauchar and Harder (1979) have discussed six Information Processing Models –

  1. General Inductive Model,
  2. Concept Attainment Model,
  3. Taba Model,
  4. General Deductive Model,
  5. Ausubel’s Model and
  6. Such man’s Inquiry Model.

Modern teaching models

The most comprehensive review of teaching models is that of Joyce and Weil (1980). Bruce R.Joyce has divided all the teaching models under the title “Modern teaching models”. They identified 23 models which are classified into four basic families based on the nature, distinctive characteristics and effects of the models. These four families are :

1. information Processing Models

2. Personal Models

3. Social Interaction Models and

4. Behaviour Modification Models.

Within the families, there are specific models which are designed to serve particular purposes.

Information Processing Models

The models of this type are concerned with the intellectual development of the individual and help to develop the method of processing information from the environment. These models focus on intellectual capacity. They are concerned with the ability of the learner to observe, organise data, understand information, form concepts, employ verbal and nonverbal symbols and solve problems. The primary purposes are :

1. The mastery of methods of inquiry

2. The mastery of academic concepts and facts

3. The development of general intellectual skills such as the ability to reason and think more logically

The models which belong to this family are :

a. The Concept Attainment Model

b. Inquiry Training Model

c. The Advance Organiser Model

d. Cognitive Growth Development Model

e. Biological Science Inquiry Model

Brief Review of the Information Processing Source Models

SOURCE TEACHING MODEL INNOVATOR AIMS AND APPLICATION
The Information Processing Source 1-Concept Attainment Model

2-Inductive Model

Bruner, Hilda Taba To develop inductive reasoning, mental inductive process, and understanding of concepts and principles.
  Inquiry Training Model Richard Suchman To develop individual competencies to achieve the social objective.
  Biological Science Inquiry Model Joseph J. Schwab To develop understanding of research methodology, to think logically on social problems.
  Advance Organizational Model David Asubel To understand concepts and facts and to make the content purposeful and interesting.
  Cognitive Growth Developmental Model Jean Piaget To develop general intelligence and logic,social and moral development.

II. Personal Models

Personal development models assist the individual in the development of selfhood, they focus on the emotional life an individual,.

The emphasis of these models is on developing an individual into an integrated, confident and competent personality. They attempt to help students understand themselves and their goals, and to develop the means for educating themselves. Many of the personal models of teaching have been developed by counsellors, therapists and other persons interested in stimulating individual’s creativity and self expression.

The primary goals are :

  • To increase the student’s self worth,
  • To help students understand themselves more fully.
  • To help students recognise their emotions and become more aware of the way emotions effect other aspects of their behaviour,
  • To help them develop goals for learning,
  • To help students develop plans for increasing their competence,
  • To increase the students’ creativity and playfulness,
  • To increase the students’ openness to new experience.

The models which belong to this family are :

a. Non-Directive Teaching Model,

b. Synectics Teaching Model,

c. Awareness Training Model,

d. Classroom Meeting Model.

e-Conceptual System Model

Brief Review of The Personal Source Models

SOURCE TEACHING MODEL INNOVATORS AIMS AND APPLICATION
The Personal Source Non-Directive Teaching Model, Carl Rogers To develop self learning by auto instructions, self research and self understanding
  Synectics Teaching Model, William Gordon To develop creative competencies for problem solving.
  Awareness Training Model, W.S. Fietz To develop individual competencies and mutual relations.
  Classroom Meeting Model. William Glasser To develop skills of self –understanding and capacities of dutifulness.
  Conceptual System Model David. F. Hunt To adjust with the environment with flexibility in the personality.

Ill. Social Interaction Models

The models in this family emphasise the relationships of the individual to the society or other persons. The core objective is to help students learn to work together. to identify and solve problems, either academic or social in nature.

The primary goals are :

To help students work together to identify and solve problems

  • To develop skills to human relations, and
  • To become aware of personal and social values.

The models which belong to this family are :

a. Group Investigation Model,

b. Role Playing Model,

c. Jurisprudential Inquiry Model,

d. Laboratory Training Model,

e. Social Simulation Model,

f. Social Inquiry Model.

Brief review of The Social Interaction Source Models

SOURCE TEACHING MODEL INNOVATOR AIMS AND APPLICATION
The Social Interaction Source Group Investigation Model John Dewey, Herbert To develop democratic abilities, use of knowledge and skills in life of individual and society.
  Jurisprudential Model Donald Oliver, James P. Shaver To solve problems on the basis of information and reasoning power.
  Social Inquiry Model

Social Simulation Model,

Role Playing Model.

 

Benjamin Cox, Byron To develop competencies of problem solving and adjustment
  Laboratory Method Model Bethal, Maine To develop group skills individual capacities and adjustment.

IV. Behaviour Modification Model

All the models in this family share a common theoretical base, a body of knowledge which referred to as behaviour theory. The common thrust of these models is the emphasis on changing the visible behaviour of the learner.

The models which belong to this family is Operant Conditioning Model

Brief Review of The Behaviour Modification Source Model

SOURCE TEACHING MODEL INNOVATORS AIMS AND APPLICATION
Behaviour Modification Source Operant Conditioning Model B.F.Skinner To achieve the objectives of lower level of  cognitive domain on the basis of individual differances

A number of instructional strategies to realise different instructional goals have been developed recently by different researchers They have transformed existing knowledge in the learning and teaching processes into ‘Models of Teaching’ which can be used by teachers in the teaching, learning process for realising different instructional objectives. There is a need to incorporate a few ‘Models of Teaching’ in the curriculum of teacher education programme at the secondary as well as elementary level so that prospective teachers attain a higher degree of ‘ability to teach’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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PERCEPTION OF TIME IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee,India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

Whatever time is, it is not “time.” “Time” is the most common noun in all documents on the Internet’s web pages; time is not. Nevertheless, it might help us understand time if we improved our understanding ofthe sense of the word “time.” Should the proper answer to the question “What is time?” produce a definition of the word as a means of capturing its sense? Definitely not–if the definition must be some analysis that provides a simple paraphrase in all its occurrences. There are just too many varied occurrences of the word: time out, behind the times, in the nick of time, and so forth.’

Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

One answer to the question “What is time?” is that it is a collection of objects called “times” that ultimately reduce to relationships among events. A competing answer is that time is a substance, not a relationship among events. A more popular answer post-Einstein is that time is not a substance but space-time is, and time is a part of space-time. Before the creation of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, it might have been said that time must provide these four things:

(1) For any event, it specifies when it occurs.

(2) For any event, it specifies its duration—how long it lasts.

(3) For any event, it specifies what other events are simultaneous with it.

(4) For any pair of events that are not simultaneous, it specifies which happens first.

It was realized that these questions can get different answers in different frame of reference.

The Indian philosophers are of opinion that time is a coefficient of all consciousness including external perception and internal perception. They do not recognize the perception of time as an independent entity. They believe that time is related to events or changes, and succession and duration are the two important constituents of time. They derive the perception of succession from the perception of changes, and the perception of duration from the perception of the ” specious present “. They regard the perception of the “specious present “as the nucleus of all our time-consciousness. They derive the conception of the past and the future from the perception of the ” specious present ” in which there is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future. In it there is a rudimentary consciousness of the past and the future which are clearly brought to consciousness by memory and expectation respectively.

The Buddhists philosopher, however, do not agree with the concept of the ” specious present “. They believe only in succession and the mathematical present. They recognize succession alone as the only constituent of time, and identify the perception of time with the perception of succession. And they regard the perception of succession as identical with the perception of changes. They do not believe in time apart from changes. They identify time with succession, and succession with changes. Thus they identify perception of time with the perception of changes. They do not believe in the perception of time as a qualifying adjunct of all events or changes. But the consciousness of change is not identical with change-consciousness. The consciousness of transition is not the same as transition-consciousness. So the Buddhists try their best to derive duration from succession, and explain away the unity and continuity of time.

The Indian philosophers discuss quite comprehensively the problems of temporal perception. The first question that arises in connection with temporal perception is whether time is an object of perception or not. According to the Vedantist philosophers, time is a coefficient of all perception. The Bhatta Mlmamsaka philosophers and Naiyayika philosophers too hold that time is perceived by both the external and the internal sense-organs as a qualification of their objects of perception.

Visual perception of time

Jayanta Bhatta has discussed the possibility of the visual perception of time. Can time be an object of visual perception ? According to the philosophers of Vaisesika philosophy, an object of visual perception must have extensity or appreciable magnitude (mahattva) and manifest or sensible colour (udbhutarupa). But time is colourless. How, then, can it be an object of visual perception ? But the Naiyayika philosophers argues : How is colour perceived though it is colourless ? Certainly an object has colour which inheres in it ; but colour itself has no colour inhering in it. And if colour can be perceived, though it is colourless, then time also can be an object of visual perception, though it is colourless. Jayanta Bhatta says that time is perceived through the visual organ ; it is a fact of experience, and so it cannot be denied, though we may not account for it as a fact of experience cannot be argued out of existence. As a matter of fact, that is visible which can be perceived through the visual organ, be it coloured or colourless ; and time can be perceived through the visual organ, though it is colourless hence none can deny the visual perception of time,

Ramakrsnadhvarin, the author of Sikhamani rightly points out that if we deny the visual perception of time because it is colourless, we cannot account for our visual perception of an object as existing at present, e.g. ” the jar exists now ” (idanlrh ghato vartate). If the present time were not an object of this perception, then there would be no certainty as to the time in which the jar is perceived to exist, but there would be a doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. But, in fact, the jar is definitely perceived as existing now; the actual perception of the jar is not vitiated by the least doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. Such an undoubted perception of an object as existing “now ” clearly shows that besides the object, an element of time also, viz. the present time, enters into the visual perception of the object.

But if time is regarded as an object of visual perception, though it is colourless, because of our visual perception of an object as existing ” now “, then it may equally be argued that akasa (ether) also is an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of a row of herons in akasa (akase valaka). But akasa is not admitted to be an object of perception  it is regarded as a supersensible object which is inferred from sound as its substrate.  And if, in spite of our visual perception of a row of herons in akasa (akase valaka} akasa is not regarded as an object of visual perception, or of any kind of perception, whatsoever, then why should time be regarded as an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of an object as existing ” now ” ?

It may be argued that the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa is an acquired perception like the visual perception of fragrant sandal. Just as in the visual perception of fragrant sandal the visual presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) is blended with the representation of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion and revived in memory by the sight of the sandal, so in the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa the visual perception of the row of herons (valdka) is blended with the idea of akasa which is represented to consciousness by another cognition by association, and so akasa is not an object of visual perception. But if this argument is valid, then it may as well be argued that the element of time which enters into every perceptive process is not an object of perception, but it is represented in consciousness by another cognition, with which it is associated in experience, and thus the element of time entering into every perception is not an object of direct perception.

The truth is that the visual perception of an object as existing ” now ” is not an acquired perception like the acquired perception of fragrant sandal, because in this perception the element of time (now) is felt as an object of direct visual perception  nor is it like the visual perception of a row of herons in akasa because akasa does not enter into the perception as a qualification (visesana} of its object. The present time is perceived as a qualification of every object of perception. Whenever an object, event, or action is perceived, it is not perceived as timeless, but as existing or occurring in time, or qualified by the present time.

And time is not only an object of visual perception, but of all kinds of perception. It is perceived by all the sense-organs, external and internal, as a qualification of their objects.  Here we are reminded of Kant’s doctrine that time is the form of external and internal perception.

Perception of Time as an Independent Entity

But though time is an object of perception, it is never perceived as an independent entity. One of the essential characteristics of time is succession, and succession is never perceived apart from changes. So we can never perceive time apart from actions or changes which occur In time. The temporal marks of before and after, sooner and later, etc., are never perceived apart from actions or changes. And if there is no distinct perception of time apart from that of changes, is it not natural to conclude that there is no perception of time, but only a perception of changes? Is time nothing but change or action ? Some hold that time apart from action is a fiction of imagination; time is identical with action or change ; time and action are synonymous. Hence there is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions(karyamatravalambana).

The Naiyayika philosopfers admits that there is no perception of time apart from that of actions. But from this it does not follow that there is no perception of time at all ; for an element of time always enters into the perception of actions as a constituent factor  actions are never perceived without being qualified by time ; actions unqualified by time or timeless actions are never perceived. The perception of time is inseparable from the perception of actions  but they are not identical with each other. Hence the legitimate conclusion is that time cannot be perceived as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct (visesana) of events or actions ; there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content, but only of filled time or time filled with some sensible matter. Just as there is no perception of mere actions unqualified by time, so there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content. When we perceive succession or simultaneity, sooner or later, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive something else which qualifies these actions, and that is time. Time, therefore, is perceived not as an independent entity, but as a qualification of the objects of perception ; there is no perception of empty time.

But it may be seen that,if time is an object of perception, why is it perceived not as an independent entity, but only as a qualification of perceptible objects ? Jayanta Bhatta says that it is the very nature of time (vastusvalhava] that it can be perceived only as a qualification of perceptible objects. This is the final limit of explanation. We can never account for the ultimate nature of things.

So time is an object of perception. The Bhatta Mlmaiiisaka also admits that time cannot be perceived by the sense-organs as an independent entity, but it is perceived by all the sense-organs as aqualification (visesana) of their own objects.

This psychological analysis of the perception of time is parallel to that of William James. ” We have no sense,” he says, ” for empty time. . . . We can no more intuit a duration than we can Intuit an extension devoid of all sensible content”  Kant’s notion of a pure intuition of time without any sensible matter is psychologically false.

Perception of the Present

Time could be linear or closed. Linear time might have a beginning or have no beginning; it might have an ending or no ending. There could be two disconnected time streams, in two parallel worlds; perhaps one would be linear and the other circular. There could be branching time, in which time is like the letter “Y”, and there could be a fusion time in which two different time streams merge into one. Time might be two dimensional instead of one dimensional. For all these topologies, there could be discrete time or continuous time.

Some deny the existence of the present time and consequently of the perception of the present. When a fruit falls to the ground, it is detached from its stalk and comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground, traversing a certain space and gradually passing from one position to another, say, from A to B  from B to R, and so on until it comes to the ground. When the fruit has passed from A to B  the space between A and B is the space traversed, and the time related to that traversed space is that which has been passed through (patitakala or the past) ; and when the fruit will pass from B to R, the space between B and C is the space to be traversed, and the time related to this space is that which is to be passed through (patitavyakala or the future)  and apart from these two spaces, the traversed space and the space to be traversed, there is no third space left intervening between them which may be perceived as being traversed and give rise to the perception of the present time. So the present time does not exist. Here by the present time is meant the mathematical time-point which is the boundary line between the past and future. But such a time- point is never an object of actual perception. Hence there is no present time at all.  This argument reminds us of Zeno’s dialectic against the possibility of motion.

Vatsyayana rightly points out that time cannot be conceived in terms of space but only in terms of action. 2 Thus Vatsyayana  holds that there can be no spatial representation of time. According to him, time is perceived as qualifying an action  an action is perceived as occurring in time. When, for instance, the action of falling has ceased, and is no more, it is perceived as past ; and when the action of falling is going to happen and not yet commenced, it is perceived as future ; and when the action of falling is going on, it is perceived as present. Thus time- consciousness is found in the perception of action. When an action is no more it is perceived as past , when it is not yet begun, it is perceived as future ; and when it is going on  it is perceived as present.

If an action is never perceived as going on, how can it be perceived as no more or as not yet ? For instance, if the action of falling is not perceived as going on, how can it be perceived as having ceased, or as going to happen ? As a matter of fact, what is meant by the past time or the time ” that has been fallen through ” (patttakala] in the present case, is that the action of falling is over or no more and what is meant by the future time or the time ” to be fallen through ” (patitavyaksla) is that the action of falling is going to happen and not yet begun, so that at both these points of time, past and future, the object is devoid of action ; but when we perceive that the fruit is in the process of falling, we perceive the object in action. Thus time is perceived not in terms of space but in terms of actions  when they are perceived as going on or in the process of happening, they are perceived as present , when they are perceived as over or no more, they are perceived as past, and when they are perceived as going to happen and not yet begun, they are perceived as future. The consciousness of the present is the nucleus of the”  consciousness of the past and the future  the past and the future are built upon the present. Time is perceived only through an action ; the actual happening of an action is perceived as present ; and unless an action is perceived as happening or present, it can never be perceived as past or future, inasmuch as the action does not really exist in the past or in the future but only in the present. Hence the perception of the present cannot be denied as all our time- consciousness is centred in it.

The whole controversy hinges on the meaning of the present time. Vatsyayana takes it in the sense of the ” specious present ” or felt present .which is a tract of time. His opponent takes It in the sense of the mathematical time-point or indivisible instant which is never a fact of actual experience. Vatsyayana is right in so far as he gives a psychological explanation of the specious present which is the basis of our conception of the past and future.

The one issue upon which philosophers are deeply divided: What sort of ontological differences are there among the present, past and future? There are three competing theories. Presentists argue that necessarily only present objects and present experiences are real, and we conscious beings recognize this in the special “vividness” of our present experience. So, the dinosaurs have slipped out of reality. However,  the past and present are both real, but the future is not real because the future is .The third point of view is that there are no objective ontological differences among present, past, and future because the differences are merely subjective. This view  can be called eternalism.”

According to the Buddhist View, time has two essential characteristics, viz. succession and duration. But the Buddhist philosophers do not recognize the existence of duration or block of time. They identify time with mere succession of ideas. The Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no abstract time apart from presentations. Time is not a substantive reality, as the Naiyayika philosophers hold, but it is a cluster of successive presentations  an abstract time apart from momentary impressions is an artificial conceptual construction. And according to the Buddhists philosophers , there are no continuous and uniform impressions (dharayahika-jnana] but only a series of detached and discrete impressions, a perpetual flux of successive presentations (ksanabhangura-jnana). Continuity is only an illusory appearance due to our slurring over the landmarks of impressions owing to their similarity. Momentary sensations alone are real ; there is no continuity among discrete sensations. The seeming continuity of impressions is nothing more than the rapid succession of impressions owing to the rapidity and uniformity of stimulations.

Time may be viewed either as one-dimensional or as bi-dimensional. Either it may be regarded as having only linear extension or succession, or it may be regarded as having simultaneity and succession both. The Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no synchronousness or simultaneity; there is only succession or sequence among our presentations. So a momentary presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future, but it apprehends only the present which has no duration. Thus according to the Buddhist philosophers , the sensible present has no duration ; it is an instant or a ” time-point “.

The Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold that the sensible present is not a mathematical point of time but has a certain duration ; the sensible present is a tract of time extending over a few moments it is an extended present or the ” specious present ” (vitata evakalah). According to them the ” specious present” having a certain duration yields us one unitary presentation without flickering of attention.

But the Buddhist philosophers hold that there is no ” specious present ”  the present has no duration ; it is instantaneous or momentary inasmuch as our impressions are momentary. Our presentations are not somewhat prolonged processes, but instantaneous or nonduring events. And there are no continuous and uniform impressions, as the Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold.

According to Prabhakara, in the consciousness ” I know this ” (aham idam janami) there is a simultaneity of three presentations, viz. the presentation of the knower , the presentation of the known object (this)) and the presentation of knowledge (or the relation between the knower and the known). This is Prabhakara’s doctrine of Triputl Samvit or triple consciousness.

The Buddhist philosophers hold that the three elements are not simultaneous ; but they are discrete and detached from one another , there is no relation among them ; there can be no relation between the knower and the known. They hold that at first there is a particularized presentation (sakara-jnana) of ” I ” (aham), then that of ” this ” (idam)) and then that of ” knowing ” (janami). Thus these discrete and momentary impressions flow in succession. But when the first impression of ” I ” vanishes, it leaves a residuum  which colours and modifies the second impression of ” this ” ; and when the second impression vanishes, it leaves a residuum which colours and modifies the third impression. Thus though these three impressions are discrete and isolated from one another, there is a cumulative presentation of these momentary impressions owing to the transference of residua from the preceding impressions to the succeeding ones (vasana-samkrama) and the residua of the former colouring or modifying the latter (upaplava}. Thus the Buddhist philosophers have invented the hypotheses of residua (vasana}) transference of residua (vasanasamkrama), and modification of impressions by residua (upaplava} to explain away the fact of continuity or the consciousness of transition ; a succession of presentations is certainly not the consciousness of succession. The Buddhiss philosophers  do not explain, but explain away the fact of unity and continuity of consciousness.

The Buddhist philosophers examine the perceptive process and show that perception cannot apprehend the ” specious present “. A perception is nothing but a presentation ; and a presentation is the presentation of a single moment ; it cannot apprehend the past and the future. If there is a series of presentations, is it the antecedent presentation  (uttaravljnana}, or is it the succeeding presentation  that takes hold of the preceding presentation by the hind part, as it were ? The Buddhist philosophers answer that B can neither take hold of C, nor can it take hold of A. The past as past is not present  and the future as future is not present. Hence the present presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future presentation, and consequently, there can be no direct apprehension or perception of the past and future.

But the Buddhist philosophers hold that the past enters into the present at the time of passing away, and the future also enters into the present, though it is not yet come, so that the present presentation is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future.

Thus the Buddhist philosophesr surreptitiously introduce an element of linking or transition between the past and the present, and between the present and the future to explain our consciousness of the continuity of time. But though they admit that the past and the future enter into the present, they insist that it is only the present that is perceived and not the past or the future which enters into the present. Such is the nature of our experience that it unfolds successively one presentation appearing and then disappearing. And in this scries of presentations an antecedent state (purvadasa) cannot come in contact with a subsequent state (aparadala)^ and a subsequent state cannot come in contact with an antecedent state. All sense-presentations apprehend the present alone which is instantaneous or momentary,

Some Naiyayika philosophers hold that sometimes the present is perceived as extended or with a certain duration, for instance, when we perceive a continuous action, e.g. cooking, reading, etc. The sensible present is not momentary, but has a certain length of duration (vartamanaksano dtrghah) ; it is not made up of a single moment, but composed of a number of moments (ndndksanaganatmaka).

The Naiyayikaphilosophers  and the Vedantist philosophers  hold that a continuous and uniform impression bears clear testimony to the unbroken and uninterrupted existence of its object ; and consequently, it apprehends an extended present with a certain duration.

The Buddhist philosophers urge that time cannot be a composite whole made up of parts ; it cannot be a cluster of simultaneous presentations because there is no simultaneity among presentations. Time is not bi-dimensional, as some Naiyayikas hold, but it is one-dimensional .There is no simultaneity, but only succession among our presenta- tions. It is foolish to hold that perception apprehends an extended present with a certain duration.

The Buddhist philosophers object that there is no uniform impression (avicchinna-drstt). Every impression is momentary ; there cannot be a continuous impression. When there is a rapid succession of momentary impressions, they appear to be continuous, though they are not really so. And because there is no continuous impression, there can be no perception of the ” specious present ” with a certain duration. 4 Even if there were a continuous impression, it would not be able to apprehend the ” specious present  ? , because an object must be presented to consciousness in order that we may have a prcsentative knowledge of the object, and the object cannot be presented to consciousness for more than one moment, since all objects are momentary.  But, as a matter of fact, there can be no continuous and uniform impression ; consciousness must always apprehend itself as momentary  and not only consciousness is momentary., but also the consciousness of the momentariness of consciousness is momentary, of impressions must be enduring ; momentary impressions are apprehended as momentary by a consciousness which must be permanent. Thus, according to the Buddhist philosophers, all presentations are momentary, and as such they can apprehend only the present which has not a length of duration, but is constituted by a single moment ; the sensible present, therefore, is instantaneous or momentary.

The Buddhist philosophesr recognize only one aspect of time, viz. succession. They try to explain away the other aspect of time, viz. duration. But some Naiyayika philosophers and the Vedantist philosophesr clearly recognize the importance of duration apart from which succession has no meaning. The Buddhist philosophers have argued that a presentation cannot apprehend the past and the future as they are not presented to consciousness ; it can apprehend only the present which is constituted by a single moment. The Naiyayika philosophers urges that even a momentary glance (nimesa-drsti] can apprehend the continued existence of an object. Why should, then, perception be regarded as apprehending the instantaneous present ?  Even supposing that a momentary glance cannot apprehend the past and the future, but only the present, what is the span of the present time perceived by a continuous and uniform impression (animesa-drsti} ? Is it a time-point or a tract of time ? Is it an instant or a length of duration ? The sensible present continues as long as the continuous and uniform impression persists without an oscillation of attention, and as long as it is not interrupted by another impression ; so that this single unitary presentation apprehends not an instantaneous present but a lengthened or extended present with a certain duration.

Most philosophers  believe time travel is physically possible. To define the term, we can say that in time travel, the traveller’s journey as judged by the traveller’s correct clock takes a different amount of time than the journey does as judged by the correct clocks of those who do not take the journey. The physical possibility of travel to the future is well accepted, but travel to the past is more controversial, and time travel that changes the future or the past is generally considered to be impossible.

You may have heard the remark that you have no time to take a spaceship ride across the galaxy since it is 100,000 light years across. So, even if you were to travel at just under the speed of light, it would take you over 100,000 years. Who has that kind of time? This remark contains a misunderstanding about time dilation. This is 100,000 years as judged by clocks that are stationary relative to Earth, not as judged by your clock. If you were in the spaceship that accelerated quickly to just under the speed of light, then you and your clock might age hardly at all as you traveled across the galaxy. In fact, with a very fast spaceship, you have plenty of time to go anywhere in the universe you wish to go.

Indian philosophers also believe the difference in time dimensions in other planes .we can find references of travelling to different planes and outer space and its impact on time status,in many mythology  events,(like marriage episode of Balram, the brother of Lord Krishna , with Raveti, the daughter of King Raivat, who just returned from Swarga after one month and find one complete yuga has passed here.)

The Buddhist philosophers may urge that such an extended present is a tract of time made up of a number of moments ; but the present is really a single moment ; the immediately preceding moment is past and the immediately succeeding moment is future ; so they cannot be perceived. The Naiyayika philosophers  replies that in determining the span of the sensible present we must not assume at the outset that it is momentary, but we must determine it by an appeal to experience.

A psychological investigation must not be guided by metaphysical speculation ; but metaphysics must be based on psychology. Psychologically considered, there is no mathematical point of time, but only a tract of time. That time must be regarded as present which is grasped by a single continuous impression without a break or interruption. And such an unbroken and uninterrupted impression apprehends the present as an unbroken and uninterrupted block or duration of time. Hence the sensible present is not an instant, but has a length of duration.

The Buddhist philosophers may urge that even according to the Naiyayika philosophers  there cannot be a stable consciousness (sthirajnana) but only a series of momentary impressions 5 how, then, can he hold that there can be a perception of the ” specious present ” ? Though all Naiyayikas hold that a psychosis extends over three moments the moment of production, the moment of existence, and the moment of destruction and there can be no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the central sensory or manas y yet there are some Naiyayikas who hold that a continuous and uniform impression is not destroyed at the third moment.  Besides, the temporal mark of a consciousness need not necessarily correspond with the temporal mark of its object.

An object is apprehended by consciousness as having a continued existence. A pulse of consciousness, though existing at present can apprehend the past as well as the future as past and future.  The feeling of the past is not a past feeling and the feeling of the future is not a future feeling. For instance, a present recollection apprehends the past ; a present flash of intuition (pratibha jnana) apprehends the future ; and a present inference apprehends both the past and the future.

The Buddhist philosophers may urge that the operation of the sense-organs does not exist for more than a single moment ; and in the absence of a continued peripheral action there cannot be a perception of an extended time or the ” specious present “.

The Naiyayika philosophers  replies that peripheral action does not exist for a moment, but continues for some time. The perception of an object depends upon the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and this intercourse is not momentary, but persists for some time ;peripheral stimulation is not a momentary act, but a somewhat prolonged process ; and consequently perception does not apprehend an instant or a ” time-point “, but a tract of time with a certain duration,

Vatsyayana says that sometimes the present is perceived as unmixed with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive that a substance exists. And sometimes the present is perceived as mixed up with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive the continuity of an action, e.g. cooking, cutting, etc. Thus Vatsyayana admits that the present is sometimes perceived as having a certain duration.

According to the Vedantist phjlosophers , too, a continuous and uniform impression (dharavahikaluddhi] is a single unitary psychosis with a certain duration ; it is not a series of momentary impressions in rapid succession, as the Buddhist philosophers hold. In the continuous impression of a jar the mental mode which assumes the form of the jar is one and undivided as long as the jar is presented to consciousness without any flickering of attention, and is not interrupted by another psychosis. It is not made up of many momentary psychoses, because according to the Vedantist philosophers , a psychosis continues in the field of consciousness as long as the mind does not assume the form of a different object. So the Vedantist also admits that a continuous and uniform presentation does not apprehend an instantaneous present, but an extended present with a certain duration. Thus the Vedantist philosophers and some Naiyayika philosophers hold that the sensible present has duration, while the Buddhist philosophers hold that the sensible present is instantaneous or momentary. Certainly the former view is psychologically correct. The Buddhists deny the  specious present ” because it contradicts their fundamental doctrine of impermanence or momentariness.

The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle- back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration with a bow and a stern, as it were, a rearward and a forward looking end.”

Time is a real however it has many facets and it may not be possible to nail down our perception of time to any single one.

Is time more like a straight line or instead more like a circle? If your personal time were circular, then eventually you would be reborn. With circular time, the future is also in the past, and every event occurs before itself. If your time is like this, then the question arises as to whether you would be born an infinite number of times or only once.

Indian philosophers strongly believe the essentiality of time as a dimension for the existstence. That is why they believe in the existence of past , present and future. According to them past provide base and future is the by-product of present. Time is continuity. Remotely it appears that this concept of time gave the base to the theory of reincarnation and rebirth.

The present is a fleeting moment; whatever is happening now (present) is confined to an infinite simply narrow point on the time line which is being encroached upon by what we think of as the past and the future. Present resembles the sharp point of a recording laser or needle; it may be mental awareness of the recording  of memory as it is being inscribed into our brain..

Unlike the present we see past and future as measurable durations of time. Past historical events,  are all measurable durations or extensions in time, just like a recorded material on tape. This similarity suggests that past is just a recorded memory, while future can be compared to an unrecorded tape. Historical events have in them the same time characteristic as stories that are just creations of human imagination. Both contain in them the time concepts of earlier, the later, the past present and the future; this again suggests that past really is similar to memory of events.

Future appears to be a projection created by our past experiences stored in our memory. The fact that the present which gives us the most real feel of time cannot be measured while the inaccessible past and future can be measured as durations strongly suggest that the way we perceive time is an illusion. Time is most likely is a concept created by our mind by merging consciousness, memories, anticipation, perception, change and motion. There however is a real underlying process and there is a cause for this process the Time is a real phenomenon a continuous change through which we live. Time becomes evident through motion; sunrise sunsets, night and day, the changing seasons, the movement of the celestial bodies all is indicative of continuous change.

References

A Manual of Psychology., second edition, 1910,

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,

James -Principles of Psychology,

Ladd -Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory ,

Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti (Benares, 1924).

Nyayabhasya of Vatsyayana (Jlvananda’s edition, Calcutta, 1919).

Nylyamanjari of Jayanta. (V.S.S., Benares, 1895

Nyayavartika of Udyotkara (B.L, 1887-1904).

NyayavartikatatparyatikS of Vacaspati Misra (V.S.S., Benares),

Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya

Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya (V.S.S,, Benares, 1893).

 

 

 

 

 

 

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THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal,A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

“The mediocre teacher tells. The good teacher explains. The superior teacher demonstrates. The great teacher inspires.” -William A. Ward

Teachers hold in their hands the success of any country and the wellbeing of its citizens; they are the critical guardians of the intellectual life of the nation. Teachers are one of the main pillars of a sound and progressive society; they bear the weight and responsibility of teaching, and, apart from parents, are the main source of knowledge and values for children. A good teacher is like a candle, it consumes itself to light the way for others, he affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops.

Interdependence of philosophy and education is an essentiality for human development, both represents two side of a coin, both are equally important. PHILOSOPHY DETERMINES THE VIEW OF LIFE WHILE EDUCATION DETERMINES THE WAY OF LIFE. They are so interlocked that without the one the existence of the other is beyond comprehension.

The inter-dependence of philosophy and education is clearly seen from the fact that the great philosophers of all times have also been great educators and their philosophy is reflected in their educational systems.

No teacher however effective in practice can avoid assumptions, conscious or unconscious, as to what it is that he is about. These assumptions, it should be pointed out, are the material of theory, not of practice, and they need both to be examined critically and to be related to other assumptions in the largest context of belief, in order to be adequate as a basis for practice

IDEALISM- THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

From this very general philosophical position, the Idealist would tend to view the Learner as a microscopic mind, the Teacher as a paradigmatic self, the Curriculum as the subject matter of symbol and idea (emphasizing literature, history, etc.) The educational approach of this philosophy is of a holistic nature.  In which self-realization and character development is strongly supported.  The idealist feels that with the growth of a fine moral character as well as personal reflection, wisdom is gained.  Information across curriculum

Idealists have high expectations of the teacher. The teacher must be excellent, in order to serve as an example for the student, both intellectually and morally. No other single element in the school system is more important than the teacher. The teacher must excel in knowledge and in human insight into the needs and capacities of the learners; and must demonstrate moral excellence in personal conduct and convictions. The teacher must also exercise great creative skill in providing opportunities for the learners’ minds to discover, analyze, unify, synthesize and create applications of knowledge to life and behavior.

The idealist holds the role of the teacher to be that of an important position.  The teacher serves as a model for the student by teaching through example and guidance the lifelong habits of patience, tolerance and perseverance towards a goal.  It is the teacher’s responsibility to encourage the students and to provide them with materials to encourage them to work to achieve higher goals.

Just as personality is a major factor in the idealist view of the student, it plays a major part in the idealist view of the teacher. The teacher is seen as having perhaps the most important single role in the educative process. The teacher serves as a living ideal or model for the student and represents, to some degree, what the student can become.

The idealist teacher “tries to be the right sort of person himself and to develop the right sort of personality in his pupils. The teacher should be close to the Absolute and should be, in a very real sense, a co-worker with the Absolute in developing the pupil’s capacities and guiding him closer to knowledge of the Ideal. The teacher should be close to the Absolute in developing the pupil’s capacities and guiding closer to knowledge of the Ideal. The teacher should set an example that the student will follow. This is, of course , compatible with the notion that the real world (the world of the senses) is a copy of the Absolute. Thus, the closer we are to come to the Absolute, the more we must model our behavior upon those persons that we know are paradigm cases.

Since idealists believe in character development, they also believe that the teacher should be a role model for students to emulate.  Teaching is considered a moral calling.  The teacher’s role is to be a skillful questioner who encourages students to think and ask more questions in an environment that is suitable for learning

NATURALISM – THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

Naturalism is a concept that firmly believes that ultimate reality lies in the nature of the matter. Matter is considered to be supreme and mind is the functioning of the brain that is made up of matter. The whole universe is governed by laws of nature and they are changeable. It’s through our sense that we are able to get the real knowledge. The senses works like real gateways of knowledge and exploration is the method that helps in studying nature. Naturalism is a term loosely applied in educational theory to systems of training that are not dependent on schools and books but on manipulation of the actual life of student. Naturalism is an artistic movement advocating realistic description: in art or literature, a movement or school advocating factual or realistic description of life, including its less pleasant aspects. In literature, the doctrine rejecting spiritual explanations of world: a system of thought that rejects all spiritual and supernatural explanations of the world and holds that science is the sole basis of what can be known. a belief that all religious truth is derived from nature and natural causes, and not from revelation

The teacher’s role is to remain in background. The natural development of child should be stimulated. Since, Nature is considered to be best educator,

According to naturalists the teacher is the observer and facilitator of the child’s development rather than a giver of information, ideas, ideals and will power or a molder of character.In the words of Ross “teacher in a naturalistic set up is only a setter of the stage, a supplier of materials and opportunities, a provider of an ideal environment, a creator of conditions under which natural development takes place. Teacher is only a non-interfering observer”.

For Rousseau, the teacher, first of all, is a person who is completely in tune with nature .He has a profound faith in the original goodness of human nature. He believes that human beings have their own time-table for learning. “Emile organized education according to Emile’s (a boy) stages of development. For each stage of  development, the child, shows certain signs that he is ready to learn what is appropriate to that stage. Appreciating the educative role of the natural environment as an educative force the teacher does not interfere with nature, but rather cooperates with the ebb and flow of natural. forces. Significantly, the teacher who is aware of human nature and its stages of growth and development, does not force Emile to learn but rather encourages learning, by insulating him to explore and to grow by his interactions with the environment.

Rousseau opines that teacher should not be in a hurry to make the child learn. Instead he should be patient, permissive and non-intrusive. Demonstrating great patience the teacher can not allow himself to tell the student what the truth is but rather must stand back and encourage the learner’s own self discovery. According to him the teacher is an invisible guide to learning. While ever-present, he is never a taskmaster. Naturalists are of the view that teacher should not be one who stresses books, recitations and massing information in literary form, “rather he should give emphasis on activity, exploration ,learning by doing”.

Great emphasis was placed upon the study which teachers should make of the environmental background of each student, since unacceptable behavior was rooted there rather than in the pupil’s ill will. Teachers were advised to learn of the racial, national, and religious backgrounds of their students if a pupil caused trouble or lacked initiative in school, the home conditions should be studied to see whether a home broken by divorce, death, or marital conflict is responsible for the child’s difficulties. If a teacher were unable to manage a class , he was held responsible because he lacked insight into child nature

PRAGMATISM- THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

According to William James  “Pragmatism in education came into prominence to fulfil an obvious need in the educational thought of America. With education becoming available to all men rather than to a select few, the country was searching for a way of viewing the educational process other than through the framework provided by the older “elitist” philosophies of You see by his what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and reconciler……. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, and no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field she is at a great advantage over both positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way of conception.

Good teaching cannot be reduced to technique; good teaching comes from the identity and integrity of the teacher.The role of the teacher is important in successfully educating children. The teacher must capture the child’s interest and build on the natural motivation that exists. Teachers need to remember to vary their teaching methods to accommodate each individual learning style. Not all children learn at the same pace or are at the  same point; therefore, the teacher must vary his/her style. Dewey believed that knowledge should be organized and relate to current experiences.

The teacher, for the pragmatist, is a member of the learning group who serves in the capacity of helper, guide, and arranger of experiences. He is as involved in the educative process as are this students.

Thus, the pragmatic teacher does not abdicate responsibility. If anything’s just the opposite is true. The teacher is responsible for wiring with the students and helping them develop their own projects. He advises and directs projects and activates that arise out of the felt needs of the students rather than those of the teacher. He must arrange the conditions by, as Dewey indicates, simplifying, purifying, ordering and balancing the environment is such a way as to provide the experiences that will contribute the most to the growth of this students.

REALISM – THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER:

From this very general philosophical position, the Realist would tend to view the Learner as a sense mechanism, the Teacher as a demonstrator, the Curriculum as the subject matter of the physical world (emphasizing mathematics, science, etc.), the Teaching Method as mastering facts and information, and the Social Policy of the school as transmitting the settled knowledge of Western civilization. The realist would favor a school dominated by subjects of the here-and-now world, such as math and science. Students would be taught factual information for mastery. The teacher would impart knowledge of this reality to students or display such reality for observation and study. Classrooms would be highly ordered and disciplined, like nature, and the students would be passive participants in the study of things. Changes in school would be perceived as a natural evolution toward a perfection of order.

For the realist, the world is as it is, and the job of schools would be to teach students about the world. Goodness, for the realist, would be found in the laws of nature and the order of the physical world. Truth would be the simple correspondences of observation.

The teacher, for the realist, is simply a guide. The real world exists, and the teacher is responsible for introducing the student to it. To do this he uses lectures, demonstrations, and sensory experiences, The teacher does not do this in a random or haphazard way; he must not only introduce the student to nature, but show him the regularities, the “rhythm” of nature so that he may come to understand natural law. Both the teacher and the student are spectators, but while the student looks at the world through innocent eyes, the teacher must explain it to him, as well as he is able, from his vantage point of increased sophistication. For this reason, the teacher’s own biases and personality should be as muted as possible. In order to give the student as much accurate information as quickly and effectively as possible, the realist may advocate the use of teaching machines to remove the teacher’s bias from factual presentation. The whole concept to teaching machines is compatible with the picture or reality as a mechanistic universe in which man is simply one of the cogs in the machine.

A teacher should be such that he himself be educated and well versed with the customs of belief and rights and duties of people, and the trends of all ages and places. He must have full mastery of the knowledge of present life. He must guide the student towards the hard realities of life. He is neither pessimist, nor optimist. He must be able to expose children to the problems of life and the world around..

EXISTENTIALISM-THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

Existentialism is the most individualistic of all modern philosophies. Its overriding concern is with the individual and its primary value is the absolute freedom of the person, who is only what he makes himself to be, and who is the final and exclusive arbiter of the values he freely determines for himself. Great emphasis is placed on art, on literature, and the humanistic studies, for it is in these areas that man finds himself and discovers what values he will seek to attain.

Existentialism represents a protest against the rationalism of traditional philosophy, against misleading notions of the bourgeois culture, and the dehumanizing values of industrial civilization. Since alienation, loneliness and self-estrangement constitute threats to human personality in the modern world, existential thought has viewed as its cardinal concerns a quest for subjective truth, a reaction against the ‘negation of Being’ and a perennial search for freedom.

The teacher’s role is to help students define their own essence by exposing them to various paths they may take in life and creating an environment in which they may freely choose their own preferred way. Since feeling is not divorced from reason in decision making, the existentialist demands the education of the whole person, not just the mind.

There are five characteristics of this ideal that are formulated by this existential framework. These include becoming more authentic, more spiritual, having a critical attitude, having a clear sense of personal identity and a developing empathetic awareness towards others.

Teachers are potentially able to offer a very valuable ‘other horizon’ which is able to assess qualitatively the understandings of students. Teachers can be most influential in the educational development of students’ spirituality if, through their interaction, ‘crises’ can be created. Teachers can be the learner’s ‘best enemy’), able to ‘wound’ most provokingly. This is somewhat like playing the ‘devil’s advocate’ in order to test and to clarify the understandings of others.

In order to exercise one’s freedom in an authentic manner it is also necessary that the teacher develop a critical attitude. Having a critical indicates that persons appreciate that they have a certain degree of unquestioned meanings that constitute how they make sense of, and give value and purpose to life. It is recognized that the teacher be necessarily a life-long learner.

The teacher’s characteristic of being ‘open’ to possibilities includes a willingness to allow others to re-evaluate those aspects of one’s understandings that can be articulated. If one chooses to ‘close’ oneself off from the criticisms of others, one is no longer teacher. Having’openness’ in this regard allows one to come to an understanding of self and others.

The teacher should become aware of how s/he relates to the entire curriculum. One is understood to be ‘in’ truth by critically examining and reflecting upon all which one understands. Therefore, the traditionally accepted meanings attached to various issues should be “touched with a hammer” both to ‘sound them out’ and to examine how the learner is attuned to them. Understanding, creating and choosing one’s personal identity – who one is and what one stands for – is a desirable characteristic of a teacher. Personal identity may reference historical, sociological, religious and biological frameworks,

An important characteristic of a teacher is that they have the ability to make judgments with regards to what is worthwhile and valuable in them and in others. This should be demonstrated by an empathetic awareness for others whom they are in-the-world-with

Existentialists do not wish the teacher to be social minded umpire or provider of free social activity or a model personality to be limited, by the students. He must himself be a free personality, engaged in such relations and projects with individual students that they get the idea that they are too are free personalities. He may indirectly influence them about his values but he should impose his cherished values on them, test his values become the code of conduct for the students, who may begin to accept them without thought. Instead of expecting them to imitate he should help them to be ‘original’ and ‘authentic’.

His effort should be that students’ mind should have autonomous functioning so that they become free, charitable and self-moving. The role of teacher is very important because he is the creator of such as educational situation in which the student can establish contact with his self by becoming conscious of his self and can achieve self-realization.

The teacher must build positive relationships between himself and his students. He should avoid applying labels to children (such as ‘lazy’, ‘slow learner’ etc.) for individuals may indeed come to think of themselves this way. The teacher is also changing and growing as he guides the pupil in his discovery of self.

HUMANISM- THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

Philosophical Humanism is any outlook or way of life centered on human need and interest. Sub-categories of this type include Christian Humanism and Modern Humanism. Modern Humanism, also called Naturalistic Humanism, Scientific Humanism, Ethical Humanism and Democratic Humanism is defined by one of its leading proponents, Corliss Lamont, as “a naturalistic philosophy that rejects all supernaturalism and relies primarily upon reason and science, democracy and human compassion.” Modern Humanism has a dual origin, both secular and religious, and these constitute its sub-categories.

The role of the teacher is important in successfully educating children. Theteacher  must capture the child’s interest and build on the natural motivation that exists. Teachers need to remember to vary their teaching methods to accommodate each individual learning style. Not all children learn at the same pace or are at the  same point; therefore, the teacher must vary his/her style. knowledge should be organized and relate to current experiences Teacher is a facilitator; helper; partner; promotes, but does not direct learning, sets mood for learning, acts as a flexible resource for learners

There are a variety of ways teachers can implement the humanist view towards education. Some of these include:

Allow the student to have a choice in the selection of tasks and activities whenever possible.Help students learn to set realistic goals.

Have students participate in group work, especially cooperative learning, in order to develop social and affective skills.

Act as a facilitator for group discussions when appropriate.

Be a role model for the attitudes, beliefs and habits you wish to foster. Constantly work on becoming a better person and then share yourself with your students.

Humanistic educators believe that both feelings and knowledge are important to the learning process. Unlike traditional educators, humanistic teachers do not separate the cognitive and affective domains:

PERENNIALISM-THE  CONCEPT OF TEACHER

Perennialism philosophy of education is a very conservative and inflexible philosophy of education. Perennialists believe in acquiring understandings about the great ideas of civilization. These ideas have the potential for solving problems in any era. The focus is to teach ideas that are everlasting, to seek enduring truths which are constant, not changing, as the natural and human worlds at their most essential level, do not change. Teaching these unchanging principles is critical. Humans are rational beings, and their minds need to be developed. Thus, cultivation of the intellect is the highest priority in a worthwhile education. The demanding curriculum focuses on attaining cultural literacy, stressing students’ growth in enduring disciplines. The loftiest accomplishments of humankind are emphasized– the great works of literature and art, the laws or principles of science

Perennialists disapprove of teachers requiring students to absorb massive amounts of disconnected information. They recommend that schools spend more time teaching about concepts and explaining they are meaningful to students.

The teacher, to the perennialist, is a mental disciplinarian with highly developed logical skills, capable of teaching logical thinking and the use of reason to his students. The teacher must have the ability to work with the natural tendencies of the students toward reason. He must serve as a benevolent taskmaster, exercising the minds of the students in order to help them develop their rational faculties.

Thus, besides having been trained in logic, the teacher must have the proper spiritual orientation. Nor is this all. Since the teacher is to train the students in reason, memory and will power, he must certainly have these three qualities if he is to help the student on the road to knowledge and the development of his faculties.

Education requires hard work and effort. If the student is interested in the subject, well and good, but if not, s/he still must be required to do the tasks. After all, the student does not know what s/he will need in the future. Motivation is fine, and if the teacher can provide it, well and good, but if not, the student must work at the task regardless

Perennialists believe that reading is to be supplemented with mutual investigations (between the teacher and the student) and minimally-directed discussions through the Socratic method in order to develop a historically oriented understanding of concepts. They argue that accurate, independent reasoning distinguishes the developed or educated mind and they thus stress the development of this faculty. A skilled teacher would keep discussions on topic and correct errors in reasoning, but it would be the class, not the teacher, who would reach the conclusions. While not directing or leading the class to a conclusion, the teacher may work to accurately formulate problems within the scope of the texts being studied, Perennialism, typically considered to be teacher-centere. However, since the teachers associated with perennialism are in a sense the authors of the Western masterpieces themselves, these teachers may be open to student criticism through the associated Socratic method, which, if carried out as true dialogue, is a balance between students, including the teacher promoting the discussion

MARXISM- THE CONCEPT OF TEACHER

The teacher’s role in habit formation is crucial according to Marxist  educational theorists. First, the teacher teaches more by example than by precept (especially with younger children). In all his word and actions the teacher must be a perfect example of the ideal Communist so that his pupils will emulate him. The teacher who does not reflect true Soviet recognition of the power of good example, children are expected to attend nursery schools when they are three years old. At this tender age a well-disciplined cadre of Communist teachers can mold the personality of the child to fit the pattern of behavior drawn up by the leaders of the party

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY- CONCEPT OF TEACHER

The goal of education for an analytic philosopher is making individual aware of the meaning of homeless, of being at home, and of the ways of returning. In the strict sense the teacher is concerned principally with open ended education. Freedom to his students from his isolation and his anonymity, freeing him seeing his situations and powers. So much so that the role of teacher seems similar with psychiatric therapy. No educationist today is more concerned with education in this sense than an Analysis teacher. Every analysis philosopher is a doctor and its missionary… for the purpose of encouraging individuals of all kinds and conditions to understand their situations and themselves. And it is the starting pint of every analysis’s that no other modern philosophy has taken the self i.e. the student and its situation seriously enough to make the saturation the subject matter of its inquiry. All analysis’s star with the individual who chooses his course and who dies in disquietude. And all of them protect against the forces within man and his contemporary situation that discourage him from being at home, or, worse from seeing himself as both mortal and responsible.

According to analysis the teacher shows by his example that education is a concentration on personal freedom-one which encourages the student to accept the facts and beliefs which have relevance for him. Nietzsche for criticizing the role of teacher in relation to traditional method (historic-scholastic method) of teaching of mother tongue:

People deal with it as if it were a dead Language and as if the present and the future were under no obligation to it what so ever. The historical method had become so universal in our time that even the living body of language is sacrificed for the sake of anatomical study…The historical method may certainly be a considerable easier and more comfortable one for the teacher; it also seems to be compatible with a smaller display of energy and will a part. But we shall find that this observation hold good in every department Pedagogical life.

With equal Force Nietzsche criticizes the teaching of German Composition in the Public schools.

Owing to the very fact in this department it is an almost always the most gifted Pupils who display the greatest eagerness, it ought to have been made clear how dangerously stimulating, precisely here, the task of the teacher must be. German composition makes an appeal to the individual and the more strongly a pupil is conscious of his various qualities, the more personally will he do his German composition.

Nietzsche than goes on to tell what the typical teacher in the public school does with the pupil’s first attempt at expressing his individuality in composition.

What does he (The Teacher) hold most reprehensible in this class of work? What does he call pail’s attention to? To all excesses in form or characteristics of the individual…in short, their individuality is reproved a rejected by the teacher in favour of an unoriginal decent average. On the other hand, uniform mediocrity gets peevish Praise.

 

 

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Theories of Illusions in Indian Philosophy

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India

Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusions. These theories are not only based on the purely psychological analysis of illusions, but also on their epistemological significance and ontological basis, Prabhacandra refers to seven different theories of illusions in Prameyakamalamartanda :

1-Akhyati (non-apprehension),

2-Asatkhyati (apprehension of a non- existent object),

3-Prasiddhlrthakhyati (apprehension of a real object established by knowledge),

4-Atmakhyati (apprehension of a subjective cognition projected into the external world),

5-Anirvacaniyarthakhyati (apprehension of an undefinable object),

6-Anyathakhyati or Viparita- khyati (apprehension of an object as otherwise, i.e.as a different object),

7-Smrtipramosa (obscuration of memory) or Vivekakhyati (non-apprehension of discrimination or non-discrimination).

It is not known who is the advocate of the first doctrine. The second doctrine is held by the Madhyamika. It is not known who is the advocate of the third doctrine. The fourth doctrine is held by the Yogacara ; the fifth, by the Samkara School of Vedantists ; the sixth, by the Patanjala, the Naiyayika, the Vaisesika, the Bhatta Mimamsaka, and the Jaina ; and the seventh, by the Prabhakara Mimamsaka.

In Nyayatatparyadiyika Jayasimhasuri mentions eight different theories of illusions, adding to the above list Alaukikakhyati (apprehension of an extraordinary object, different from the ordinary objectsof experience). The Sarhkhya advocates the doctrine of Sadasatkhyatl Ramanuja advocates the doctrine of Satkhyati (apprehension of a real object)..

THE DOCTRINE OF AKHYATI

The doctrine of Akhyati is given by Prabhacandra, a Jaina philosopher, in Prameyakamala-Martanda). According to this doctrine, an illusion has no objective substratum ; it is objectless (niralambanct) ; it does not apprehend any object at all ; it is a pure hallucination. Let us consider the illusion of a mirage, or the illusory perception of water in the rays of the sun. What is the object of this illusion ? Is it water, absence of water, or the rays of the sun, or something else ? Water cannot be the object of the illusory cognition, for, in that case, the cognition would be valid and not illusory. The absence of water cannot be the object of the illusion, because it is the cognition of water that induces the person under illusion to exert himself to get water. The rays of the sun, too, cannot be the object of the illusion, for, in that case, the cognition would not be illusory but valid, representing the real nature of the external stimulus. It cannot be argued that the rays of the sun are perceived as water, inasmuch as one thing cannot be perceived as something different. Hencean illusion is objectless or without any objective substratum (niralam banam wparyayajnanam.

Evaluation of Akhyati

Prabhacandra  evaluates the doctrine of Akhyati . According to him, if illusions have no objective substrates (alambana) if they are not excited by external stimuli, by what peculiar mark are we to distinguish one illusion from another ? For instance, how can we distinguish the illusory cognition of water (in the rays of the sun) from the illusory cognition of silver (in a nacre) ? If, again, illusions are not produced by external objects, what is the difference between an illusion and a state of dreamless sleep ? It may be urged that there is no difference between the two, except that in an illusion there is consciousness, while in dreamless sleep there is no consciousness at all ; they agree in having no external stimulus. But Prabhacandra contends that at least the object that appears in consciousness in an illusion must be regarded as the object of that illusion. Thus an illusion can never be held to be a non- apprehension of an object.

THE DOCTRINE OF ASATKHYATI

The Madhyamika holds that in the illusory cognition of silver, there is a cognition of silver as real, though really there is no silver at all. Hence he concludes that in an illusion something non- existent is cognized as existent.

Evaluation of Asatkhyati

Jayanta Bhatta evaluates the doctrine of Asatkhyatt . He argues,what is the meaning of Asatkhyati, or apprehension of a non- existent object ? What is the object of an illusion according to this doctrine ? Is it an absolutely non-existent object like a sky-flower ? Or is it an object existing in some other time and place ? If the latter, then Asatkhyati is nothing but Vipantakhyati, according to which, silver existing in some other time and place appears in the illusory cognition of silver, but not existing in that time and place. If the former, then there would be a cognition of a sky-flower also ; but because such an absolutely non-existent object never appears in consciousness, it cannot be the object of an illusion.

It may be argued that non-existent things appear in consciousness through the intensity of residua or subconscious impressions (vdsanalhyasa). But a residuum (vasana] is not possible without a real object ; it is nothing but a vestige left by the previous perception of an object ; why should such a residuum be the cause of the cognition of an absolutely non-existent object ? If we admit that some other kind of residuum (vasana] produces the cognition of a non-existent object, why should such a residuum produce the cognition of silver and not that of a sky- flower ? What regulates the operation of such a residuum ? An absolutely non-existent object can never appear in consciousness, nor can it induce a person to exert himself to get hold of it. 1 Thus the doctrine of Asatkhyati is untenable.

THE DOCTRINE OF ATMAKHYATI

Vidyaranya Muni, a Samkarite, gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Atmakhyati :According to the Buddhists, mind (citta) and mental states (caltta) are produced by four different causes :

(i) co-operating cause (sahakari-pratyaya}

(2) dominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya)^

(3) immediate cause (samanantara-pratyaya} and

(4) objective datum or external cause (alambana-pratyaya).

Now, in the first place, the illusion of silver cannot be produced by the co-operating cause (sahakari-pratyaya) which, in the present case, is light ; for light is the cause of the distinctness of the perception.

In the second place, it cannot be produced by the dominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya) which, in the present case, is the visual organ, for the visual organ is the cause only of the visual character of the perception , it cannot account for the particular nature of the visual perception, viz. that of silver.

In the third place, it cannot be produced by the immediate cause [samanantara-pratyaya] which is the immediately preceding cognition  for the illusory cognition of silver may arise immediately after a cognition of an entirely different kind.

In the fourth place, it cannot be produced by an external cause (Slambana-pratyayd)) for, according to the Buddhist idealist (Yogacara), there is no external reality at all. How, then, can the Buddhist idealist account for the illusory cognition of silver ? The Yogacara holds that it is produced by a vasana or residuum of silver which, at some time or other, arose in the beginningless series of nescience (avidya)) which, again, had been produced by a yet earlier idea of silver, and so on. Thus the idea of silver is the result of a beginningless series of residua ; and owing to error this subjective idea appears to consciousness as something external. An illusion, therefore, is not produced by an external object in contact with a sense-organ ; but it is simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the external world ; it is a purely subjective hallucination.

Evaluation of Atmakhyati

Jayanta Bhatta offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Atmakhyati :

According to this doctrine, a mere idea appears as the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition ; there is neither a subject apart from ideas, nor an object apart from ideas 5 there is simply a series of ideas or cognitions. Thus, if in an illusion a mere idea is manifested in consciousness, and not an external object, then we would have such a cognition as u I am silver “, and not as ” this is silver “.  Moreover, this doctrine implies Viparitakhyati, inasmuch as, according to this view, an internal or subjective idea is cognized as something different, viz. an external or objective reality. And this doctrine implies Asatkhyati too, since the cognition of externality has no real objective basis, there being no extra-mental reality.

Prabhacandra also criticisze  the doctrine of Atniakhyati . According to him, if all cognitions apprehend only their own forms, and not those of external objects, as the Yogacara holds, there would be no distinction between an illusory cognition and a valid cognition, and con- sequently, there would be neither any sublating cognition nor any sublated cognition. If, again, the forms of illusory cognitions such as silver and the like are not those of external objects, but mere forms of consciousness, then they would be apprehended as such, like the forms of pleasure and pain, and not as something external. And also a person under illusion would exert himself to get the object of illusion, as if it were a subjective momentary cognition, and not an extra-mental reality. If it is urged that an internal momentary cognition is mistaken for an external permanent object owing to the potency of nescience (avidya) then the doctrine of Atmakhyati leads to Viparltakhyati, since the internal form of a momentary cognition appears as an external permanent object. Thus the doctrine of Atmakhyati is untenable.

The arhkara-Vedantist (Vidyaranya) offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Atmakhyati. In the illusion of silver, is the illusory silver devoid of origination, on account of its extra- ordinary nature ? Or does it originate like an ordinary silver ? On the first alternative, it would not be of the nature of an emergent cognition as it really is ; it comes into being, and so it cannot be without an origin. On the second alternative, it must be produced either by a cognition or by an object. It cannot be produced by an object. If it is produced by a cognition, is it produced by a pure cognition or a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause ? It cannot be produced by a pure (visuddha) cognition, as pure cognition constitutes liberation. If it is produced by a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause, is it the same originating cognition which apprehends the silver ? Or is it some other cognition ? The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both being momentary, and hence occupying different points of time, there would be no presentation of silver at all. The second alternative also is impossible. If it is another cognition that apprehends the silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by a non-vitiated cause, as in that case there would be no reason why such a cognition should specially apprehend silver. If, on the other hand, the cognition apprehending the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or it is not silver. It cannot be silver, for, in that case, silver would have causal efficiency and consequently it would have a real existence, which is not admitted by the Yogacara. If silver is not the cause, then it cannot be mani- fested in the illusory cognition. Thus on the doctrine of Atmakhyati the illusory cognition of silver would never come into being.

THE DOCTRINE OF ALAUKIKAKHYATI

Jayanta Bhatta gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyati in Nyayamanjari and says that it is held by a certain Mimamsaka. According to this doctrine, in the illusory cognition of silver it is not a nacre that is the object of the illusory cognition, but it is silver ; but this silver is different from ordinary or laukika silver  it is alaukika or extraordinary silver. Just as the valid cognition of silver has for its object ordinary or laukika silver, so the illusory cognition of silver has for its object extraordinary or alaukika silver. What is the difference between laukika silver and alaukika silver ? Whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be regarded as silver ; but some silver known as an object of consciousness serves our practical purposes (vyavahara-pravartaka) while some other silver does not ; the former is called ordinary or laukika silver, while the latter is called extraordinary or alaukika silver. In the illusory cognition of silver it is an extraordinary or alaukika silver that is the object of the illusion ; it is silver because there is a cognition of silver ; and it is alaukika or extraordinary silver because it does not serve any practical purpose.

Evaluation of Alaukikakhyati

Jayanta Bhatta criticiszes  the doctrine of Alaukikakhyati . He asks, how do you know that there is extraordinary or alaukika silver corresponding to the illusory cognition of silver ? It is an absolutely new and unperceived object. The contradicting perception u this is not silver ” clearly establishes thealaukikatva or extraordinariness of the silver which existed at the time of the illusory cognition.

Hence there is neither silver corresponding to the illusion of silver, nor is it alaukika or extraordinary. So it is not right to hold that whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be silver ; silver is manifested to consciousness in the illusory cognition of silver, though really there is no silver at all at that time and place. Real silver can be known only through the cognition of silver which is not contradicted by any other cognition ?

Moreover, what differentiates an ordinary or laukika object from an extraordinary or alaukika object ? On what does the distinction depend ? Does it depend upon the distinction of our cognitions (pratibhasa-nibandhana] ? Or does it depend upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of our practical purposes (vyavahara- sadasadbhava-nibandhana) ? The first alternative is not tenable ;forsometimes we are conscious of the existence of silver, and some- times of the non-existence of silver ; but we are never conscious of the laukikatva (ordinariness) and alaukikatva (extraordinariness) of silver. The second alternative also cannot be maintained, for what is the meaning of practical use (vyavahara) ? Does it mean the capacity of being an object of thought and speech (jnanabhidhana- svabhava) ? Or does it mean the capacity of producing an effect or action (arthakriya-nirvartana) ? The first view is untenable, because there is no consciousness of laukikatva (ordinariness) or alaukikatva (extraordinariness) of an object. The second view also is not tenable, for, in that case, the woman embraced in a dream would be laukika^ and a jar which is destroyed as soon as it is produced, and as such cannot serve any practical purpose, would be alaukika. Further, he who does not make an effort to pick up silver at the sight of a nacre does so, not because he recognizes the alaukikatva (extra- ordinariness) of the existing silver, but because he understands that there is no silver in reality. If there is alaukika silver as the object of the illusion of silver, why should a person under illusion make an effort to pick it up ? If it is urged that he perceived the alaukika silver as laukika^ then at last the advocate of the doctrine of Alaukika- khyati comes to adopt the view of Anyathakhyati, according to which, one object appears as a different one in an illusion. 1

THE DOCTRINE OF ANIRVACANIYAKHYATI

The Saihncara-Vedantist holds that the object of an illusion is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable (anirvacantya). This is called the doctrine of Anirvacanlyakhyati. According to this doctrine, whatever is manifested in a cognition is the object of that cognition. In the illusory perception of silver, it is silver that appears in consciousness ; so silver must be the object of this illusion. If something else is regarded as the object of this illusion, as the doctrine of Anyathakhyati holds, why should we call this illusion an illusion of silver and not of something else ? So it is silver that is the object of the illusion of silver. But this silver is neither real (sat)) nor unreal (asat)  nor both real and unreal (sadasat)) but it is undefmable (anirvacantya). It cannot be real, for, in that case, the cognition of silver would be valid, and not illusory, and as such would not be contradicted by any sublating cognition. Nor can it be unreal, for, in that case, it would not produce the cognition of silver, and, consequently, it would not lead the person under illusion to exert himself to get hold of silver. Nor can it be both real and unreal, as this supposition would involve both the above difficulties, and further, two contradictory qualities like reality and unreality cannot inhere in one and the same object. Hence the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver must be regarded as undefinable (anirvacamya}}-

The Sarhkarite, therefore, holds that undefinable silver is produced at that time and place and continues as long as the illusion of silver persists. This kind of existence is called by him pratibhasika-satta or apparent existence, which is different from ‘uyavahartka-satta or empirical existence. But what is the use of admitting an undefinable reality to account for an illusion ? An illusory cognition may very well be explained by the doctrine of Anyathakhyati, according to which, an illusion is the misapprehension of one thing as a different thing  for example, the illusion of silver is the misapprehension of a nacre as silver which exists in some other time and place. The Sarhkarite urges that silver existing in some other time and place cannot be an object of perception, since it is not present to the sense-organ and there can be no presentation without a present object. The Neo-Naiyayika argues that the silver existing in some other time and place is brought to conscious- ness by association, and produces the perception of silver by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jnanalaksana-sannikarsa). The Sarhkarite urges that in that case, in the inference of fire from smoke, fire which is not present to the sense-organ might be brought to consciousness by association, and produce the perception of fire by means of an extraordinary inter-course whose character is knowledge (jnana-laksana-sannikarsa] and thus there would be no inference at all.

Besides, what is the meaning of Anyathakhyati ? If it means a cognition of one thing as otherwise, to what does the otherwiseness actually belong ? Does it belong to the cognitive activity (the act of cognizing), or to the result of cognitive activity, i.e. the resulting cognition, or to the object of cognition ? The first alternative is impossible. If the act of cognizing the shell is in the form of silver, then the shell cannot be called the objective substrate of the illusory cognition of silver ; because an object can impart its own form to that cognition by which it is apprehended, and hence the shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition which apprehends silver. The second alternative also is not tenable. The otherwiseness (anyathatva) cannot belong to the result of cognitive activity or the cognition itself, for the cognition does not essentially differ, whether it is true or illusory j the cognition does not appear as something different or otherwise. Nor can the third alternative be maintained. In what sense, can the otherwiseness belong to the object, viz. the shell ? Does it mean that the shell identifies itself with silver ? Or does it mean that the shell transforms itself into the form of silver ? In the first alternative, is the shell absolutely different from silver ? Or are they different and non-different at the same time ? The first view is untenable, since things absolutely different from each other can never identify themselves with each other. The second view also is untenable, for, in that case, such judgments as ” the cow is short-horned ” would be illusory. In the second alternative, if the shell actually transforms itself into the form of silver, then the cognition of silver cannot be sublated as it is the cognition of a real change. If it is urged that the shell actually transforms itself into silver for the time being, i.e. so long as the illusion lasts, then silver would be perceived in the shell also by those who do not suffer from any defect of the sense-organs and the like. Thus the doctrine of Anyathakhyati cannot be stated in an intelligible form. It does not offer a better explanation of an illusion than the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati, according to which an undefinable object is produced at the time of an illusory cognition.

But it may be urged that the object of the illusory cognition of silver cannot be illusory or undefinable silver, inasmuch as the cause of silver (e.g. its different parts) is absent at the time. The Samkarite urges that it is produced by amdya in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver perceived in the past, and revived by the perception of its similarity with a nacre which is in contact with the visual organ impaired by a certain derangement. Hence it cannot be said that illusory silver (pratibhasika rajata) cannot be produced at the time, which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver.

Thus the samkarite argues that an illusion is a presentative cognition, and as such it must be produced by a present object ; and the object of a cognition must be that which appears in consciousness ; it cannot be some other object which does not appear in consciousness. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is the object of the cognition as it appears in consciousness ; and that silver must be present at that time and place, when and where the illusion is produced ; otherwise the illusion would not be a presentative cognition. Thus the illusion of silver has silver for its object which is produced then and there and continues as long as the illusion lasts. But this silver cannot be real, as in that case the cognition of silver would not be illusory. It cannot be unreal, as in that case there would be no cognition of silver and consequently no activity for the appropriation of silver. Nor can it be real and unreal both, as it involves self- contradiction. Hence it must be undependable.

Evaluation of Dnirvacamyakhyati

Ramariuja contends that even the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati cannot avoid Anyathakhyati, which it seeks to refute. The very assumption of an undefinable existence to account for an illusion implies that one thing appears as another, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. If an undefinable object were apprehended as undefinable at the time of the illusory cognition, then the cognition would not be illusory, and hence It would not be contradicted by a subsequent cognition. If it is urged that the undefinable object of an illusion does not appear as undefinable so long as the illusion lasts, but subsequently It Is known to be undefinable by rational reflection, then also the doctrine of Anirvacamyakhyati leads to Anyathakhyati, as an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. Moreover, the doctrine of Anyathakhyati can adequately explain all the facts connected with an illusion, viz. illusory cognition, activity consequent upon an illusion, and the subsequent sublating cognition. What, then, is the use of supposing an undefinable object which is absolutely unperceived and groundless ? Even if we admit that an undefinable object is produced at the time of the corresponding illusion, what is its cause ? In the illusory cognition of silver what is the cause of the undefinable silver which is the object of the illusion ? The cognition of silver cannot originate the undefinable silver, for there cannot be the cognition of silver before origination of the silver. It is absurd to argue that at first a cognition arises without any object, and then this objectless cognition produces the undefinable silver and makes it an object of apprehension. Nor can it be argued that a certain defect in the sense-organs is the cause of the illusory silver ; for a defect abiding in the knowing person cannot produce an effect in an outward object. Nor can the sense-organs, apart from defects, give rise to the illusory silver, for the sense-organs are the causes of cognitions only, and not of the objects of cognitions. Nor can the sense-organs deranged by a certain defect originate the illusory silver ; for they also can produce peculiar modifications only in the cognitions produced by them, but not in the objects of those cognitions. Nor can a beginningless nescience (avidya] be the cause of the illusory silver, for the doctrine of nescience does not stand to reason. Ramanuja has brought seven charges against the Sanhkarite doctrine of nescience (avidya).”

THE DOCTRINE OF SATKHYATI

The Ramanujist holds that an illusory perception has a real object (sat) for its objective substrate. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre the silver that is manifested to consciousness is a real object, for an unreal object can never be apprehended. Otherwise, why is it that only silver is apprehended in a nacre, and not a jar, or a cloth, or some other thing ? It cannot be argued that silver is apprehended owing to its similarity with the nacre, inasmuch as the similarity of the nacre with silver would revive the subconscious impression of silver, and thus produce the recollection of silver, but would never produce the perception of silver. It is real silver that is the object of the illusory perception of silver. But how is it real ? All objects of the world are produced by triplication or quintuplication (pancikarana) of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, so that everything exists everywhere in the form of its elements. Hence silver in which the element of fire predominates exists in part in the nacre in which the element of earth predominates.

Moreover  there is a law that an object is similar to that object which contains the parts of the latter. According to this law, a nacre which is similar to silver must contain the parts of silver. Thus in the illusory” perception of silver in a nacre., silver must exist in part in the nacre. But, then, why is the perception of silver in a nacre called illusory ? It is called illusory, not because silver does not exist even in part in the nacre, but because in the nacre the parts of silver are much less than those of the nacre, and they do not serve our practical purposes. Thus every illusory perception has a real object for its objective substrate. This is the doctrine of Satkhyati.

Evaluation of Satkhyati

According to the Ramanujist, all cognitions are real ; even an illusory cognition has a real object for its objective substrate. Thus the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. The samkarite also holds that the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. But, according to the Samkarite, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver has only apparent or illusory existence (pratibhasika-satta)^ while according to the Ramanujist, it has real or ontological existence (paramarthika- satta). But if the object of an illusion has real existence, how can we perceive water in a desert ? It is true that a part of water does exist in earth on account of triplication or quintuplication of the subtle elements. But the distinctive character of water does not exist in a particular earthy substance produced by triplication or quintuplication of the elements. Even if the distinctive character of water exists in the part of water which constitutes a part of that substance, it is not capable of being perceived. Triplication or quintuplication is such a combination of the elements that they cannot be separated. Before triplication or quintuplication the elements are subtle and imperceptible after triplication or quintuplication also the part of water alone cannot be perceived in the earthy substance. Moreover, it does not stand to reason that the elements of water in the earthy substance, though subtle, are perceived from a distance, but they cannot be perceived by those who are near it. The Ramanujist says that fire and earth are not perceived owing to a certain defect of the peripheral organ, and water is perceived owing to demerit (adrsta). But this is no argument.

For the same reason it is wrong to hold that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre because silver really exists in the nacre in the form of the elements of fire, which enter into three-fold or five-fold combination to constitute the nacre. Moreover, why are the elements of fire in the nacre perceived as silver alone ? They might as well be perceived as lightning, the sun, and other fiery objects, because the elements of fire are common to all these objects before combination. It cannot be said that certain particles of the fire (teias) which, by triplication or quintuplication, are transformed into silver, are combined and are perceived in the nacre, for there is no proof of their existence. It cannot be said that the cognition of silver is the proof of their existence, for it would involve a vicious circle. The existence of silver in the nacre would depend upon the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object ; and the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object would depend upon the existence of a part of silver in the nacre. It cannot be said that the existence of a part of silver in the nacre is proved by the perception of similarity of the nacre with silver. The nacre is similar to silver because it is endowed with those qualities which are common to itself and silver, viz. brightness and the like, and not because it contains a part of silver ; there is no law of nature that an object must contain a part of another object with which it has similarity.

If the clothes and ornaments of Caitra are similar to those of Devadatta, Devadatta may mistake the clothes and ornaments of Caitra for his own. But the parts of the clothes and ornaments of Devadatta do not interpenetrate into the clothes and ornaments of Caitra. Hence the doctrine of Satkhyati is groundless.

THE DOCTRINE OF SADASATKHYATI

This doctrine is held by the Samkhya. Kapila criticizes all the rival doctrines of illusion and establishes his own doctrine.  And Aniruddha explains his arguments. The Madhyarnika holds that some-thing non-existent, e.g. the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver, appears in consciousness in the illusory perception ” this is silver “. This is wrong, for a non-existent object can neither lead to action nor produce a cognition, e.g. the horns of a man.  Prabhakara holds that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” there are two cognitions :

(i) the perception of ” this ” present to the visual organ, and

(2) the recollection of ” silver ” ; and non-discrimination of these two cognitions from each other leads to action.

This also is wrong, for apprehension of non-difference or identity is found to lead to action, and the illusory perception ” this is silver ” is contradicted by the sublating cognition ” this is not silver “, while a valid cognition can never be contradicted.  The Samkarite holds that the objective substrate of the illusory perception ” this is silver ” is neither real nor unreal nor both ; if it were unreal, there would be no immediate or presentative cognition j if it were real, there would be no sublating cognition ; and it cannot be both as it is self- contradictory ; hence the object of the illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both, but it is undefmable. This also is wrong, for the illusory perception, in the present case, is defined as ” this is silver “.

The Naiyayika holds that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” it is a nacre that appears in consciousness as a piece of silver. This also is wrong, because it is against experience that one object

should appear in consciousness as another object.

Hence the Samkhya concludes that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” the cognition of ” this ” is real (sat) and the cognition -of ” silver ” is unreal (asat). The cognition of ” this ” has for its object an object present to the visual organ ; so it is real. The cognition of ” silver ” has for its object ” silver ” which is not present to the visual organ  and it is contradicted by a sublating cognition ; so it is unreal. So an illusion apprehends both a real object (sat) and an unreal object (asat}. This is Aniruddha’s interpretation of the doctrine of Sadasatkhyati. Vijnanabhiksu says that in the illusory perception ” this is silver ” the silver that appears in consciousness is real (sat), since it exists in the shop of a silver-merchant, and it is unreal (asat)> since it is falsely ascribed to a nacre.

THE DOCTRINE OF PRASIDDHARTHAKHYATI

According to this doctrine, a non-existent thing is not the object of an illusory cognition, but a really existent object established by knowledge ; for example, water is the object of the illusion of water,and when the illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, then the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun.

Evaluation of Prasiddharthakhyati

This theory, too, is untenable. If all cognitions were true representations of their objects, there would be no difference between a valid cognition and an illusion, all cognitions would be equally-valid. And a person having an illusory cognition of water and acting upon it would feel the wetness of the ground, etc., which are the effects of water though water itself may be absent, because the effect of water is not momentary like the flash of lightning. And if all cognitions are equally valid, no cognition can be contradicted by another cognition. But it is a fact of experience that some cognitions are contradicted by other cognitions. Hence the doctrine of Prasiddharthakhyati is untenable.

THE DOCTRINE OF VIVEKAKHYATI OR SMRITIPRAMOSA

Prabhakara’s doctrine of Vivekakhyati (non-discrimination) is sometimes called Akhyati (non-apprehension). But in order to distinguish this doctrine from that of Akhyati described above we prefer to call it by the name of Vivekakhyati. According to Prabhakara, whatever is manifested to consciousness must be the object of that consciousness ; and hence there can be no apprehension of an object as a different thing ; there can be no Anyathakhyati or misapprehension. What is the object of the illusion of silver, according to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati ? Is it silver existing in some other time and place ? Or is it a nacre which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver ? Or is it the nacre itself in its own true form ?

The first alternative implies Asatkhyati. If silver existing in some other time and place is the object of the illusion of silver, then silver which does not exist at present becomes the object of the illusory cognition, and thus something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Hence Anyathakhyati implies Asatkhyati.

The second alternative is unintelligible. If a nacre, which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver, is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver, then is there an apprehension of a nacre or an apprehension of silver ? If the former, then there is no illusion, as a nacre is perceived as a nacre. If the latter, then there is no proof of the existence of the nacre there, which is manifested as silver in consciousness. It cannot be said that the nacre is known by the sublating cognition u this is not silver ” ; because the object of the illusion of silver cannot be established by some other cognition. A sublating cognition merely establishes the non-existence of the object of the sublated illusion  it does not ascertain the object of the illusory cognition.

The third alternative also cannot be maintained. It cannot be held that a nacre is the object of the illusion of silver. For, in that case, everything present at the time of the cognition, e.g. the proximate piece of land, etc.., would be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition. 1 Hence Prabhakara concludes that whatever is manifested in a cognition must be regarded as the object of that cognition. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is manifested in consciousness ; so silver must be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition of silver. It is foolish to regard a nacre as the object of the illusion of silver.

We have already found that according to Prabhakara, there are two elements in an illusory cognition. It is made up of a presentative element and a representative element which are not discriminated from each other as long as the illusion lasts. This lack of discrimination between the two elements is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element involved in an illusion. In the illusory cognition ” this is silver “, ” this ” is not identical with ” silver “, as the doctrine of Anyathakhyati holds, ” this ” is nothing but ” this ” which is per- ceived, and ” silver ” is nothing but ” silver ” which is remembered ; ” this ” is one thing (e.g. brightness, etc.), and ” silver ” is quite a different thing. The distinction between these two is recognized when there is the so-called sublative cognition c * this is not silver “. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition ? Prabhakara holds that the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to smritlpramosa or obscuration of memory.

Evaluation of Vivekakhyati

Prabhakara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative elements which cannot be discriminated from each other owing to obscuration of memory. But when the illusion is contradicted by a sublative cognition the presentative element is discriminated from the representative element. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre in the form ” this is silver “, there is a presentation of ” this ” and there is a representation or reproduction of silver in memory, which are not distinguished from each other. But the Naiyayika urges that in the illusion of silver there is an actual perception or presentation of silver  in this process we do actually feel that we are perceiving silver. But Prabhakara tries to explain away this fact of experience. He cannot account for the fact that as long as the illusion of silver lasts, there is an actual presentation or perception of silver, and not a mere representation of silver. He cannot give a satisfactory account of the so-called non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element in an illusion. He cannot also explain the nature of the so-called smrtlpramosa or obscuration of memory.

Let us consider these in detail.

In the first place, Prabhakara holds that when we have the illusion of silver in a nacre the sense-organ does not come in contact with real silver ; so there is no presentation of silver, but only a representation of silver. In the illusion ” this is silver ” there are two elements, a presentation of ” this ” and a representation of ” silver “, which are not discriminated from each other at the time.

But the Naiyayika and the Vedantist contend that we are conscious of silver as something presented to consciousness ” here and now ” and not as something perceived in the past and remembered now.  Nor can it be said that there is only a presentation of ” this ” and not of ” silver “, for we have a direct and immediate knowledge of both u this ” and ” silver ” at the same time  so both of them are directly presented to consciousness or perceived at present. Gaiigesa and his followers hold that in the illusion ” this is silver ” both the elements ” this ” and ” silver ” are perceived, the first through the ordinary intercourse between the visual organ and its object, and the second through the extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge {jnana~lak$ana~sannlkar$a)

In the second place, what does Prabhakara mean by non- discrimination ? So long as an illusion lasts there is no apprehension of non-discrimination of its presentative factor from its representative factor. It is apprehended, if at all, when it is sublated. But as a matter of fact, the subsequent sublative cognition testifies to the  immediate consciousness of ” this is silver ” at the time of the illusory perception, rather than non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element. Moreover, non-discrimination at the time of an illusion cannot induce exertion in the person under illusion to appropriate or avoid the illusory object. In the illusion ” this is silver ” what moves a person to action ? Is it the actual perception and the recollection together or either of the two ? If the former, then do the two psychoses operate together or in succession ? The first of these latter alternatives is inadmissible, since presentation and representation being distinct psychoses cannot occur at the same time. If the two cognitions are successive, the former can have no casual efficiency with regard to the person’s action, since the latter intervenes between the two. Nor can it be said that either psychosis by itself moves the person to action ; for the particular action follows neither from the perception of ” this ” nor from the recollection of ” silver ”  but from the direct and immediate apprehension of ” this is silver “. Thus mere non- discrimination cannot account for exertion induced by an illusion.

In the third place, what is the meaning of smrtipramosa or obscuration of memory ? If it means the absence of memory, then there cannot be a reproduction of silver perceived in the past, and it cannot differ from swoon in which there is no memory. If it means the consciousness of memory not as memory, but as something opposed to it, viz., perception, then the doctrine of smrtipramosa would imply Anyathakhyati. If it means the apprehension of a past object as present, then also it would imply Anyathakhyati. If it means the blending of perception with recollection in such a way that the two psychoses cannot be distinguished from each other, then what is the meaning of blending ? Does it mean the appre- hension of the two different psychoses as non-different or identical ? Or does it mean the actual blending of the two different psychoses ? The first alternative leads to Anyathakhyati. The second alternative is impossible, for two physical things can blend with each other as milk and water, but two psychoses cannot blend with each other. Thus the doctrine of smrtipramosa is unintelligible.

THE DOCTRINE OF ANYATHAKHYATI

According to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati, an object is apprehended as a different object in an illusion which is not a sum of two psychical processes perception and recollection but a single psychosis of a perceptual character. When we perceive silver in a nacre, we perceive in the nacre only the common qualities of nacre and silver, and not the peculiar qualities of the nacre ; the perception of similarity revives the idea of the peculiar qualities of silver in memory ; and the reproduction of silver in memory produces the perception of silver, and so we have an illusory perception ” this is silver “.

Jayanta Bhatta refutes Prabhakara’s objections to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati in the following manner :

First, Prabhakara has urged : What is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver ? Is it silver existing in some other time and place ? Or is it a nacre that conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver ? Or is it a nacre in itself ? He has urged that the first alternative implies Asatkhyati or apprehension of a non-existent object as existent. The Naiyayika replies that silver is not non-existent ; but it does exist in some other time and place. There is a difference between an absolutely non-existent thing (e.g. a sky- flower, etc.) and an object not existing ” here and now “, but in some other time and place. The former is never an object of consciousness, while the latter is an object of consciousness.

Secondly, Prabhakara has urged that the second alternative is absurd and unintelligible. The Naiyayika replies that the nacre is said to conceal its own form, since we do not perceive its peculiar features (e.g. triangularity, etc.), and it Is said to assume the form of silver, since we remember the distinctive features of silver.

Thirdly, Prabhakara has urged that the third alternative also is unreasonable. One object can never be apprehended as a different one \ for, In that case, whatever is present to the sense-organ at the time of the illusory perception of silver would be regarded as the substrate of that illusion. The Naiyayika replies that he does not mean that whatever is present to the sense-organ is the object of consciousness, so that the piece of land before the eyes may be regarded asthe object of consciousness. What he means is that the nacre is the cause of the illusion of silver ; it is not an object of the illusory perception of silver. So all the charges of Prabhakara against Anyathakhyati are groundless,

References

History of Indian Logic, by S. C. Vidyabhusan (1921),

Indian Logic and Atomism , by A. B. Keith (1921).

Kiranavall of Udayana (Benares, 1885 and 1887).

Nylyamanjari of Jayanta. (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).

Nyaya Sutra of Gautama (Jlvananda’s edition, Calcutta, 1919).

Prameyakamalamartanda of Prabhacandra Bombay, 1912

Samkhyapravacanabhlsya (Benares, 1909).

The Sadholal Lectures on Nyaya by Dr. Ganganstha Jha on Indian Thought),

Samkhyasiitravrtti of Aniruddha (B.L,

Vivaranaprameyasarngralia of Madhavacarya Vidyaranya (V.S.S,, Benares, 1893).

Ramanuja’s Bhasya on Brahma Sutra.

Tarkikaraksa of Varadaraia (Benares, 1003),

Yogabliasya of Vyasa (Benares, 191 1).

Yoga Sutra of Patanjali (Benares, 191 1).

 

 

 

 

 

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ILLUSIONS – Indian Psychology Explanation

 

Dr. V.K.Maheshwari, M.A. (Socio, Phil) B.Sc. M. Ed, Ph.D.

Former Principal, K.L.D.A.V.(P.G) College, Roorkee, India

Mrs Sudha Rani Maheshwari, M.Sc (Zoology), B.Ed.

Former Principal, A.K.P.I.College, Roorkee, India


The writer must believe that what he is doing is the most important thing in the world. And he must hold to this illusion even when he knows it is not true.
John Steinbeck

Indian philosophers treat psychology always as the basis of epistemology and ontology , and their psychological analysis is sometimes coloured by their meta-physical presuppositions.   The treatment of Indian philosophers of illusory perceptions is more psychological than physiological. And their psychological analysis of illusory perception is closely allied with the determination of its epistemological value and ontological basis. They do not give an exhaustive classification of the different kinds of illusions with reference to all the sense-organs. But still they give a psychological classification of the principal types of illusions.

The different schools of Indian philosophers have tackled the problem of illusion in different ways. They give us slightly different accounts about its psychological nature. There is a hot controversy among them about its ontological basis and their polemics against one another exhibit their wonderful power of psychological analysis and rare meta- physical acumen.

kinds of Illusions

Samkara Mis’ra and Jayasimhasuri  divides illusions into two kinds

:( 1)-Anulhuyamanaropa- those which consist in false ascription of an actually perceived object to another object present to a sense-organ (anulhuyamanaropa) . They illustrates the first kind of illusion by the illusory perception of the double moon. They explains it in the following manner. When we press the eye-ball with a finger, the moon appears to be double  but before the eye-ball was pressed the moon appeared to be single, and after the pressing has ceased the moon appears to be single. And sometimes the illusion of the double moon is due to the excess of darkness (timira) within the eye-ball, which bifurcates the ray of light issuing out of the eye-ball. In this illusion an object revived in memory is not falsely ascribed to an object present to a sense- organ.

(2) Smaryamanaropa-  those which consist in false ascription of an object revived in memory to another object present to a sense-organ (smaryamanaropa}.The illusions of the second kind are produced by the sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions, like recognition. They cannot be produced by the sense-organs alone ; nor can they be produced by subconscious impressions alone ; they are produced by both taken together. For instance, the illusory perception of silver in a nacre is produced by the visual organ in contact with the nacre, in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of brightness of the nacre, which it has in common with silver.

Jayanta Bhatta divides illusory perceptions into two kinds,  Indriyaja bhranti (Illusion) and Manasi Ihranti (Hallucination):

(1) Indriyaja bhranti Illusion- Those which are produced by the peripheral organs,

They are peripherally excited. They are produced by some defects in the external stimuli, or by some defects in the peripheral organs. They are never without objective substrates as they are always produced by external stimuli (salambana}.

(2) Manasi bhranti – Those which are produced by the central organ or mind (manasa].  They are centrally excited.They are produced by some defects in the central organ or mind. They are always without objective substrates,as they are never produced by external stimuli (niralambana}.

Jayanta Bhatta illustrates these different kinds of illusory perceptions. The illusory perceptions of silver in a nacre, and of a sheet of water in the rays of the sun reflected on sands in a desert are illusions due to defects in the external stimuli (visaya-dosa). The illusory perceptions of bitter sugar, double moon and a mass of hair are illusions due to defects in the peripheral organs (indriya-dosa).

All these are illusions, have no external stimuli ; they are independent of the peripheral organs ; they are solely of mental origin ; they are due to some defects in the mind (manodosa or antahkarana-dosa}.  For example, when a lover is overpowered by stormy passion awakened by pangs of separation, he perceives the semblance of his beloved lady near him, though she is far away. illusions are due to the recollection of objects distant in time and space owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions.

Dreams also are illusions due to revival of subconscious impressions left by previous perceptions ; they are excited by the mind overcome by drowsiness. Thus in hallucinations the forms which appear in consciousness are mostly memory-images owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions.

There are numerous forms of Hallucinations:

Sadrsa Vijnana- When awakened by similar cognitions

Kamasokadt- Because of strong passions, e.g. lust, grief, etc.

Taddarsanabhyasa- Sometimes by the habitual perception of these objects.

Nidra-Because of drowsiness.

Cinta-Sometimes by constant thinking.

Dhatunam vikrtih- Sometimes by perversion of the bodily humours

Adrsta-(i.e. merit or demerit)  Where there are no other causes.

Sridhara also divides illusory perceptions into peripherally excited illusions and centrally excited illusions or hallucinations. He divides the former again into indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) illusions and determinate (savikalpaka) illusions. Indeterminate illusions contain only presentative elements ; they are due to pathological disorders

(1)-Peripherally excited illusions of the peripheral organs alone.Devided further into two forms:

a-(Nirvikalpaka) illusions- indeterminate, contain only presentative elements ; they are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs alone For example, when we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow, the illusion is purely presentative in character, and is produced by the visual organ perverted by pre-ponderance of the bilious humour..

b-(Savikalpaka) illusions- determinate Determinate illusions contain both presentative and representative elements ; they are produced by the peripheral organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions – For example, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, the illusion is produced by the perverted visual organ in contact with the nacre in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver. Here the illusory perception contains both presentative and representative elements , the presentative element (idam) is produced by the perverted visual organ, and the representative element (rajatam) by the subconscious impression. But the illusion is perceptual in character, though it contains presentative and representative elements  hence it is produced by the perverted visual organ in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver.

Sridhara points out that these illusions are produced by external stimuli which have certain features in common with those objects which are manifested in illusory perceptions ; this similarity between the real objects or external stimuli (e.g. nacre) and the illusory objects (e.g. silver) appearing in consciousness is the cause of these illusions. But hallucinations are not peripherally excited ; they arise solely from some derangement of the mind or the central sensory. Hallucinations never arise out of the perception of similarity which is not possible in these cases, since there are no external stimuli to excite them. For instance, when a man is infatuated with love for a woman he perceives the semblance of his beloved, here, there, and everywhere, though there is no objective stimulus. Hallucinations are illusory perceptions because in them absent objects appear in consciousness as present.

2- Centrally excited illusions -  . In centrally excited illusions , there are no external stimuli ; so they cannot be produced by the perception of the common features of two objects and the recollection of the peculiar features of one of the two. In illusions there is no perception of external objects, but only a perception of those objects which are reproduced in memory andprojected into the external world. Recollection alone is the cause of hallucinations, while perception and recollection both are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.

Thus both these kinds of illusions consist in false ascription of memory-images (smaryamanaropa). The former consist in the projection of memory-images into the external world. The latter consist in the superimposition of memory-images on external objects actually perceived. Thus the above two divisions of illusions are not mutually exclusive. But they are based on two different principles.

Causes of Illusions

Illusory perceptions are due to some defects (dosa) in the conditions of perception, or to wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (asamprayoga) or to subconscious impressions (samskara).

(i) Illusory perceptions are produced by defects in any condition of perception– Ordinarily, sense-perception is produced by several conditions taken together. It requires an external object of perception and sometimes an external medium of perception, e.g. light in the case of visual perception. Then it requires an external sense-organ through which the object is perceived, and also the central organ or mind without the help of which the peripheral organs cannot operate on their objects. And in internal perception the mind alone is the channel of perception. Besides these, the self is involved in every act of perception ; it is the self which perceives an object through the senses. These are the conditions of sense-perception.

(ii) Illusions are due to defects in the external stimuli or objects (visaya-dosa)) e.g. similarity (sadrsya) movement (calatva)  distance (duratva) etc. For instance, we perceive a nacre as a piece of silver (sukttka-rajata) a rope as a owing to similarity between the two in each case. Again, the rapid movement of a fire- brand in a circle produces the illusion of a circle (alatacakra). But when it is moved slowly it cannot produce the illusion of a circle.

(iii) Illusions are due to the movement of the conveyance (lahyasraya-dosa) in which we travel. For instance, when we move in a railway train the train moves and we also move along with it, but the trees and other objects around us appear to be moving.

(iv) Illusions are due to defects in the external medium of perception (e.g. alokamalimasatva]. For instance, when the light is dim or dirty, we sometimes mistake one object for another.

(v) Illusions are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs (bahyendriya-dosa). For instance, when the visual organ is affected by jaundice or preponderance of bile, we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow (pita-sankha}. Or when the eye-ball is pressed with a finger, the moon appears to be double (dvicandra).

(vi) Illusions are clue to pathological disorders of the bodily humours (adhyatmagatadosa) e.g. the flatulent humour, the bilious humour, and the phlegmatic humour. For instance, pillars of fire are seen owing to provocation of the bodily humours.

(vii) Illusions are due to defects in the central sensory or mind (antdhkarana-dosa or mano-dosa). For instance, when the mind is overpowered by the predominance of rajas or tamas we have illusory perceptions. When the mind is overpowered by strong emotion or passion we have illusory perceptions. A man infatuated with love for a woman, sees the semblance of his beloved here, there, and everywhere. When the mind is overpowered by drowsiness, we have illusory perceptions in the form of dreams.

(viii) Illusions are due to defects in the self (pramatr-dosa). For instance, when the self is affected by strong desire, aversion, hunger, rage, etc., we have illusory perceptions.

Prasastapada says that an illusory perception consists in the misapprehension of one object as another object, both of which were perceived in the past with their peculiar characters, and it is due to three causes :

(1)Wrong apprehension by a peripheral organ perverted by provocation of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours .

(2) The mind-soul-contact depending upon the sub-conscious impression left by the previous cognition of an absent object ; and

(3) Demerit (adharma) ; as, for example, the illusory perception of a horse in a cow. Here Prasastapada refers to peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.

Sources of illusions

Dharmottara describes four sources of illusions, e.g. disorders of the peripheral organs, disturbances in the external stimuli, movement of the conveyance in which we travel, and disorders of the bodily humours. According to him, all these different causes of illusions must involve a derangement of the sense-organs. There can be no ” sense-illusions ” unless there are ” sense-disorders “.

Thus some illusions are due to some defects in the various conditions of perception. This condition of illusions is emphasized in the philosophy of Nyaya-Vaisesika.

In the second place, illusory perceptions are produced by wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (asamprayoga}. This condition of illusions is mentioned by the Bhatta Mimariisakas. Right perception depends upon right inter- course between the sense-organs and their objects (satsamprayoga], It requires a real object (sat), and right intercourse between this object and the proper sense-organ (samprayoga). If there is no real object and still we have perceptual experience, the perception is illusory. In dreams there are no real objects or external stimuli, but still we have illusory perceptions of various objects. So dreams should be regarded as hallucinations. If, in spite of the presence of a real object, there is wrong intercourse between it and the proper sense-organ, we have illusory perception. For instance, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, there is wrong intercourse between the visual organ and the nacre. Right perception depends upon the intercourse of that object with the proper sense-organ, which is manifested in consciousness. When one object is in contact with a sense-organ, but another object appears in consciousness, the perception is illusory. For instance, when a nacre is in contact with a visual organ, but a piece of silver appears in consciousness the perception is illusory. Thus right perception depends upon right operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects, and illusory perception depends upon wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects. This condition of illusions, viz. asamprayoga  emphasized by the Mimarhsakas, is included in visaya-dosa and indriya-dosa mentioned by the Nyaya-Vaisesika.

In the third place, illusory perceptions are produced by subconscious impressions (samskara]. We have already found that subconscious impressions are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. For example, when a nacre is in contact with the visual organ, we sometimes perceive only its brightness which is common to both nacre and silver, and the perception of this brightness revives the subconscious impression of silver, and the visual organ in co-operation with this subconscious impression produces the illusory perception of silver.

Thus subconscious impressions in co-operation with the peripheral organs produce those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.  We have also found that centrally excited illusions or hallucinations are due to subconscious impressions alone. For example, a lover infatuated with love for a woman sees his beloved near him, though she is far away. Here the subconscious impression of the woman is revived by the strong passion of love and invades the field of consciousness ; the memory-image of the woman distant in time and space appears like a woman actually perceived here and now.

Srldhara explains the functions of the peripheral organs and sub-conscious impressions in producing these kinds of illusions. He asks : When we mistake a cow for a horse, what is the cause of non-apprehension of the distinctive character of a cow ; and what is the cause of apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ ? He says that the visual organ cannot apprehend the distinctive character of a cow, though it is in contact with a cow, because it is perverted by the disorders of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours. But how can the perverted sense-organ produce apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ ? Can it produce apprehension of absent objects ? If so, then it can produce apprehension of any absent object whatsoever at any time, and thus there will be nothing to determine the appearance of particular objects in consciousness in illusory perceptions.

Srldhara points out that the perverted sense-organ brings about apprehension of an absent object only in co-operation with the mind-soul-contact which depends upon the subconscious impression of an absent object. Though the visual organ is in contact with a cow, it cannot apprehend the object as a cow because it is perverted by disorders of the bodily humours. But still it apprehends the individual as endowed with those features which are common to cows and horses. The perception of similarity revives the subconscious impression of a horse ; and this subconscious impression being revived brings about the recollection of a horse ; and this recollection of a horse, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the perceptual experience of a horse, in contact with the visual organ because of the similarity between a cow and a horse. Thus any absent object cannot appear in consciousness at any time in the presence of any object in contact with a perverted sense-organ

Similarity between a present object and an absent object, and the subconscious impression of the latter revived by the perception of similarity determine the appearance of a particular absent object in an illusory perception. Hence, the perverted sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions produce certain illusory perceptions.

Psychological Analysis of an Illusion

A centrally excited illusion or hallucination is solely due to revival of subconscious impressions. A peripherally excited illusion which contains only presentative elements is due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs. So these two kinds of illusions are simple psychoses. But a peripherally excited illusion which contains both presentative and representative elements is complex in character. It is due to the peripheral organs and subconscious impressions. This kind of illusion has been analysed by different schools of Indian thinkers in slightly different ways.

Let us consider the illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Is it a single psychosis ? Or is it a combination of two psychoses ? If it is a single psychosis, what is its nature ?

Prabhakara’s Analysis

Prabhakara holds that in an illusion there are two elements, an element of perception or presentation and an element of recollection or representation. When we perceive a nacre as silver, we perceive only the common qualities of nacre and silver, viz. brightness and the like, and the common qualities which are perceived in the nacre revive the idea of silver in memory by association. Thus in the illusion of silver in a nacre there is the perception of brightness and the like, and the recollection of silver. But so long as the illusion lasts we do not distinguish the presentative element from the representative element. Thus an illusion is made up of a presentative element and a representative element, in which there is no discrimination of the two factors from each other. This non-discrimination (vivekakhyati) of the presentative element from the representative element is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition (badhaka-jnana) does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition Prabhakara holds that we cannot discriminate the representative element from the presentative element, because the former docs not appear in consciousness as representation or memory owing to smrtipramosa or obscuration of memory.

(ii) The Nyaya-vaisesika analysis

According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, an illusion is a single psychosis of a presentative or perceptual character. In the illusion of silver in a nacre at first we perceive those qualities of the nacre which are common to both silver and nacre, e.g. brightness, etc., but we do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the nacre owing to the perversion of the visual organ ; then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar qualities of silver by association. So far the Nyaya-Vaisesika agrees with Prabhakara. But according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the recollection of silver, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the perception of silver, in contact with the visual organ ; the illusion of silver is perceptual in character  it is experienced as a direct perception, and not as a recollection. If we regard an illusion as a mere reproduction of past experience, then we miss its distinctive psychological character.

According to the Neo-Naiyayika, the visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association as we have already seen. Here there is no contact of the visual organ with actual silver ; there is no ordinary intercourse (laukika sanmkarsa] between the sense-organ and its object. But there is an extraordinary inter-course (alaukika sanmkarsa)^ by means of which the idea of silver reproduced in memory by association produces the visual perception of silver. This is called the extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jnana-laksana-sannikarsa).

(iii) The Samkara-Vedantists Analysis

According to the Vedantist, an illusion is a presentative process. The Sankara- Vedantist explains the illusion of silver in a nacre in the following manner. At first the visual organ perverted by certain pathological disorders comes in contact with the nacre which is present to the sense-organ, and brings about a mental mode in the form of ” this ” or ” brightness “. Then the object-consciousness determined by ” this ” is reflected in the mental mode, so that the mental mode streaming out of the sense-orifice, the object- consciousness (yisaya-caitanya) determined by ” this “, the mental consciousness (or consciousness determined by the mental mode) in the form of ” this ” (vrtti-caitanya\ and the logical subject- consciousness (pramatr-caitanya) are identified with one another. Then there is produced avldyd or nescience in the form of nacre , this avidya exists in the object-consciousness which has been identified with the subject-consciousness. This avidya in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of the common features, e.g. brightness and the like, and with the help of the peripheral disorders, is transformed into illusory silver (pratibhasika rajata\ on the one hand, and the illusory perception of silver (rajatajnanathasa) on the other.  Stripped of all epistemological and metaphysical implications, the Sarhkarite’s analysis of an illusion is exactly the same as that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika from the psychological point of view. According to both, an illusion is a simple psychosis of a presentative character. According to both, an illusion is produced by a sense-organ vitiated by a certain derangement in co-operation with a subconscious impression revived by the perception of similarity. They do not differ in their psychological analysis of an illusion, though they differ in their epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of illusion, which we shall consider later on.

Illusion (viparyaya) and Doubtful Perception (samsaya]

Udayana says that both an illusion (viparyaya) and a doubtful perception (samsaya) are not produced by the corresponding objects (anarthaja) ; but the former is definite (mkayatmaka} while the latter is indefinite (anise ay atmaka}. An illusion is a false perception of a definite character in the waking condition.

Jayanta Bhatta points out that an illusion differs from a doubtful perception both in its nature and in its origin. Firstly, in an illusion one object is definitely perceived as another object, e.g. a post as aman, or a man as a post ; while in a doubtful perception the mind wavers between two alternatives, sometimes touching the one, and sometimes touching the other. Thus an illusion is a definite, false perception, while a doubtful perception is an indefinite, or un- certain, false perception. Secondly, an illusion springs from the recollection of the peculiar qualities of one object (e.g. silver, or water) which is suggested by the perception of the common quality in another object (e.g. nacre, or the rays of the sun)  while a doubtful perception springs from the recollection of the peculiar qualities of two objects (e.g. a post and a man) which are suggested by the perception of their common quality (e.g. tallness).

References

History of Indian Logic, by S. C. Vidyabhusan (1921

Indian Logic and Atomism , by A. B. Keith (1921).

Kiranavall of Udayana (Benares, 1885 and 1887).

Nyayatltparyadipika of Jayasimhasuri (B.I., 1910)

Nylyamanjari of Jayanta. (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).

Nyayakandali of Srldhara (V.S.S., Benares, 1895).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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